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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to show that Hume's 1752 essay "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously in the sense that 
Hume wrote this essay in the hope that the republican form of govern­
ment it describes and recommends, a republican form of government
"modelled with masterly skill" (Essays 528), would one day be estab-
•]lished in Britain. Now this is not at all a fashionable position to 
take with respect to this essay of Hume's. As far as I know, only 
three scholars have taken the Perfect Commonwealth to be a practicable
possibility for Hume: John Plamenatz, John Robertson, and J. B
2Stewart. The large majority, however, deny this. For example, 
Shirley Letwin tells us that Hume wrote "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" because he thought it would be "amusing to see if one could
3sketch a better mode [ of perfect government] than Harrington 's." 
David Miller has no doubt that, for Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" was "an idle curiosity" and not a "practical advocacy of
4change" , while Frederick Whelan labels this essay a "speculative
exercise" on the part of Hume, a piece of "abstract republicanism."
According to Whelan, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" was, for Hume,
5"almost a ~jeu d'esprit." And Annette Baier doubts whether Hume "was 
...sure that it [i .e the Perfect Commonwealth] could be tried ing
Britain." Others (Nicholas Phillipson, Duncan Forbes, Donald
Livingston) do not tell us directly that Hume did not intend "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth" to have a serious place in his thought. But by 
attributing to him ideas and positions which, for one reason or
another, make it impossible to take this essay seriously, they can also 
be seen as holding that Hume wrote "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" as
7an amusement or as a speculative exercise. Thus, in arguing that
Hume wrote "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" in order that it would have
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a practical impact on the British public, we are going against 
prevailing opinion.
Now, anyone wanting to argue that Hume hoped that his Perfect Common­
wealth would one day be implemented in Britain must deal with a number 
of important questions. Was Hume a political reformer? If so what 
type of a reformer was he, conservative or radical? That is, was he a 
piecemeal reformer, advocating reforms which never deviated in any 
significant way from what the public had inherited from its ancestors? 
Or was he a wholesale reformer, advocating the complete reorganization 
of society? Did Hume the reformer (if in fact he was a reformer) wish 
to remain essentially loyal to society's beliefs, practices, institu­
tions, and the principles underlying them? Or did he wish to start de 
novo, uprooting both fundamental principles and the beliefs, practices, 
and institutions founded upon them? Further, what type of reform is 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" itself, conservative or radical? Do 
the reforms advocated in this essay seek to take the British public 
significantly beyond what it knows, or do they remain loyal to the 
principles of the existing British polity and its well-established and 
conventional beliefs, practices, and institutions? Finally, is the 
nature of the reformism embraced by Hume (assuming he was a reformer) 
consistent with the nature of the reforms advocated in "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth"?
These questions are important for us, for if there is no evidence 
that Hume was a reformer, then clearly any talk that he wrote "Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth" so that the reforms it recommends might one day 
be implemented in Britain is nonsense. But even if we establish that 
Hume did in fact have reformist intentions, we cannot automatically 
take "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously, for it might turn out
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(as sane argue, as we shall see in a moment) that Hume was a conserva­
tive reformer while the establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth would 
require radical reform. In other words, it might turn out that there 
is no harmony between the type of reformism that Hume embraces and the 
type of reform that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is, in which case
Q
it would be impossible to take this essay seriously.
Was Hume a political reformer? Some think not. J. S Mill portrays
Q
Hume as "prefer[ing the existing]__order of things", while Leslie
Stephan has him advocating "stagnation" in the political realm. And
Letwin holds that since, for Hume, "there was much less difference
between forms of government than it seemed", Hume's message was: "[D]o
not seek an ideal polity, but seek to safeguard the existing form of
11government against the weaknesses inherent in it."
Recently, however, two important scholars in the area of Hume's 
political thought, Whelan and Miller, agree that we can talk about Hume 
the political reformer. But both take him to be a conservative
reformer, and we shall see why later. Whelan claims that Hume displays 
"the desirability of preserving whatever seems to be of value in what 
exists and otherwise of cautious and incremental reformism." He labels 
Hume's approach to political reform "conservative utilitarianism", and 
tells us that this is a type of "conservative reformism [which] 
concerns a presumption of utility to be accorded to received opinion 
and well-established institutions."^ Miller attributes a stronger 
form of conservative reformism to Hume. He thinks that, for Hume the 
reformer, there is a "need to preserve existing conventions, and to 
innovate when necessary in such a way that these conventions are least 
disturbed." Reform must take place, but it must be "carried out with­
out disturbing existing habits." Reforms must never stray far from the
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familiar, but "must remain closely tied to [society's] conventionally- 
accepted judgements."14
The fact that these scholars attribute to Hume a form of conservative
reformism is important. For they both take "Idea of a Perfect Common-
15wealth" to be (for Hume) a radical reform. But if this is so, that 
is, if Hume was a conservative reformer while at the same time he 
thought that the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain 
would involve wholesale, radical reform, then "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" can be safely shelved as a piece of entertainment or 
speculation, and Hume could not have been serious about the practica­
bility of his perfect form of government.
But not everyone who takes Hume to be a reformer labels him a con­
servative reformer. Piamenatz thinks that Hume allows "broad... 
improvement" in the political realm and "great though gradual [poli­
tical] changes." He thinks that, for Hume, "[i]nnovation can be large
16and yet beneficial, provided it is slow and cautious". Piamenatz's 
view that Hume allows broad improvements, great changes, and large 
innovations is a clear indication that he attributes to Hume a form of 
non-conservative reformism. But what form? What, for Piamenatz, is a 
broad improvement, a great change, a large innovation? He doesn't tell 
us. And because he doesn't tell us we cannot know the exact nature of 
the non-conservative reformism that he ascribes to Hume.
John Robertson is equally unclear. Distinguishing between reformers 
and revolutionaries, Robertson tells us that Hume belonged to the 
former group and not to the latter. Both reformers and revolutionaries 
have as their end governmental change. However, both seek this end 
through different means, revolutionaries through sudden, violent change
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17and reformers through careful and gradual change. Given that
Robertson labels Hume a "reformer", and that, for Robertson, reformers
do seek to change government, it seems safe to say that he takes Hume
18to be a non-conservative reformer. But by telling us next to nothing 
about how he understands the term "reformer", Robertson (like 
Plamenatz) gives us no insight into the character of Hume's (non­
conservative) reformism.
John Christian Laursen is convinced that Hume's thought "is...best
characterized as a contribution to reform politics, rather than as
quietist or conservative", and complains that "[t]oo many commentators
conclude that Hume's ideas are 'conservative' without seeing the many
19ways in which they can be reformist, liberal, and even radical." For
anyone interested in the subject of "Hume the reformer" such remarks
are tantalizing. Unfortunately, however, Laursen does not develop them 
20in any detail. What does he mean by "conservative", "reformist", 
"liberal", and "radical"? These are vague, ambiguous terms, and 
because Laursen doesn't explain them, we cannot know what he means when 
he tells us that Hume was not a "conservative", but a "liberal, and 
even radical" reformer.
So, while Plamenatz, Robertson, and Laursen hold that Hume was a non­
conservative reformer, all fail to give us any insight into the nature 
of the non-conservative reformism that they claim Hume embraced. But 
this is not their only failure. For, at the same time, all fail to 
deal with the important question of how Hume can be a non-conservative 
reformer. Why this question arises, and why it is important, will 
become clear later in this "Introduction".
Like Plamenatz, Robertson, and Laursen, J. B Stewart claims that Hume
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21was a non-conservative reformer. However, unlike them, he develops
this idea in some detail. Stewart does not argue that Hume was a
radical reformer (in the sense in which I defined this term earlier).
This would be absurd, for as we shall see there is no rocm for radical
reformism in Hume's thought. Rather, recognising that Hume is "[a]l- 
22ways a moderate", Stewart places him somewhere between conservative
and radical reformism (as I have defined these terms). According to
Stewart, there is room in Hume's thought for "radical reforms, in our
laws, policies, and constitutional arrangements." But, as such radical
reforms are introduced "enough of the structure of [the] established...
23[must be] preserved intact." In other words, Stewart's position is 
that, for Hume the reformer, only parts (even fundamental parts) of the 
existing economic, social and, political structure ought to be rubbed 
out, leaving an adequate or sufficient part of this structure un­
touched. Principles, and the institutions and practices they support,
ought to be reformed where necessary, even extirpated ("in a careful, 
24Fabian way"). But these principles and overlying beliefs and
institutions must never be extirpated as a whole. Always, enough of 
the familiar ought to remain in place.
I agree with this interpretation of Hume. Hume is neither a con­
servative reformer, nor a radical one. Always the moderate, Hume lies 
somewhere in between. The reformism he embraces aims at wiping out 
parts of the established structure (where necessary), but never calls 
for the complete removal of this structure. For the sake of a label, I 
shall call this type of reformism "conservative/radical reformism" 
indicating both its respect for, and impatience with, elements of the 
established, both at the fundamental or primary level of principles and 
at the secondary level of the beliefs, practices, and institutions
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built upon these principles.
So, unlike Plamenatz, Robertson, and Laursen, Stewart gives us a good 
insight into the nature of the non-conservative reformism that he 
ascribes to Hume. But this is not all. For he also realises that 
there is a problem with ascribing to Hume any type of non-conservative 
reformism. He knows that there are certain elements in Hume's thought 
which seem to (and have been taken to) restrict him to conservative 
reformism. (We shall briefly investigate these elements shortly.) 
Thus, he deals with the question of how Hume can be a non-conservative 
reformer, showing that the elements in question do not preclude Hume 
from being (what I have called) a conservative/radical reformer. Un­
fortunately, however, Stewart's treatment of this issue is sometimes 
incomplete and I hope to fill some of the gaps he has left. This is 
not to say that Stewart's work on the subject of "Hume the (conserva­
tive/radical) reformer" is inadequate. It is certainly not, and in 
this thesis I shall make much use of his discoveries in this area. 
However, his treatment of this subject is at times wanting and I hope 
to rectify this.
As I said, and as we shall see, Hume was (what I have called) a 
conservative/radical reformer. The important question now is whether 
this picture of Hume the reformer is consistent with taking "Idea of a 
Perfect Cormonwealth" seriously in the case of Britain. Is there, in 
the case of Britain, harmony between the nature of the reformism that 
Hume embraces, on the one hand, and the nature of the reforms advocated 
in "Idea of a Perfect Corrmonwealth", on the other? Yes. For, 
according to Hume (as we shall see) the reforms advocated in this essay 
are conservative/radical. While they will introduce into Britain 
principles and overlying institutions, practices, and beliefs which are
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significantly new and alien, at the same time they will leave untouched 
many of the existing principles and institutions, practices, and 
beliefs of contemporary Britain. As we shall see, Hume classifies both 
republics and limited monarchies as "free governments". Thus, Britain, 
being a limited monarchy, and the Perfect Commonwealth, being a well- 
contrived republic, are close politically. But this is not all. For, 
as we shall also see, Hume thinks that there is an intimate connection 
between the economic, social, and political elements of a state, and 
that while economic and social causes have political effects, political 
causes also have economic and social effects. Given this latter point, 
and given that Britain's limited monarchy and Hume's well-contrived 
republic are both forms of free government, it follows that Hume's 
Perfect Commonwealth and eighteenth century Britain share, not only a 
similar political structure, but also similar economic and social 
structures. If this is correct, then it seems that the jump fron 
Britain's limited monarchy to Hume's skilfully modelled or well- 
contrived republic will not be a violent or radical one, but 
conservative/radical. For, while the establishment of the Perfect 
Commonwealth will introduce many novelties into British society, at the 
same time many familiar and established economic, social, and political 
elements (both at the primary and secondary levels) of that society 
will be retained.
At this point we should outline the structure of this thesis and, in 
the course of this outline, bring out the problems involved in arguing 
that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously.
The first two chapters of this thesis form a single unit. Together 
they will show that Hume was (a) a reformer, who (b) wanted to cure 
society fron the many old, pernicious political and non-political
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beliefs it was labouring under, and who was eager, not only to (c) call 
for the removal from society of bad practices, institutions, and 
beliefs (no matter how long standing they were) and advocate the 
introduction of new and novel ones, but also to (d) tamper with the 
economic, social, and political fundamentals which support these 
practices, institutions, and beliefs. In the first two chapters, then, 
we will see, not only that Hume was a reformer, but, on the basis of a 
number important examples of reforms that Hume sought to introduce into 
Britain (and which will be examined in detail in Chapter 2), that he 
was a conservative/radical reformer. The next three chapters will be 
devoted to defending this picture of Hume the reformer.
As mentioned, two important scholars in the area of Hume's political 
thought, Miller and Whelan, argue that Hume was a conservative reform­
er. Why? Because, they claim, certain fundamental elements of Hume's 
thought restrict him to conservative reformism. Now, if Miller and 
Whelan are right, then, firstly, the important examples of Hume's 
conservative/radical reforms to be examined in Chapter 2 will be under­
cut, and we will have no hope of showing that Hume was a conservative/ 
radical reformer. And, secondly, we will have no hope of showing that 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously. Thus, it 
is important for us to show that it is not the case that Hume was 
restricted to conservative reformism and that there is room in his 
thought for conservative/radical reformism.
One reason why Hume has been taken to be a conservative reformer is
because of his claim that "[c]ustom__is the great guide of human life"
(E I 44). Whelan's treatment of this claim is important. He argues 
that "his [i.e Hume's] general maxim that custom is the guide of life 
...has normative as well as descriptive force in all branches of Hume's
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philosophy." He thinks that, for Hume, "custom is (and should be) the
25great guide of life." Here we have two claims: (a) The normative one 
that, for Hume, past experience ought to guide future action, and (b) 
the descriptive one that, for Hume, people are essentially habitual 
creatures who in fact cling to the customary. They are, in other 
words, fundamentally conservative beings. In Chapter 3 we shall deal 
with (a ).
Why does Whelan think that, for Hume, custom ought to be the standard
by means of which we direct our lives? Because Hume's "study of the
'understanding'...culminated in skeptical doubts", doubts which, by his
own admission, filled him with "melancholy" and "despair" (T 264). To
overcome this crippling situation, Whelan continues, "Hume__turns to
26nature as his guide." And what does nature offer us as a guide of
life? Not reason but, as Hume's investigations of human nature reveal,
custom: "'Tis not, therefore, reason which is the guide of life, but
27custom" (T Abstract 625). Custom is the guide provided by nature.
And, therefore, it ought to be our guide. Whelan concludes: "Hume
emerges from total skepticism with an acceptance of custom as the
28'great guide of human life.'"
Now, if this accurately reflects Hume's position, then, clearly, we 
are in trouble. For, if Hume recommended a conservative standard as 
our guide of life, that is, if, for him, the past ought to guide our 
future, and all future beliefs, practices, and institutions ought to 
closely resemble past ones, then, clearly, there is no room in his 
thought for conservative/radical reformism, in which case he could not 
have been serious when he put forward the various conservative/radical 
reforms which we will discuss in Chapter 2. Nor could he have been 
serious about "Idea of a Perfect Ccmnonwealth". In Chapter 3 we shall
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see that Hume never tells us that we ought to be guided by past experi­
ence alone. Rather, our guide of life ought to be the experimental 
method of reasoning, a method of reasoning which is consistent with the 
picture of Hume the reformer we are trying to paint.
Chapter 4 will deal with the descriptive claim that, for Hume, people 
are fundamentally conservative creatures who cling to their customary 
patterns of thought and behaviour. As Whelan puts it, for Hume, people 
are "primarily conservative, stable beings who derive satisfaction from 
routine modes of thought and behaviour." The Humean individual has "a
basic affinity for custom", an affinity which is embedded in his 
29nature. As a result, he holds on to the established and to what he
is used to. We find a similar idea expressed by Miller. The Humean
individual is by nature a customary being, "a creature__of habit", so
much so that once he adopts a practice and it becomes habitual he
30follow it "unthinkingly" and will not depart fron it.
But the Humean individual's natural propensity to adhere to the
customary is not the only source of his conservatism. Whelan also
points to this individual' s love of order and fear of the new and 
31unknown. Further, we shall see that the Humean individual's desire
32for a good reputation also contributes to his conservatism. Over 
all, then, we can discern three reasons for the view that, for Hume, 
man is a conservative being who clings to the established: (1) a
natural disposition to cling to custom, (2) a love of order and 
stability and fear of the new, and (3) a love of reputation.
Now, if Hume draws us a conservative picture of man, then it is non­
sense to say that he put forward as practicable possibilities either 
the conservative/radical reforms we will investigate in Chapter 2 or 
"Idea of a Perfect Conmonwealth". For, if for Hume man is a conserva-
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tive being, then surely his view must be that people will resist the 
introduction into society of anything significantly new or novel. We 
shall see in Chapter 4 that, while it is true that, for Hume, the 
individual is the owner of a strong conservative tendency, a tendency 
which has its origins in the characteristics identified above, it is 
also true that, for Hume, this individual is the owner of a progressive 
tendency as well. In other words, we shall see that the Humean 
individual is not closed to conservative/radical reformism.
So far, we have two reasons for the view that Hume must be a 
conservative reformer, namely, that he reccxnmends the past as the guide 
of life and that he has a fundamentally conservative conception of man. 
But there is third reason for this view: For Hume, society is ultim­
ately held together by habit or custom. As Miller puts it, in Hume's 
view, society is founded on "an elaborate web of convention", namely, 
the conventional rules of justice and allegiance. These rules are in
turn founded on habit, so that, if disrupted, society will dissolve and
33be plunged into the state of nature. Thus, according to Miller, 
"Hume's view of the matter implies clearly that— [any non­
conservative] change, by upsetting established habits [in the realms of
34justice and political allegiance]__is likely to be harmful."
A similar idea can be found throughout the Hume literature. Berry
tells us that, for Hume, "society coheres" because of "habitually
sanctioned expectations" in the areas of justice and allegiance.
Without such habits there can be no society. Thus, any "innovations"
in society must never disrupt these habits: "This, above all, is why
35Hume's social and political thought is conservative." Whelan agrees. 
Given that, for Hume, "[i]t is the artificial virtues...that make 
orderly social life possible at any level more extensive than the
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family", and given "the necessarily customary foundation of artificial
moral virtues", it follows that Hume can only be a conservative 
36reformer. Whelan thinks that because "Hume's investigation concludes
that habit or custom, both mental or behavioural, is the feature on
which they [i.e the artificial virtues] depend"; because, that is,
"[cjustom is__the source of moral order in society", it follows that
Hume recommends "a cautionary approach to criticism" in the realms of
37morals and politics, an approach which is "conservative in effect."
Haakonssen, too, stresses the significance of "regularity of be­
haviour", or habit, in the areas of justice and allegiance for the 
cohesion of Humean society, and that, as a result, reform must be 
conservative for Hume:
The message of Hume's theory concerning the basic 
features of society is that such regularity...depends 
upon...regular or rule-bound institutions that can 
guide our behaviour and consequently our expectations 
of each other. If such institutions, once acquired, 
are lightly given up, we lose habit and regularity; 
we lose, that is, the most important means of orient­
ating ourselves to others."
Thus, "Hume must reject policies that significantly break the rules of 
justice [and allegiance]."^
The idea here is clear. Since, for Hume, habitual acquiescence to 
the artificial virtues of justice and allegiance is responsible for 
society's cohesion, it follows that Hume must believe that any sort of 
non-conservative political reforms ought to be avoided, for such 
reforms can only upset the habits upon which justice and allegiance are 
founded, thus destroying society. If this is Hume's view, then, clear-
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ly, our task in this thesis must fail. In Chapter 5 we shall see that, 
while it is true that, for Hume, society is held together by the 
customary adherence to the rules of justice and allegiance, this does 
not restrict him to being a conservative reformer.
By the end of Chapter 5 we will have established (a) that Hume had 
reformist intentions, (b) that he was a conservative/radical reformer 
and (c) that there is roan in his thought for such reformism. In 
Chapter 6 we will show that "Idea of a Perfect Carmonwealth" itself is 
a conservative/radical reform (in the case of Britain). This is an 
important task for us. For if scholars are right in claiming that the 
introduction of the Perfect Conmonwealth into Britain would involve 
radical reform of that nation's structure, while all we can do is show 
is that Hume was a conservative/radical reformer, then "Idea of a 
Perfect Carmonwealth" could not have been put forward by Hume as a 
practicable recommendation. In Chapter 6 we will see that the Perfect 
Commonwealth has many of the important political, social, and economic 
principles and overlying institutions, practices, and beliefs of 
Britain's limited monarchy, so that the introduction of the Perfect 
Commonwealth into Britain will not be a violent one. It will not 
require a radical transformation of British society. The introduction 
of the Perfect Conmonwealth into Britain will be a conservative/radical 
reform.
In Chapter 6, then, we shall see that there is agreement and concord 
between the nature of Hume's reformism and the nature of the reforms 
advocated in "Idea of a Perfect Carmonwealth". But this is not the 
only task that we shall accomplish in this chapter. We shall also see 
that, as a reform, "Idea of a Perfect Carmonwealth" is (a) neither 
contrary to the natural course of things, nor (b) the result of
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abstract theorising. Like the other task to be accomplished in this 
chapter, both (a) and (b) are necessary if we are to show that "Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously. Why this is so 
will come out clearly as this thesis progresses.
Up until Chapter 6 we will have dealt with an important argument 
against taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously, namely, that 
Hume was a conservative reformer while his Perfect Commonwealth is a 
radical reform. By Chapter 6 we will have seen that this argument 
fails. In Chapter 7 we will bring together the remaining arguments 
scholars have given for not taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
seriously and see that these arguments also fail. Finally, in Chapter 
8 we will discuss how Hume thinks the Perfect Commonwealth might be 
established in Britain.
A final note before embarking upon our task. The reader will have 
noticed that there is no chapter in this thesis devoted to a detailed 
analysis of the constitutional arrangements of the Perfect Common­
wealth. True, we shall have to touch upon these arrangements a number 
of times in Chapter 6, but we shall not subject these to any detailed 
scrutiny. The reason for this is quite simple: This is not a thesis on 
Hume's Perfect Commonwealth. Rather, we are concerned here with show­
ing that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously 
in the sense explained earlier. But this aim can be achieved without a 
point by point analysis of the Perfect Commonwealth's constitution. 
And this is fortunate for us, for any full discussion of the constitu­
tional arrangements of the Perfect Commonwealth would require a work 
much longer than the present one. This for two reasons:
(1) In constructing his Perfect Commonwealth Hume considers a number 
of existing European systems of government: The Venetian (Essays 518;
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Essays 524), the Polish (Essays 522), the Swiss (Essays 520-21), the 
British (Essays 517; Essays 520; Essays 524; Essays 525); and especially 
the Dutch, to which Hume tells us the Perfect Commonwealth bears a 
significant "resemblance" (Essays 526). He also reflects upon the small 
republican city-states of the past (Essays 527-28). Thus, any attempt 
to fully understand the arrangements of the Perfect Commonwealth must 
include a detailed discussion of these systems of government.
(2) In constructing his Perfect Commonwealth, Hume draws heavily upon 
his analyses of human nature, morality, the science of politics, socio­
economic progress etc. Thus, any discussion of the Perfect Commonwealth 
must be preceded by a detailed discussion of these analyses. There will 
be sane discussion of these elements of Hume's thought in this thesis, 
but nothing like the detailed discussion needed in order to fully under­
stand the organisation, structure, and institutions of Hume's preferred 
form of government.
For these reasons, then, a point by point examination of the workings 
of the Perfect Commonwealth would require a much longer thesis than the 
present one, a thesis which would take us well beyond our word limit. 
Clearly, such a thing must be avoided. And it can be avoided, for, as I 
said, our purpose of showing that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" ought 
to be taken seriously can be achieved without intimate knowledge of the 
Perfect Commonwealth's political arrangements.
Having outlined the structure of this thesis, having stated its aim, 
and having given a somewhat detailed insight into the problems sur­
rounding this aim, we can now embark upon our task. We will begin by 
showing that Hume was a reformer. We shall see that David Fate Norton 
is right in claiming that "from early days reform was the effect at 
which he [i.e Hume] aimed."39
CHAPTER 1
A few days before his death in August 1776, Hume, lying on his death­
bed, was visited by his friend Adam Smith. During that visit Hume told 
Smith (among other things) that, by means of his works, "I have been 
endeavouring to open the eyes of the Public" (Essays xlvi). In other 
words, on his death-bed, Hume announced that throughout his life he had 
a reformist aim. But in doing so Hume was announcing nothing new. For 
he had already revealed his reformist intentions to the world long 
before he uttered the above quoted words to his friend. There are, I 
think, three main ways in which this claim can be supported. I shall 
investigate all three.1
I
The first way I want to show that Hume was a reformer involves two 
steps. It involves demonstrating that:
(a) Hume intended his works to be read by the public, and
(b) these works contain reformist prescriptions.
Now, if a philosopher desires his works to reach the public, and if 
these works contain reformist 'oughts', then it seems safe to conclude 
that that philosopher planned to reform the public. Let us look at (a) 
and (b) in turn.
(a) There can be no doubt that Hume wanted his works to be read by the 
2public. He tells us this again and again. For example, in the 
"Advertisement" to the first two volumes of the Treatise ("Of the 
Understanding" and "Of the Passions") Hume declares that "[t]he appro- 
bation of the public I consider the greatest reward of my labours" and
adds that he is "determin'd to regard its [i.e the public's] judgement,
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whatever it be, as my best instruction.*1 Now, whatever else is going 
on here, it is clear that the first two volumes of the Treatise were 
written with the public in mind. This is also true of this work's 
third volume ("Of Morals"), in whose "Advertisement" Hume expresses 
the hope that he "may be understood by ordinary readers."
The Enquiries too had the public as their target, for a number of 
times in this work Hume expresses a concern about the relationship 
between the "general public" and the "common reader", on the one hand, 
and his philosophical task, on the other (e.g E I 6; E I 11; E II 317 
fn. 1).
Another indication that Hume aimed his writings at the public comes 
from the concern he had with the way in which he expressed himself in 
his works. For example, Hume attributed the fact that the Treatise 
"fell dead-born from the press" to the "manner" in which he corrmunicat- 
ed his ideas in that work, rather than to its "matter". Thus, he 
recast the "matter" of the Treatise in a more suitable "manner" in the 
Enquiries (Essays xxxiv-v; L I 158). But why was "manner" important to 
Hume? Because he was afraid of being misunderstood by the public. If
this were to happen, then how could he fulfil his "ambition__of
contributing to the instruction of mankind" (T 271)? Of course, I do 
not want to deny that there are other reasons why Hume gave attention 
to the manner in which he transmitted his thoughts to the world, such 
as a desire for fame, a desire he called "my ruling passion" (Essays 
xl). However, we should not let these other considerations blind us to 
the fact that Hume was also interested in how he expressed himself 
because he was interested in being understood by the public in order to
3contribute to its "instruction".
The Essays were also written with the hope that they would be read by
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the public. In the "Advertisement" to this work Hume tells us of his
4desire to "communicate these Trifles to the Judgement of the Public."
And in "Of Essay-Writing" he calls himself "a Kind of__Ambassador"
fron the world of letters to the sociable world (Essays 535).
We have already mentioned that on his death-bed Hume told Smith of 
his desire to "open the eyes of the public." But, in addition to this, 
he also told his friend that "I have been correcting my works for a new 
edition", and expressed the hope to live a little longer in order to 
see "how the Public receives the alterations" (Essays xlvi). Even on 
his death-bed, then, Hume made clear his desire to reach the public 
with his works.
I think that enough has been said to show that throughout his life as 
a philosopher, from the Treatise to his death-bed, Hume intended his 
works to be read outside the four walls of his study. But what motiv­
ated him to persevere in the instruction of the public? We have al­
ready mentioned his desire for fame. But this is not the whole story. 
According to Hume, "a man.. .without public spirit, or a regard to the 
community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue" (Essays 
27). In light of this condemnation, it seems safe to say that Hume 
made every effort to aquire a "public spirit", and to be motivated by a 
concern for the "community". If this is correct, then we can say that 
Hume's desire to instruct the public sprang, not only fron a desire for 
fame, but also from a genuine concern for the public's welfare and 
well-being.
Let us now move on to the second part of our argument, and show that 
Hume's writings contain reformist prescriptions.
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(b) Sane philosophers (e.g Barry Stroud) take the view that Hume was 
solely a positivist empirical scientist. This is a mistaken view. 
True, as we shall see later in this chapter, Hume did see himself as a 
scientist of human nature, an "anatomist", conducting empirical in­
vestigations into the question of how the human mind operates. How­
ever, he did not restrict himself to this descriptive task. He also 
advanced his own recommendations, recommendations which had a reformist 
aim. In other words, not only is there a descriptive/scientific side 
to Hume's work, but also a normative/prescriptive side.^  In the next 
chapter we shall discuss in detail a variety of reforms advocated by 
Hume, all of which cane fron his Essays. Here I want to restrict 
myself to discussing two closely related reformist prescriptions, both 
of which are contained in the Treatise and the Enquiries, namely, 
Hume's advocacy of mitigated scepticism as a way of life and his call 
for the sovereignty of the calm passions over the violent ones.
(i) Hume distinguishes between "extravagant" (T 228) or "excessive" 
scepticism (or "Pyrrhonism") (E I 161), on the one hand, and "moderate" 
(T 224) or "mitigated" (E I 161) scepticism (which is, just "Pyrrhonism 
...corrected by common sense and reflection" (E I 161)), on the other. 
While he has little sympathy for the former type of scepticism (we 
shall see why in a moment), he endorses the second type, telling us 
that it is the position taken by every "just reasoner" ( E l  162), by 
the "true philosopher" (T 224), and recommending it as a way of life: 
"In all incidents of life we ought still to preserve our [moderate] 
scepticism" (T 270).
Hume was greatly distressed by the fact that "[t]he greater part of 
mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their
5
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opinions__[ and ] throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to
which they are inclined." Such people have "[no] indulgence for those 
who entertain opposite sentiments" (E I 161). Hume was opposed to such 
dogmatism, and aimed to "inspire... [people] with more modesty and 
reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their 
prejudice against antagonists" (El 161). He hoped to achieve this end 
by infusing "a small tincture of Pyrrhonism [i.e mitigated scepticism]" 
into the world (El 161). For mitigated scepticism does not foster 
dogmatism, but instead promotes "mild and moderate sentiments" (T 272). 
Thus, the mitigated sceptic never uses terms like "1tis evident, 1 tis 
certain, tis undeniable" (T 274; T 278).
This does not mean that the mitigated sceptic holds no beliefs. As 
Hume says in his anonymous Letter fron a Gentleman, while defending his 
Treatise;
All he means by these Scruples is to abate the Pride 
of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even 
with regard to Principles which seem the clearest, 
and which they are necessitated from the strongest 
Instincts of Nature to embrace, they are not able to 
attain a full Consistence and absolute Certainty.
Modesty then, and Humility, with regard to the the 
Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result 
of Scepticism; not an universal Doubt, which it is 
impossible for any Man to support, and which the 
first and most trivial Accident in Life must immedi­
ately disconcert and destroy (LG 19).
Thus mitigated scepticism breeds moderation, toleration, modesty, and 
the mildness of passion. It does not foster the total suspension of
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belief. As the above quote makes clear, Hume thinks that such a thing 
is "impossible". And this is why he has little patience with Pyrrhon­
ism, calling it "a fantastic sect" (T 183; T 228). For Pyrrhonists 
embrace "the excessive principles of scepticism" and call for the 
complete suspension of belief in all areas of life (E I 158-59). But 
this is impossible since "[njature, by an absolute and uncontroulable 
necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel" (T 
183; E I 160). And as Hume himself discovers, we cannot fight nature: 
"I must yield to the current of nature" (T 269). Thus, we must believe 
since nature has decreed so.
Hume never denies the theoretical soundness of Pyrrhonism. In fact,
Pyrrhonism is "impossible__to refute" (E I 159). But one can be a
Pyrrhonist only in the study. In the outside world one must abandon 
this doctrine. As Hume says in the above long quote, "the first and 
most trivial Accident in Life must immediately...destroy" Pyrrhonism. 
And one must leave the study and join life, for nature has made man 
sociable. (We shall discuss Hume's idea of man's natural sociability in 
Chapter 4). Thus, nature, by driving us into the world, "breaks the 
force of all sceptical arguments in time" (T 187; E I 159).
Nature is important to Hume the mitigated sceptic. It is nature 
which saves him fron the sceptical crisis he vividly describes in the 
final pages of Book I of the Treatise (T 263-74); and it is nature 
which seves as his guide in all areas of life. (This will come out
7clearly as this thesis progresses.) For example, the "true philos­
opher" knows that a number of important human beliefs (causality, 
objectivity, identity etc) have no rational foundation. Yet, he does 
not abandon these beliefs, for "wise nature" compels him to hold them. 
He (and the rest of us) cannot do otherwise: "Nature will always
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maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning 
whatsoever" (E I 41). Thus, concerning the belief in an independently 
existing world, Hume declares that, after the true philosopher (i.e the 
mitigated sceptic) discovers that this belief is without rational 
foundation, still "he must assent to the principle concerning the 
existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philoso­
phy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, 
and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be 
trusted to our uncertain reasonings" (T 187).
We shall discuss Hume's notion of belief in greater detail in Chapter 
3. What is important here is that the mitigated sceptic, given that he 
acquiesces in "the current of nature" (T 269), does hold beliefs, but, 
as we have seen, these beliefs are held moderately and undogmatically, 
with "Modesty" and "Humility". The mitigated sceptic is cautious in 
his expressions of belief, making no dogmatic claims about Truth and, 
therefore, having no "prejudice against antagonists" (E I 161).
Now, Hume, as we saw, hoped to inject mitigated scepticism and its 
salutary consequences into the public realm. And in doing so he was 
setting himself against those people who clung to their positions 
dogmatically, believing (wrongly) that they had access to Truth. Among 
such people were: (a) "the vulgar", or the ordinary people, who, 
according to Hume, "take things according to their first appearance" (T 
132) and do not reflect upon their beliefs (T 222-23); (b) those who 
embrace "false philosophy" (T 222-23; T 224), and who fill the world 
with "unreasonable and capricious" fictions such as "substances, and 
substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities" (T 219) and who 
invent theories such as the representational theory of perception and 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (T 225-32); and
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(c) those who embrace "superstition" and "enthusiasm". These are
"corruptions of true religion__two species of false religion", (Essays
73), and arise from different psychological conditions, the former from 
"[w]eakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance" and the latter
from "[h]ope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination [and]__ignorance"
(Essays 74). Although superstition and enthusiasm are religious
phenomena, they also have a political dimension, an "influence on 
government and society" (Essays 75). In both cases, this influence is 
pernicious. Without going into detail, the mental condition that gives 
rise to superstition makes people "submissive", "tame and abject, and 
fits them for slavery" (Essays 78). As a result, the superstitious 
easily yield to the "tyranny" of priests (Essays 78-79) who, hating 
liberty in all its forms and desiring power (Essays 65-66), promote 
"oppression and slavery" (D 251). Further, given their mental 
condition, the superstitious "support...prerogative and kingly power"
(Essays 79). That is, they tend towards despotic and absolutist
political programs, including that of the Divine Rights theorists andg
the doctrine of Passive Obedience, a doctrine to which Hume was 
opposed (Essays 448-92).
In contrast, given its psychological roots, "[e]nthusiasm...is 
naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty" (Essays 78; H 5 10), a 
liberty which is anarchic and which threatens social stability. For 
the enthusiast thinks of himself as "a distinguished favourite of the 
Divinity" (Essays 74) and, thus, is "little influenced by authority" 
(Essays 79). That is, he accepts no rule other than his own. He 
assaults all human institutions, moral, political and religious (Essays 
77). Enthusiasm makes people "bold, daring and uncontroled__and
incline[s] them to arrogate, in their actions and conduct, the same
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liberty, which they__[assume] in their rapturous flights and extasies"
(HGB 172). Thus, enthusiasm is responsible for "the most cruel dis­
orders in human history" (Essays 77). Hume labels as enthusiastic 
Puritans (HGB 172), Anabaptists, Levellers, Camisars, and Covenanters 
(Essays 77), people who, in one way or another, caused social dis-
9harmony in their countries by declaring war on the civil authorities.
These are just some of the prevailing beliefs that Hume attacks in 
his writings (we shall come across more later in this thesis e.g moral 
rationalism, mercantilism, "severe" moralism etc), beliefs which were 
clung to dogmatically by their intolerant advocates. Thus, in advo­
cating that people embrace mitigated scepticism, we can take Hume as 
advocating that these people abandon the established beliefs which they 
currently hold and embrace a new and novel outlook on life. "I make 
bold to recommend [true] philosophy [i.e mitigated scepticism], and 
shall not scruple to give it preference to superstition of every kind 
or denomination" (T 271). In recommending mitigated scepticism as a 
way of life Hume was seeking to reform the public.
(ii) Hume distinguishes between "calm" and "violent" passions (T 276; E
II 239), and normatively recommends "the prevalence of the calm pas-
10sions above the violent" (T 417-18; E II 239). This recommendation 
should not surprise us given Hume's advocacy of mitigated scepticism 
and its result (among others) of promoting the "mild and moderate 
sentiments" (T 271). Hume calls the sovereignty of the calm over the 
violent passions "strength of mind" (T 418; E II 239), that is, the 
ability "to resist the temptation of present ease or pleasure" and to 
look forward to our "more distant profit and enjoyment" (E II 239). 
Only when our calm passions are in control are we able to act this way.
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In contrast, when the violent passions rule, we are led "to prefer 
whatever is present to the distant and remote" and we "desire objects 
more according to their situation than their intrinsic value" (T 538). 
Thus, the violent passions are the cause of "fatal errors in our 
conduct" (T 538) and force us "beyond all bounds of prudence and 
discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are 
often irretrievable" (Essays 4). Hume complains that many attribute 
"strength of mind" to "pure reason and reflection." But this is wrong. 
Rather, this quality "is really the result of our calm passions and 
propensities" (E II 239).
Hume's recommendation that the violent passions ought to yield to the 
calm ones, is another indication that Hume was interested in reforming 
the public.
We are trying to establish the claim that Hume's writings contain 
reformist prescriptions. We have given two examples of such prescrip­
tions, but, clearly, two examples are not enough in order for our claim 
to be firmly established. Thus, in the next chapter we shall look at 
more examples of such prescriptions. There we shall reinforce, not 
only the claim that Hume's writings contain reformist prescriptions, 
but also the claim made during our discussion of mitigated scepticism 
that Hume's reforms were designed to take the public beyond their 
established beliefs. But for now, we must be satisfied with the two 
examples given above and, keeping in mind what is to cane in Chapter 2, 
we can say that Hume's works contain reformist recommendations. And 
since Hume wrote for the public, it seems safe to conclude that Hume 
had reformist intentions.
Let us now turn to the second way in which the claim that Hume was a
reformer can be supported.
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Hume was an anatomist of human nature. His aim was to "proceed in the 
accurate anatomy of human nature" (T 263), to "anatomize human nature 
in a regular manner" (T Abstract 646). Anatomy is "the science of man" 
(T Intro xvi), the aim of which is to "explain the principles of human
nature" (T Intro xvi), to "[examine] the Mind__to discover its most
secret Springs and Principles" (L I 32-33). In other words, one of 
Hume's purposes in his works was to conduct a descriptive, scientific 
analysis of the human mind in order to uncover its principles, to 
reveal how the mind operates.
There are a number of reasons why Hume conducts this investigation 
into the mind's principles and qualities. One reason has to do with 
his belief that the discovery of the mind's principles is important if 
we are to acquire knowledge in other areas of human life: "There is no 
question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science 
of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, 
before we become acquainted with that science" (T Intro xvi). The 
science of human nature, the discovery of the principles of the human 
mind, is the foundation of all other sciences including the "four 
sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics" (T Intro xv-xvi) 
and "[e]ven Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion" (T 
Intro xv). Our inquiries into these sciences depends upon our know­
ledge of how the human mind operates. Thus, Hume declares that his aim 
is "instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, 
to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences 
[morals, politics, mathematics etc], to human nature itself" (T Intro 
xvi). The science of man, or anatomy, is the "capital" of all other
II
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sciences, and, thus, if we want to unlock these other sciences, we must 
first conquer this "capital".
We have just seen that Hume thinks that any successful enquiry into 
morals, politics etc depends upon prior knowledge of how the mind 
operates. But Hume also thinks that without such knowledge "' [ t ] is 
impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these 
sciences" (T Intro xv; my emphases). In other words, a further reason 
why Hume wants to uncover the principles of human nature is because he 
hopes to contribute to the improvement of the sciences of morality, 
politics, logic, mathematics etc. Hume's investigation into human 
nature was not merely contemplative. It was meant to have a practical 
impact, namely, to give us the knowledge we need in order that we may 
pursue the other sciences with greater accuracy.
But this is not the only practical effect Hume hoped his examination 
of the human mind would have. And here we come to what is for us the 
most important reason for Hume's examination of human nature. Hume 
believed that knowledge of the principles of the mind was essential for 
his role as reformer.
In a number of places in his writings Hume distinguishes between two 
different kinds of philosophers, namely, the "Metaphysician" and the 
"Moralist". To explain this distinction, Hume compares the first to an 
"Anatomist" (a term we have already met) and the second to a "Painter". 
This distinction between the metaphysician/anatomist, on the one hand, 
and the moralist/painter, on the other, first appeared in a 1739 letter 
to Hutcheson (L I 33), and was repeated in the Treatise (T 620-21) and 
in the first Enquiry (E I 9-10).
What is the difference between the metaphysician/anatomist and the 
moralist/painter? The main difference (for us) lies in their pur-
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1 1pose. The function of the former (as we have already seen) is to 
uncover the principles of human nature. In contrast, the purpose of 
the latter is to "paint... [virtue] in the most amiable colours" in 
order to "please the imagination, and engage the affections" (E I 5) so
that "they excite and regulate our sentiments; and__bend our hearts to
the love of probity and true honour" (E I 6). The moralist "moulds the 
heart and affections; and by touching those principles which actuate 
men, reforms their conduct, and brings then nearer to that model of 
perfection which it describes" (E I 7). In other words, the meta­
physician/anatomist is an empirical scientist. His task is 
descriptive. On the other hand, the moralist/painter is a reformer. 
He has a prescriptive task.
Now, according to Hume, the metaphysician/anatomist can play an 
important part in assisting the moralist/painter to achieve his task: 
"An Anatomist...can give very good Advice to a Painter or Statuary; and 
in a like manner, I am perswaded, that a Metaphysician may be very 
helpful to a Moralist" (L I 32; T 621; E I 10). But how does the 
anatomist help the painter and the metaphysician the moralist? To 
answer this question let us first examine the relationship between the 
anatomist and the painter and then use the results of this examination 
to to shed light on the relationship between the metaphysician and the 
moralist.
The purpose of the painter is to depict the "Grace and Beauty" of his 
subject (L I 32), to produce "a Venus or an Helen" (E I 10). But in 
order to achieve this task, the painter, Hume thinks, "must still carry 
his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position 
of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of 
every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to
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beauty" (E I 10). And, of course, it is the purpose of the anatomist 
to uncover this "inward structure" for the painter. Armed with this 
knowledge he acquires fron the anatomist, the painter is able to pursue 
his task in a proper fashion.
Turning now to the metaphysician and the moralist, we find an 
identical relationship between them. As we saw, the task of the 
moralist is to "bend our hearts to the love of probity" (E I 6), to 
shape "the heart and affections" of men in order to reform their 
conduct (E I 7). How? "[B]y touching those principles which actuate 
men" (E I 7). And whose task is it to uncover these actuating 
principles? The metaphysician's. He has the job of exposing human 
nature and revealing its operations. Thus, as in the case of the 
anatomist and the painter, the metaphysician helps the moralist by 
giving him the raw materials he needs to get on with his job. And his 
job is that of reforming human conduct. To do this he needs to know 
the psychological principles of man.
This reveals an important point about Hume's conception of the 
reformer: In pursuing his task the reformer must take seriously what 
nature has provided. His reforms must be consistent with the course of 
nature. This idea canes out in a number of places in Hume's writings. 
For example, in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" Hume attacks Plato's 
Republic and More's Utopia as being "plainly imaginary" on the ground 
that both "suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind" (Essays 
514). Manners, for Hume, are founded on human nature. Thus, Hume is 
opposed to Plato and to More because both call for reforms which go 
against the principles of human nature. Again, in "Of Commerce", Hume 
writes: "Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and cannot 
pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of
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thinking" (Essays 260). What, for Hume, is a violent change? He gives 
us his answer a few sentences after the above quote when he tells us 
that, while sovereigns ought to introduce reforms, these reforms must 
"comply with the cannon bent of mankind", that is, with human nature. 
Reforms which ignore human nature are violent. Thus, sovereigns can, 
and must, introduce reforms into the public realm, even (as we shall 
see in the next chapter) reforms which deviate significantly fron what 
the public has inherited fron the past. But these reforms must never 
ignore nature. Reformers must take human nature as their starting 
point, "and give it all the improvements of which it is susceptible"
(Essays 260). They must be "acquainted with the nature of man... [and] 
expect not any impossibilities from him" (T 602). This idea that, for 
Hume, the reformer must take what is natural seriously is important and 
should be kept in mind as this thesis progresses. Let us now return to 
the subject at hand.
The metaphysician helps the moralist (reformer) by giving him know­
ledge of the principles of human nature. Now, we have already seen 
that Hume considered himself an anatanist, a metaphysician. Given his 
view about the supportive role that the metaphysician/anatomist plays 
with respect to the moralist/painter, and given that he saw himself as 
a metaphysician/anatomist, it follows that Hume saw himself as being 
helpful to the moralist. To the degree that the metaphysician/ 
anatanist helps the moralist/painter (who is a reformer), Hume, in his 
role as a metaphysician/anatomist, is also a reformer.
But Hume's role as a reformer extends beyond that of a metaphysician 
helping the moralist by exposing to him the secrets of human nature. 
For there can be no doubt that Hume was a moralist/painter too. As we 
saw earlier in this chapter Hume wanted the public to embrace mitigated
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scepticism and abandon zeal in favour of moderation and humility in 
belief. And he wanted the public to submit their violent passions to 
the rule of their calm ones. Of course, as with the previous argument 
designed to show that Hume was a reformer, more examples of Hume's 
reforms are necessary before this argument can be established on a firm 
footing. Thus, as with the previous argument, we will have to wait 
until Chapter 2 before we can fully embrace this argument. However, 
keeping in mind what is to come in Chapter 2, and already knowing about 
Hume's desire to promote mitigated scepticism and the sovereignty of 
the calm passions, we can say that Hume was not only a metaphysician/ 
anatomist but also a moralist/painter.
Both the moralist and the metaphysician (by virtue of the support he 
gives the moralist) are reformers. As Hume says, "each.. .may contrib­
ute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind" (E I 
5; my emphasis). Hume was both a moralist and a metaphysician and, 
therefore, in two ways, a reformer.
Ill
The third and final way we can show that Hume was a reformer is by 
asking the question: "By means of what method did Hume the anatomist 
hope to discover the principles of human nature?" The answer is: "By 
means of the experimental method of reasoning", a method which 
combines "reason and experience" (T 414; E II 180) and involves 
"experiments...[which are] judiciously collected and compared" (T Intro 
xix), experiments which are subjected to "a depth of reasoning and 
reflection" (T Abstract 645).
According to Hume, the anatomist can embark on his task only with the
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help of the experimental method of reasoning, for it is "impossible to 
form any notion of...[the mind's] powers and qualities otherwise than 
fron careful and exact experiments" (T Intro xvii), that is, experi­
ments which are carefully reflected upon. With this method of reason­
ing the anatomist of human nature can "render all our principles as 
universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and 
explaining all effects fron the simplest and fewest causes" (T Intro 
xvii; T Abstract 646). In other words, "by following the experimental 
method...[the anatomist can deduce] general maxims fron a comparison of 
particular instances" (E II 174).
Now, Hume sees a "peculiar disadvantage" arising fron trying to 
conduct "careful and exact experiments" in the realm of human affairs, 
a disadvantage not suffered by natural philosophy, namely, "that in 
collecting its experiments, it [i.e the science of human nature] cannot 
make them purposely, with premeditation" (T Intro xviii-xix). In other 
words, the scientist of human nature is unable to perform controlled 
laboratory-style experiments of the sort performed by the natural 
scientist. When the latter wishes "to know the effects of one body 
upon another in any situation" all he has to do is "put them in that 
situation, and observe what results from it." Clearly, the anatomist 
is unable to do such a thing. Instead, he must "glean up. ..[his] 
experiments in this science fron a cautious observation of human life, 
and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by 
men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures" (T 
Intro xix). In other words, the anatomist's experiments cane fran 
careful observation of human life. But he does not restrict himself to 
observing present life. He also investigates past life, or history. 
We shall return to this point in a moment. But first we should bring
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out a further problem surrounding the experimental method of reasoning.
We have just mentioned that, according Hume, the anatomist turns to 
history for his experiments. However, Hume complains that "[w]e have 
not as yet had experience of three thousand years", and that, there­
fore, there are not "sufficient materials upon which we can reason"
(Essays 87). In other words, human experience is severely limited and, 
therefore, so are the experiments at the anatomist's disposal. The 
result, of course, is an adverse effect upon the certainty of the 
anatomist's discoveries: "[P]erhaps we are still in too early an age of 
the world to discover any principles, which will bear the examination 
of the latest posterity" (T 273).
Still, in spite of the fact that (a) the anatomist cannot conduct 
controlled experiments, and (b) the raw materials at his disposal are 
limited, Hume does think that the anatomist can, by means of experi­
mental reasoning, "discover, at least in some degree, the secret 
springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its 
operations" (E I 14). Other times he goes further, claiming that we 
"can expect assurance and conviction" in the science of man (T 273), 
and, therefore, "assurance and conviction" from the experimental method 
of reasoning. He thinks that "[tjhere seems all the reason in the 
world to imagine that it [i.e the science of man] may be carried to the 
greatest degree of exactness" (T Abstract 645-46), for he thinks that 
"[wjhere experiments...are judiciously collected and compared, we may 
hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in 
certainty [ to natural science]" (T Intro xix). He even talks of 
"eternal political truths" (Essays 21), an important claim given the 
dependence of politics upon the science of man. In Chapter 3 we shall 
return to the question of the certainty of the results yielded by
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experimental reasoning and we shall see that, according to Hume, these 
results can be free from doubt.
As we mentioned, the Humean anatomist collects experiments, not only 
by observing present life, but also by investigating the past. History 
provides him with a wealth of material to reflect upon in order that he 
can accomplish his task. Thus, Hume reagards history as "the great 
mistress of wisdom" (HGB 687). Given that "in all nations and ages... 
human nature remains the same in its principles and operations" and 
that "[mjankind are so much the same, in all times and places" it 
follows, Hume thinks, that "history informs us of nothing new or 
strange in this particular." Rather, the "chief use" of history 
is only to discover the constant and universal prin­
ciples of human nature, by...furnishing us with ma­
terials from which we may form our observations and 
become acquainted with the regular springs of human 
action and behaviour (E I 83).
For the Humean anatomist, then, history is "so many collections of 
experiments" by means of which he
fixes the principles of his science, in the same 
manner as the physician or natural philosopher be­
comes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals,
and other external objects, by the experiments which
12he forms concerning them (E I 83-84).
Investigation of, and reflection upon, the past is the key to the 
anatomist's task. It comes as no surprise, then, that according to 
Hume, "[t]he object of...history [is] to instruct" (Essays 240).
Hume's desire "to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning INTO 
MORAL SUBJECTS" (as he announces on the title page of all three volumes
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of the Treatise) is important for us. For, in having this desire he
was eager to play a part in introducing a new method of reasoning into 
13"moral subjects" and to fight against the "many chimerical systems" 
that presently exist (T 273), those "hypotheses embrac'd merely for 
being specious and agreeable" (T 272). The existing "scientific 
method" for investigating human nature and studying moral subjects, 
"where a general abstract principle is first established, and is 
afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions", 
is pernicious and must be abandoned (E II 174). Instead, experimental 
reasoning should be used:
Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and 
systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to 
no arguments but those which are derived fron experi­
ence. It is full time they should attempt a like 
reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject 
every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, 
which is not founded on fact and observation (E II 
174-75; my emphasis).
Thus, Hume was eager to follow Locke, Shaftsbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson 
and Butler (T Intro xvii fn. 1; T Abstract 646) in "put[ting] the 
science of man on a new footing" (T Intro xvii). Like them he had 
nothing but "contempt" (T Abstract 646) for those who, in the science 
of man, present their a priori "conjectures and hypotheses" as "certain 
principles" (T Intro xviii). He wanted to play a part in reforming and 
improving the science of man by means of a new and better method of 
analysis, a method which, he was sure, would produce "a compleat system 
of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new" (T Intro 
xvi), and thus render the science of man "superior in utility" to all
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other doctrines (T Intro xix). And given that (a ) the science of man 
is the foundation of all other sciences, and (b) the reformer depends 
heavily on the science of man in order to perform his task, we can say 
that, by seeking to introduce a new and better method of reasoning into 
the science of man, Hume was seeking to contribute to the improvement 
of all other areas of human knowledge and to help the reformer pursue 
his task with greater success.
IV
Our aim of this chapter has been to show that Hume was a reformer. We 
have made some strong moves towards this aim, but we have not fully 
reached it. For, as I have already noted, two of the three arguments 
given in order to establish that Hume had reformist intentions are 
lacking. In order for these arguments to work we must show that Hume's 
writings contain reformist prescriptions. We gave two examples of such 
prescriptions, but, clearly, more must be supplied. This shall be our 
task in the next chapter. Or, rather, it shall be one of our tasks.
CHAPTER 2
The introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain will not 
require the complete extirpation of that nation's economic, social, and 
political beliefs, practices, and institutions. Nor will it require 
the complete extirpation of the principles underlying these beliefs, 
practices, and institutions. As we shall see in Chapter 6, a well- 
contrived British republic modelled on Hume's plan will retain many of 
the primary and secondary features of the eighteenth century British 
limited monarchy. However, the transformation of Britain into the 
Perfect Commonwealth will not leave everything untouched. Such a 
transformation will require the introduction of novelties. It will 
require new departures and innovations. Thus, while the introduction 
of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain will not be a radical reform, 
it will be a conservative/radical reform (as I defined this term in the 
"Introduction"). For our purpose, then, it is not enough to show only 
that Hume was a reformer. We must go further and show that he was a 
reformer who:
(a) did not hesitate to attack established beliefs, practices, and 
institutions,
(b) did not hesitate to recommend reforms which took the British 
public beyond what it knew, reforms which were not conventionally- 
based, and
(c) did not hesitate to tamper with the fundamentals of the state 
and alter these in significant ways.
We have already made sane progress towards (a) and (b) in the previous 
chapter, where we saw that Hume was eager to combat the various false 
ideas that the British public was labouring under (false philosophy, 
enthusiasm etc), and to infuse a good dose of mitigated scepticism into 
the public realm. In this chapter we shall continue with (a) and (b),
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and, importantly, establish (c) by looking at some of the economic, 
social, and political reforms that Hume proposed for contemporary 
Britain. As we saw, Hume wrote for the public. And he had the 
"ambition...of contributing to the instruction of mankind" (T 271), of 
"open[ing] the eyes of the Public" (Essays xlvi). Thus, we have a good 
ground for arguing that the reforms which will be examined below were 
meant by Hume to be more than just contemplative or speculative. We 
shall begin with the sweeping reforms that Hume calls for regarding the 
existing British constitution.
I
Hume thinks that the British constitution is "a good constitution"
(Essays 31 ) , producing many "happy effects" (Essays 501 ) and having 
"many advantages" (Essays 46) ("effects" and "advantages" we shall note 
in Chapter 6). Still, he takes it to be defective, and one of Hume's 
aims in his Essays is to show those who desire to retain Britain's 
limited monarchy that they can fulfil this desire only by subjecting 
the British constitution to serious reform. Before investigating the 
reforms proposed by Hume two issues must be dealt with. First, we must 
look briefly at Hume's view of the British constitution.
According to Hume, "the ENGLISH government is a mixture of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy" (Essays 207). That is, the British 
constitution is a mixed constitution, made up of three elements, a 
monarchic (the Crown), an aristocratic (the House of Lords) and a 
republican (the House of Commons). But this is true only in theory. 
In reality, due to history and other circumstances, the aristocratic 
element of the constitution, Hume thinks, has become obsolete: "As to
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the house of lords...both experience and reason shew, that they have no 
force or authority sufficient to maintain themselves alone." Any 
"force" or "authority" this House has, Hume thinks, is derived from the 
Crown (Essays 44). Thus, the Lords is not an independent branch of the 
constitution, which explains why Hume calls "the present" Lords "frail"
(Essays 527) and why he speaks of "[t]he depression of the lords"
(Essays 112).
As a result of the Lords' depression, frailty, and dependence, when 
Hume investigates the British constitution he talks only about "the 
republican and monarchical part of our constitution" (Essays 64). The 
former part (the Commons) champions liberty, "and think[s] no evil 
comparable to subjection and slavery" (Essays 64-5). The latter, on 
the other hand, the Crown, seeks to preserve "order and peace" and so 
emphasises the need to be given greater authority (thereby limiting 
liberty), for only greater authority will combat "sedition and civil 
wars" (Essays 64).
In a mixed constitution each element acts as a check or balance on 
the others (T 564). In the British constitution this balance is 
between the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons. But this is only in 
theory. In practice, due to the frailty of the Lords, the elements 
which need to be balanced in the British constitution are the Crown and 
the Commons. Hume thinks that, while the monarchical part of the 
British constitution is "great", "the republican part...prevails" 
(Essays 12), and that the "just balance" between the two parts which in 
fact make up the British constitution is "extremely delicate and 
uncertain" (Essays 64). How is this fragile balance between Crown and 
Commons maintained? How, in other words, is the current constitution 
kept from tearing itself apart? By means of the "influence of the
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crown" (Essays 45 fn. 2), that is, royal patronage; or "we may call it 
by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence" (Essays 
45). It used to be that "talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent on earth
__dazzled mankind" (Essays 51), and that this reverence for the Crown
was able to keep the Commons at bay. Today, however, people have 
undergone "a sensible change in...[their] opinions" and any talk of the 
king as God's lieutenant does nothing (to Hume's approval) "but excite 
laughter in every one" (Essays 51). Given this loss of reverence for 
the Crown, it is only patronage (and the sense of interest that under­
lays it) that prevents this branch of the constitution from being 
swallowed up by the Commons. Thus, royal patronage is a practice 
"necessary to the preservation of our mixed government" (Essays 45). 
This is the only means by which the current Commons can be "confined 
within the proper limits" (Essays 44). (Later, we shall see why Hume 
is desperate to keep the current Cannons within its "proper limits".)
But patronage, Hume fears, is an inadequate means of holding the con­
stitution together. For there is always the possibility that patronage 
will collapse. Patronage, it seems, can work only "in times of tran­
quillity." During times of "shock or convulsion" the life-blood of 
patronage, "private interest and influence", are shattered, and, since 
the title of King no longer commands the respect it used to, the result 
(during times of disturbance) can only be that "the royal power...will
immediately dissolve" (Essays 51). Thus, a better way of keeping the
1balance between the Crown and Commons must be found.
This, then, is Hume's view of the constitution he wants to reform. 
In order to understand the reforms Hume proposes we must deal with a 
second point: Hume's fear of self-interest in politics.
According to Hume, people are not governed solely by self-interest:
CHAPTER 2 - 4 2
"'[T]is__rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken
together, do not over-balance all the selfish" (T 487). But this is 
true only in everyday life. In politics "every man ought to be 
supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than 
private interest" (Essays 42). Hume admits that it is "somewhat 
strange" that what is "true in politics" should be "false in fact", but 
this is how things are. For in politics, that one thing which 
restrains self-interest, "honour", vanishes as a result of partisan 
zeal and fervour (Essays 43).
Now, Hume thinks that those in power ought to rule with a view to the
"public good." This "ought to be their object", their "chief business" 
2(Essays 254). Given this, and given the prominence of self-interest 
in the political realm, Hume, "sounding a strong antimonarchical note"
3(as Stewart puts it), argues that we "ought not to trust the future 
government of a state entirely to chance, but ought to provide a system 
of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest 
posterity" (Essays 24). In other words, in the realm of politics the 
domination of individual interests must be prevented by means of im­
personal political structures. Only such structures can force private 
interests to work for the public good. But even where a government 
does embody such structures, every effort must be made to ensure that 
they operate efficiently. Thus, Hume argues that where a constitution 
divides authority among several bodies, it must ensure that one body 
can never swamp the others and govern in its own interest rather than 
that of the public. Such constitutions must have "particular checks 
and controuls" in order to make it in "the interest, even of bad men, 
to act for the public good." Where a constitution embodies the 
principle of the division of powers, but lacks the structures and
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controls necessary to prevent the complete domination of one power, as 
was the case in the badly-contrived republics of the ancient world, 
then the only result can be "disorder" and the "blackest crimes" 
(Essays 15-16):
When there offers, therefore, to our censure and ex­
amination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, 
where the power is distributed among several courts, 
and several orders of men, we should always consider 
the separate interest of each court, and each order; 
and, if we find that, by the skilful division of 
power, this interest must necessarily, in its opera­
tion, concur with public, we may pronounce that gov­
ernment to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, 
separate interest be not checked, and be not directed 
to the public, we ought to look for nothing but fac­
tion, disorder, and tyranny from such a government 
(Essays 43).4
Keeping in mind (a) Hume's view of the British constitution, (b) his 
fear of self-interest in politics and the need for rule by means of 
impartial structures, and (c) his call for the necessary "checks and 
controuls" in constitutions dividing authority among several parts, we 
can go on to examine the reforms Hume advocates for the British con­
stitution, reforms which are necessary "in order to bring it [i.e the 
British constitution] to the most perfect model of limited monarchy" 
(Essays 526).
(A) We have already noted that Hume wants to prevent the current 
Commons fron swamping the British constitution. Why? Because the 
Cannons, "according to its present constitution", is defective (Essays
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52), for it is made up of "zealots.. .who kindle up the passions of 
their parti zans, and under the pretence of public good, pursue the 
interests and ends of their particular faction" (Essays 27). To over­
come this problem, Hume recommends (a) that Britain's political parties 
be reformed and (b) that reforms be made to the constitution. We shall 
discuss the former reforms in the next section. Regarding the latter 
reforms, Hume calls for two changes to be made to the Commons in order 
to cure it of its defect.
(i) Constituencies should be made equal in terms of population (Essays 
526), thus eliminating from the British political scene the 217 
boroughs, most of which were sparsely populated and whose members were 
concerned to advance, not the public interest, but "their personal 
interests or those of their patrons."^
(ii) With the elimination of boroughs Britain would be left only with 
counties as electoral districts. Here, Hume recommends that the 
property qualification for those allowed to vote in county elections 
should be raised from forty shillings to property worth two hundred 
pounds (Essays 526). Why did Hume call for this reform? Probably for 
two reasons:
(a) Hume calls the current "ENGLISH electors" "an undistinguished 
rabble", for they lack "fortune and education" (Essays 523-24). The 
idea seems to be this: In those types of government which have a 
popular element, namely, limited monarchies and republics (both of 
which, as we shall see, Hume takes to be forms of "free government"), 
this popular element must be restricted to those people who have a 
strong and healthy cognitive faculty and a sound education. But in 
order for people to come to have these qualities they must have both 
"the greatest Leisure" and freedom from "providing for the Necessities
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of Life" (Essays 546). In other words, they must be people of 
"fortune". Only such people live in those conditions and in that 
environment which facilitate study and education. Thus, in raising the 
property qualification for those allowed to vote in the counties, Hume 
hopes to give Britain a better type of voter, a voter who on election 
day will be able to make a better decision due to his "fortune" and, 
consequently, his "education".
(b) The second reason for Hume's dissatisfaction with the present forty 
shilling freehold qualification in the counties has to do with his view 
that this qualification does not produce independent voters. In The 
History of England Hume notes the establishment of this qualification 
in the fifteenth century with approval. However, he laments, "it were 
to be wished, that the spirit, as well as the letter of this law, had 
been maintained" (H 2 452-53). To understand what Hume has in mind 
here we should note that in Hume's Britain freeholders who met the pre­
scribed property qualification were, theoretically, independent and 
thus could vote as they saw fit. However, in reality, few were wealthy 
enough to resist pressure from above and vote independently. Since 
voting was open, these freeholders had to be careful not to offend the 
great and, thus, had to vote in accordance with the wishes of those 
upon whcm they depended for a living or for favours. When voting, 
then, most freeholders expressed the interests of local magnates, 
bishops, government patrons etc.^ Now, we have already noted Hume's 
demand that the various bodies of a free constitution be independent. 
But, clearly, the situation described above destroys any hope of such 
independence. Hume wants to rectify this by raising the current county 
property qualification to such a level as to ensure that county voters 
are independent enough so as not to fall under the influence of the
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great.
(B) As a result of these changes to the Commons, Hume thinks that 
changes should also be made to the Lords. We have seen that Hume was 
worried about forms of government which divide authority among several 
bodies but do not prevent one faction or interest from completely 
swamping the others. Thus, if the changes mentioned above are made to 
the Commons while the Lords is left as it is, then Hume fears that this 
latter House will be "frail" and unable to deal with a Commons which 
has become "too weighty" (Essays 527). Clearly, such a thing must be 
prevented fron happening. Thus, changes to the Lords must be made in 
order that it may act as a restraint on the Conmons.
But this is not the only reason why Hume thinks that the Lords needs 
to be reformed. We saw above that, according to Hume, the current 
Lords depends upon the Crown for any authority it might have. Given 
Hume's view regarding the independence of the various bodies which make 
up those constitutions which embody the principle of the division of 
powers, it follows that the Lords must become independent of the Crown. 
This is necessary, Hume thinks, in order that this body can act as a 
restraint on the Crown. In any monarchy, absolute or limited, there 
must be an "independent powerful nobility, interposed between...[the 
public] and the monarch." Without such a "nobility" the public is 
"totally naked, defenceless, and disarmed." Hume laments that, at 
present, Britain is without such a "nobility" (H 4 370). This is 
dangerous, for without a "middle power between king and people... a 
grievous despotism must infallibly prevail" (Essays 358). Thus, Hume 
thinks that the Lords must be reformed, not only in order to act as a 
restraint on the Commons, but also in order that it can act as an 
independent nobility and check the power of the king.
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We must pause here and expand on what has just been said in order to
fully understand Hume's talk of the need for an independent nobility in
Britain. According to Hume, every society, regardless of its form of
government, will, as a matter of fact, be divided into ranks, for ranks
"arise necessarily, because uniformly, fron the necessary and uniform
7principles of human nature" (T 402). As we shall see, even the 
society of the Perfect Commonwealth will be divided into ranks. The 
division of society into ranks is inevitable. Now, according to Hume, 
in every society there will be a group of people who will receive their 
high rank as a result of governmental appointment. Others, however, do 
not derive their "authority" and "influence" "from the commission alone 
of the sovereign" (Essays 358). Their high rank in society is inde­
pendent of the sovereign's "smile and favour" (Essays 22). Instead, it 
is "instituted by the hand of nature" (Essays 358). Less poetically, 
their authority in society is determined by one or more "of the other 
sources of honour" namely "[bjirths, titles, possessions, valour, in­
tegrity, knowledge, or great and fortunate atchievements" (Essays 22). 
Which independent "source of honour" operates in any society depends 
upon its form of government. For example, in an absolute "civilized" 
monarchy it is "[b]irths, title, and place" which form this source 
(Essays 93), along with "hereditary riches" (E II 248) and "wit, 
complaisance, or civility" (Essays 126), while in a "free government" 
the source is "industry and [present] riches" (Essays 93; E II 249) and 
"capacity, or knowledge" (Essays 126). Thus, in republican Holland 
"the governing part of...[the] state consists altogether of merchants" 
(given the source of value in a republic), while in monarchical 
Germany, Spain, and France "the governing part...consists chiefly of 
nobles and landed gentry" (by virtue of the source of value under that
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form of government)(Essays 207). We shall return to Hume's discussion 
of the relationship between form of government and rank later. For 
now, what is important is his view that in an absolute monarchy the 
nobility will form society's independently influential body, while in a 
free government (limited monarchies and republics) this position will 
be held by merchants, traders, manufacturers, that is, "the middle 
rank" (Essays 277).
This latter point causes problems for the interpreter of Hume. We 
have already noted that, for Hume, there is a need for an independent 
nobility in Britain in order to stand between the king and the people. 
Now, Britain is a limited monarchy, and Hume classifies such monarchies 
as free governments (Essays 10; Essays 265; Essays 493), along with 
republics. But free governments, we have just been told, have as their 
independent power the middle rank. Thus, on the one hand, Hume talks 
of the need in Britain for an independent power in the form of a 
nobility, and, on the other, we are told that in Britain, as in all 
nations with a free government, the middle rank will rise as that 
nation's independent power. How can we solve this confusion?
As we saw earlier, Hume thinks that in the British constitution the 
republican element prevails. Given his view about the relationship 
between form of government and rank, he believes that in Britain today 
"the chief source of distinction" is "present opulence and plenty" (E 
II 248-49). But the British constitution also has a monarchical ele­
ment and, therefore, in Britain, titles, blood, hereditary wealth etc 
are also a source of rank. In other words, Hume thinks that in Britain 
today (given that its government is a combination of both monarchy and 
republicanism) "[t]he people in authority are composed of gentry and 
merchants" (Essays 207). This, he thinks, is how things in fact are.
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But this is not how they ought to be. For, as we noted earlier, Hume 
thinks that in any monarchy, absolute or limited, it is the nobility 
who ought to be independently powerful. In other words, given 
Britain's form of government, both the nobility and the merchants are 
in authority. But given also that Britain is a monarchy, only the 
nobles ought to be in authority. We shall see later that Hume has a 
clear preference for the middle rank as society's independently 
powerful. But this situation must only exist in the other type of free 
government, a republic. In a monarchy, including a limited or free 
one, the nobility must form the independent power.
Hume thinks, then, that every society, regardless of its form of 
government, will in fact have people who have authority and influence 
without the sovereign's blessing. This is how things are, and this is 
how things ought to be. For these independently influential people 
"form a kind of independent magistracy in a state" (Essays 358), and 
such a magistracy is of the utmost importance. Why? Because without 
it "[n]o expedient at all remains for resisting [the sovereign's] 
tyranny" (Essays 358). The idea is that where there is no group who 
derives its authority and influence from "the hand of nature", but only 
from the hand of the sovereign, then there will be no one to keep a 
check on the activities of the sovereign. And it is important that 
such a check exists in society for "authority...ought never, in any 
constitution, to become quite entire and uncontroulable" (Essays 40). 
It is the function of those who are independently influential and 
respected to see to it that the sovereign's power is always kept within 
its proper limits. When the sovereign displays tyrannical tendencies, 
then, he will be opposed by the "independent magistracy". And, impor-
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tantly, in this opposition, this independent body will be supported by 
the lower orders. For, "rank, and station, has a mighty influence over 
men" (Essays 39) and, clearly, Hume thinks that rank which is the 
result of the "hand of nature" rather than of the sovereign's "smiles 
and favours" has the greatest influence. Such people are the "leaders" 
of society (Essays 22), and are imitated by the rest of society. There 
is "[an] imitation of superiors...[by] the people" (Essays 207). Thus, 
society's "independent magistracy" will have the respect of the common 
people and will be supported and followed by them in their attempt to 
challenge a bad sovereign. Similarly, members of the "independent 
magistracy" will support a good sovereign, and in doing so they will
g
carry the people with them (given the power of imitation).
Every political society must have an "independent magistracy" in 
order to support the sovereign when he deserves it, and oppose him when 
he behaves inappropriately. In Britain, as in every monarchical form 
of government, this checking function ought to be preformed by an 
independent nobility. But, as we saw, Hume thinks that Britain has no 
such nobility.
What Britain needs, then, is a Lords made up of an appropriate 
nobility which will act as a check upon both the Commons and the Crown. 
At present, the balance between these two parts of the constitution is 
maintained by means of patronage. But, as we saw, Hume believes that 
under certain circumstances patronage can fail, thus bringing the 
constitution to an end. The best way to ensure the balance between the 
Commons and the Crown is by means of a strong and independent Lords.
With all this in mind we can return to our discussion and ask: What 
changes does Hume think should be made to the Lords so that it can 
properly perform its function in the constitution?
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Not surprisingly, one change that is needed is that regarding the 
type of people, type of aristocrats, sitting in that House. What is 
needed is what is now lacking, namely, a Lords made up "entirely of the 
men of chief credit, abilities, and interest in the nation" (Essays 
527), rather than of incompetent men who owe their position to fortune. 
Only nobles of the former type will be able to play the role of 
society's "leaders" and form an adequate "independent magistracy". 
Only they will be able to act as a balance in Britain's mixed govern­
ment. Thus, Hume recommends that seats in the Lords ought not to be 
hereditary, but must instead be based on "the election of their own
members". At the same time he thinks that an increase in the number of
9Lords to three or four hundred is also essential. If the Lords is to
perform its role, then, not only must it be strengthened in quality,
but also in quantity. Hume also thinks that the bishops ought to be
removed from the Lords, along with the "SCOTCH peers". Why? Undoubt-
ably because this House's twenty-six bishops and sixteen Scottish
10representatives were fully under the control of the king's ministers. 
Thus, expelling these two groups from the Lords is essential if that 
House is to become an independent body. Finally, Hume declares that if 
any commoner is called to take a seat in the Lords he should not be 
allowed to refuse (Essays 527).
Here, then, we have a good example of a conservative/radical reform. 
Working within the existing constitutional framework, Hume is prepared 
to tamper with the current constitution in significant ways, extirpat­
ing old, well-established practices, and introducing new and novel 
ones. His reforms will fundamentally alter the complex relationship 
between the various parts of the constitution. They will alter the 
make-up of the two Houses of Parliament. And, they will provide
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society with a new and better independent magistracy which will lead 
society in a new and better direction (given the power of imitation).
But here we should note that, according to Hume, even if these 
reforms were introduced, and Britain were transformed into "the most 
perfect model of limited monarchy", the new constitution would still be 
defective, it would be "still liable to three great inconveniences"
(Essays 527):
(A) First, the division between the Court and Country parties would 
remain (Essays 527). Why? As mentioned at the beginning of this sec­
tion, Hume sees the British constitution as a mixture of a republican 
and a monarchical element, a mixture of Liberty and Authority. As a 
result, parties of Liberty and Authority (i.e Country and Court) are 
"involved in the very nature of our constitution" even in its most 
perfect form. Court and Country parties "will always subsist, so long 
as we are governed by a limited monarchy" (Essays 65), even a perfect 
limited monarchy. But why is this an "inconvenience"? Because such 
parties are parties of principle and such parties are violent. We 
shall say more about this in the next section.
(B) Second, the running of the constitution would still depend greatly 
upon the "king's personal character", thus creating "variable and 
uncertain circumstances" (Essays 527). To understand this complaint we 
must note that the British monarch inherits his position. But 
hereditary monarchy leaves too much to chance: "The power of the crown 
is always lodged in a single person, either king or minister; and as 
this person may have either a greater or lesser degree of ambition, 
capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power, which is too 
great in one hand, may become too little in another" (Essays 46). But
can't the power of the crown in a limited monarchy be defined in a
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precise way so that it will not vary according to who is sitting on the 
throne? No. True, in a limited monarchy the crown is checked by the 
other parts of constitution. But it is never "possible to assign to 
the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, 
form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of the constitution"
(Essays 46). As a result, limited monarchies are inherently unstable. 
Such instability is "an unavoidable disadvantage" of limited monarchy 
(Essays 46). And note that this problem cannot be overcome by trans­
forming the hereditary monarchy into an elective one in the hope of 
ensuring that the monarch is of the appropriate character. For such a 
transformation would be disastrous. For one thing, the election of a 
king "is a point of too great and too general interest, not to divide 
the whole people into factions: Whence a civil war, the greatest of 
ills, may be apprehended, almost with certainty, upon every vacancy"
(Essays 18; Essays 503-04). Further, it is very unlikely that the 
election of a monarch would bring to power a suitable person, for 
candidates will always "employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure 
the votes of the electors: So that such an election will give no 
better chance for superior merit in the prince, than if the state had 
trusted to birth alone for determining their sovereign." Hume, 
therefore, concludes that "an hereditary prince...[is] the best 
MONARCHY" (Essays 18). But hereditary limited monarchies, as we have 
just seen, have their problems i.e they are inherently unstable.
(C) The final defect of a perfect British limited monarchy is the 
continued existence of a standing army (Essays 527). Hume prefers a 
militia to a standing army. The former is "the only method of securing 
a people fully, both against domestic oppression and foreign conquest" 
(Essays 509). A standing army, however, is dangerous, "the beaten
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road...to arbitrary government (Essays 363). Thus, Britain's standing 
army is "a mortal distemper in the BRITISH government, of which it must 
at last inevitably perish" (Essays 647), perish, that is, into military 
despotism. The important question for us is why Hume thinks that even 
a perfect British limited monarchy will have to retain a standing army. 
The answer seems to be because there are many Britons who still dispute 
the legitimacy of the Hanoverian title (Essays 502-11). But "[a] 
prince, who fills the throne with a disputed title, dares not arm his 
subjects" (Essays 509).
Thus, even if the progressive reforms outlined above were introduced 
into Britain, problems would remain. Even a perfect British limited 
monarchy would be defective. In order to reach perfection the British 
should strive to implement the reforms outlined in "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth", reforms which, as we shall see, are conservative/radical 
and will transform Britain into a well-contrived republic.
II
We noted in the previous section that, according to Hume, the current 
House of Commons is defective, for it is made up of men who zealously 
pursue the interests of their own party rather than the public good 
(Essays 27). Thus, those who desire to preserve the existing British 
constitution must reform the Commons by (a) reforming the constitution, 
and (b) reforming the British political-party system. We have already 
discussed (a). It is now time to discuss (b). This discussion is 
important for our purpose. For, as we have seen, Hume thinks that 
political parties are involved in the very nature of the British 
constitution. Thus, to tamper with Britain's system of political
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parties is to tamper with a fundamental element of the British polity. 
And, as we shall see, the tampering that Hume recommends regarding 
Britain's existing political-party system is non-conservative in 
nature.
Hume had a very low opinion of political parties. They "subvert 
government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities 
among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and 
protection to each other." Thus, "founders of sects and factions 
[ought] to be detested and hated" (Essays 55). However, despite this 
contempt, Hume was prepared to accept the existence of factions in 
Britain. Why? Because, (a) the division of humans into factions is an 
inevitable result of human nature: "Factions...naturally propagate 
themselves [among humans]" (Essays 55); (b) limited monarchy is a form 
of free government, and "[t]o abolish all distinctions of party may not 
be practicable, perhaps not desirable, in a free government" (Essays 
493; Essays 407); and (c) as we saw in the previous section, Hume 
thinks that parties are a natural consequence of the British constitu­
tion. Given that this constitution has a monarchical and a republican 
element, it follows that, "according to the various prejudices, 
interests, and dispositions of men, sane will ever attach themselves 
with more passion to the regal, others to the popular part of the 
government" (H 6 375- 76; Essays 64-65), thus yielding parties of 
Authority and Liberty. For these reasons, then, Hume does not argue 
for the elimination of political parties fron Britain. However, the 
parties he recommends for Britain are in important ways different from 
the existing ones.
Consistent with his mitigated scepticism, Hume labels himself a 
"friend to moderation" in politics (Essays 15), and describes his role
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as one of "promoting moderation" in the realm of party politics (Essays 
27). He expresses the hope to "teach us a lesson of moderation in all 
our political controversies" (Essays 53), for "[m]oderation is of 
advantage to every establishment" (Essays 500). (And here, with this 
talk of "promoting moderation", we have more evidence, if more were 
needed, that Hume wrote in order to influence the public). This 
political moderation is to be contrasted with "party-rage and preju­
dices" (Essays 87), that is, with zealous party loyalties. Hume was 
greatly concerned to put a bridle on the passions of the "party- 
zealots" (Essays 28).
In accordance with this role as an enemy of political zealotry, and 
true to his aim to promote political moderation, Hume announces his 
desire to introduce "moderation with regard to the parties, into which 
our country is at present divided" (Essays 27). According to Hume, his 
country is at present divided into two sets of parties. The first is 
that between Court and Country (Essays 65). But he adds that "court 
and country are not our only parties" (Essays 72). For the division 
between Whigs and Tories continues to exist. Neither was it abolished 
after the Revolution nor is it "now abolished" (Essays 71-72), but 
continues to exist and "to confound and distract our government" 
(Essays 69).
At this point we should say something about the relationship between
these two sets of parties, a relationship which greatly complicated
11Britain's political-party scene. Very briefly, by Hume's time, the 
modern Whigs, who had held power continuously from 1715 to 1742, had 
moved into the government or Court faction, while most Tories, and seme 
old-fashioned pre-1688 Whigs, had joined the ranks of the opposition or 
Country faction. Now this created an odd situation. For the Social
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Contract Theory (with its emphasis on liberty and the right to revolu­
tion) was a fundamental part of Whiggism, while Tories held onto the 
principle of the Divine Right of Kings and the related principle of 
Passive Obedience (with its emphasis on greater royal authority). But 
as members of the government or Court faction, Whigs naturally stressed 
the need for greater executive power, while Tories, as members of the 
opposition, naturally began to talk of the need to limit governmental 
power. In short, then, Whigs and Tories had switched languages. 
Hume's aim was to change this messy situation by eradicating the Whig/ 
Tory division thus leaving Britain, not only with a Court and a Country 
faction, but, as we shall see, with a much improved version of this 
party division. ^
Hume had no sympathy for the Whig/Tory division. As we noted, he 
describes this division as confounding and distracting the task of the 
British government. He also describes it as an "extrinsic weight" on 
the constitution which "turns it fron its natural course, and causes a 
confusion in our parties" (Essays 72). And in 1763 he was glad that 
"the Factions of Whig and Tory" are "in a manner extinguished" (L I 
385). But, as we have seen, Hume was also dissatisfied with the Court/ 
Country division. One of the defects of the improved British constitu­
tion examined above was that this party division would remain. How­
ever, despite his dissatisfaction with the Court/Country division, Hume 
sought to retain it, and we shall see why later. Thus, his description 
of this party division is much more favourable than that of the Whig/ 
Tory one. A number of times he describes it as Britain's only "genuine 
[party] division" (Essays 65; Essays 71).
Why was Hume opposed to the Whig/Tory division? To answer this 
question we must look at Hume's classification of political parties.
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Hume divides parties into "PERSONAL" and "REAL" (Essays 56). Only 
the latter is important for us. He divides "real" parties into three 
sub-groups, "those from interest, from principle, and fron affection"
(Essays 59).
Parties of Interest: As the name suggests, parties of interest spring
up among "distinct orders of men" (e.g merchants, soldiers, nobles, the 
people etc (Essays 60)), who share the same interests, and seek to 
promote these in the political arena. According to Hume, such parties 
"are the most reasonable, and the most excusable" (Essays 59), indicat­
ing that, for him, important interests ought to be allowed to express
themselves in political society. Importantly, parties of interest will
13exist in the Perfect Commonwealth (Essays 525).
Parties of Affection: These parties "are often very violent" and are
made up of those who have a love for "particular families and persons,
whom they desire to rule over them" (Essays 63). The Whig and Tory
parties are parties of affection: "A TORY...[is] a partizan of the
family of STUART... [while] a WHIG__[is] a friend to the settlement in
the PROTESTANT line [i.e the House of Hanover]" (Essays 71). Given
that the Whig and Tory parties are parties of affection, and given that
such parties are violent, Hume seeks to undermine the affectional
attachments of these two factions. He tries to achieve this in two
14ways. First, he points out, "with impartiality", the advantages and 
disadvantages of having each family as Britain's ruling family (Essays 
502). By doing so, he hopes to make each side see the strengths and 
weaknesses of having its beloved family in power, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of having in power the family which is the object of its 
hatred. If this can be achieved, then there is a good chance that 
affectional attachments will loosen. Secondly, Hume directs his atten-
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tion to the Tories and reminds them of two things: (a) The House of 
Hanover came to the throne "without intrigue, without cabal, without 
solicitation", but by "the united voice of the whole legislative body", 
and this must count for something (Essays 511). (b) Disputing the title 
of the Hanoverians "brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions", 
but no "wise man" would want such evils visited upon his nation (Essays 
511). Tories, therefore, must abandon their affection for the Stuarts. 
But in giving Tories this advice we can take Hume as hoping, not only 
to weaken the Tory affection for the Stuarts, but also the Whig affec­
tion for the Hanoverians. For Hume is convinced that "an over-active 
zeal in friends is apt to beget a like spirit in antagonists" (Essays 
500). That is, a group, A, which zealously clings to its own position, 
will cause an opposing group, not-A, to do the same, thus leading to 
violent conflict between these two groups. But, if members of A 
moderate their zeal, their opponents will follow. Thus, if those af­
fectionately tied to the Stuarts can be made to lessen this affection, 
then the Whig affection for the Hanoverians will also weaken.
Parties of Principle: The Whig and Tory parties are not only parties 
of affection, but also parties of principle. Hume gives this latter 
label to those factions which are founded on "abstract speculative 
principle[s]" (Essays 60), on "a philosophical or speculative system of 
principles" (Essays 465). Such factions breed nothing but strife. In 
fact, members of such factions cannot even pass each other "without 
shocking" (Essays 60). Why? Hume gives us two reasons:
(a) Hume thinks that, as a result of sympathetic perception, the human 
mind is able to receive the sentiments and opinions of neighbouring 
minds (T 317-20). Thus, "such is the nature of the human mind, that it 
always lays hold on every mind that approaches it" (Essays 60). As we
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shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, Humean sympathy brings people together. 
However, this is not always the case. Sometimes sympathetic perception 
pulls people apart. And here we have a case in point. For once a mind 
sympathetically perceives that a neighbouring mind is the owner of 
principles and beliefs contrary to its own, it becomes "shocked and 
disturbed" (Essays 60-61). Minds love other minds which hold senti­
ments and opinions identical to their own, but hate "any contrariety 
...[H]ence their impatience of opposition, even in the most speculative 
and indifferent opinions" (Essays 60-61).
(b) Supporters of speculatively founded sects, Hume thinks, "explain, 
comment, confute, and defend with all the subtilty of argument and 
science" (Essays 62). In other words, these supporters see themselves 
as owners of The Truth. As a result, they have nothing but "hatred and 
antipathy" for all those not on their side (Essays 63). Because each 
side believes itself to be in possession of The Truth and thinks that 
the other side is labouring under falsehood "[e]ach [side] naturally 
wishes that right may take place, according to his own notion of it" 
(Essays 60).
For these reasons, then, parties of principle cause violence. They 
are "the poison of human society, and the source of the most inveterate 
factions in every government" (Essays 62). Thus they must be opposed. 
Since the Whig and the Tory parties are parties of principle, Hume 
seeks to undermine the speculative principles upon which they are 
founded, namely, Social Contractarianism in the case of the Whigs 
(Essays 465-87) and Divine Rights theory and Passive Obedience in the 
case of the Tories (Essays 488-92). Hume's attack on these principles 
is designed to show members of each party that their principles are not 
"so fully supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter themselves"
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(Essays 494). He hopes that by showing both factions the absurdity of 
their speculative principles, he will weaken the grip that these 
principles have on the minds of their supporters.
So far we have seen that Hume hopes to eliminate the Whig/Tory
division by attacking their affectional and philosophical foundations.
But undermining Whiggism and Toryism requires more than this. It is
also necessary to attack the historical myths that each party had cane
to embrace with regard to the constitution (Essays 494). One of Hume's
aims in The History of England was to dispel these myths by showing
that the political system of contemporary Britain was the result of
15historical accidents and unforeseen circumstances.
With their affectional, philosophical, and historical attachments 
eliminated, Whigs and Tories would be transformed into pure parties of 
Liberty and Authority respectively. But, if this is so, then the 
Whig/Tory division becomes obsolete, for the Country and Court factions 
themselves are factions of Liberty and Authority respectively. When 
considering the British constitution,
some will incline to trust greater powers to the crown 
to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against 
its encroachments with less caution, than others who 
are terrified at the most distant approaches of 
tyranny and despotic power. Thus are there parties of 
PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our constitu­
tion, which may properly enough be denominated those 
of COURT and COUNTRY (Essays 65).
And here we should remember Hume's judgement that the only "genuine" 
party division in eighteenth century Britain is that between Court and 
Country. Once Whigs and Tories are freed from their blinding attach-
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ments only this "genuine" party division will remain.
It is surprising that Hume sought to retain the Court/Country divi­
sion, surprising because as the above quote makes clear he considers 
these parties to be parties of principle. But, as we know, Hume was 
not a friend of factions founded on principles. Why, then, did he not 
call for the removal of these two factions fron the British political 
scene?
One reason no doubt is because such parties are embedded in the very 
fabric of the British constitution. The constitution is a mixture of a 
republican and a monarchical element and, thus, naturally gives rise to 
parties founded on the principles of Liberty and Authority. But this 
explanation is not adequate, for, as we saw above, Hume thinks that, 
the Whig and Tory parties, once cleansed of their sentimental, philos­
ophical, and historical attachments, are able to become pure parties of 
Liberty and Authority. But if this is so, then why does he not argue 
for the elimination of the Court/Country division and the reformation 
and retention of the (cleansed) Whig/Tory division?
The answer is this: Because, unlike the Whig and Tory parties, those
of Court and Country are, not only parties of principle, but also
parties of interest (Essays 65). Now, Hume calls parties of interest
"[t]he chief support of the BRITISH government" (Essays 525) and, as we
saw, he thinks that such parties are "reasonable" and "excusable" in
the sense that different interests in a political society must be
allowed to express themselves. In Britain these interests can find
16expression through the Court and Country factions. To remove them 
would be to remove an essential pillar of the British state.
Given that Court and Country parties (as parties of Authority and
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17Liberty) are woven into the very nature of the constitution (even in
its most perfect form, as we saw in the previous section) and, more
importantly, that, as parties of interest, they are a "chief support"
18of this constitution, Hume cannot call for their elimination. But 
given that such parties are also parties of principle and, therefore, 
inherently dangerous, Hume calls for members of both the Court and 
Country parties to take a number of steps to avoid the evils that 
parties of principle breed.
First, members must be less zealous both in the defence of the their 
principle and in their attacks on the principle of their opponents. 
Court and Country members, no doubt, have no interest in seeing the 
current constitution dissolve. Thus, as "reasonable men" they "will 
agree in general to preserve our mixed government" (Essays 65). But 
such preservation requires that these supporters realise that both the 
principles of Liberty and Authority, that is, both the republican and 
the monarchical elements of the constitution, are essential to its 
continued existence. Members of each faction must acknowledge that the 
continued existence of the current constitution requires respect for 
the other faction's principle. They must cease being blinded by 
"particulars" (Essays 65), viciously defending their own principle and 
ignoring the equally essential principle of their opponents. If they 
continue to cling to "particulars" they will end up tearing the
constitution apart. "Let us therefore, try if possible__to draw a
lesson of moderation with regard to the parties, into which our country 
is at present divided" (Essays 27). Partisan zeal must be abandoned. 
Moderation is the only way forward.
Secondly, Hume calls for members of both factions to be less zealous 
both in the defence of their ministers and in the attacks upon the
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ministers of their opponents (Essays 27-28). Hume complains that such 
behaviour only leads to "an extraordinary ferment" among members of 
both factions, which in turn has the dangerous consequence of "fil­
l i n g  ] the nation with violent animosities" (Essays 28).
We noted above Hume's view that once members of a group lessen the 
zeal with which they cling to their position, then members of the 
opposing group will follow. Thus, once Court and Country supporters 
moderate their positions, once they lessen the zeal with which they 
support their principles and ministers and attack the principles and 
ministers of their opponents, both will achieve a moderate position 
with respect to each other and ccme to examine and sonetimes even admit 
the criticisms of the other side (Essays 30-31).
Hume thinks that, once Court and Country members acquire respect for 
each other's principles and see that the principle of their opponent is 
essential for the continued existence of the present constitution, then 
there can be a true "coalition of parties", in the sense that the 
parties will no longer come to blows over "the essentials of govern­
ment" (Essays 493). No longer will parties clash over the principles 
of Liberty and Authority, but only over interests. The Court and 
Country parties are both parties of principle and parties of interest. 
By embracing moderation they will cease to cane to blows over 
principles and argue only over their competing interests. Such a
situation is ideal, and such a situation will exist in the Perfect
19Commonwealth (Essays 525).
Political parties (founded on the principles of Liberty and Author­
ity) are a natural offspring of the British constitution. And parties 
of interest are the "chief support" of this constitution. But these 
elements of the British polity (as they currently exist) are defective.
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Thus, Hume recommends to those whose aim it is to preserve the existing 
British constitution to reform these elements. He does not call for 
their elimination, but he does argue that they ought to be reformed in 
a significant and progressive way, in a conservative/radical way.
Ill
The subject of economics attracted a good deal of Hume's attention.
And, with respect to this subject, Hume clearly reveals his desire to
significantly improve the prevailing beliefs of the day:
[I]t must be owned, that nothing can be of more use
than to improve, by practice, the method of reasoning
on these [economic] subjects, which of all others are
the most important; though they are commonly treated
in the loosest and most careless manner" (Essays 304).
According to one commentator, Hume's economic writings "did much to
dissipate some of the generally accepted anti-liberal economic pre-
20judices of the time." Whether or not it is true that Hume's economic
writings did in fact have such a practical impact on the contemporary
economic scene is not important for us here. What is important is the
claim that, with these writings, Hume hoped to overturn certain well-
established, "generally accepted", economic beliefs. To show the truth
of this claim I shall, due to a lack of space, restrict myself to an
investigation of Hume's treatment of two economic issues, namely (A)
21national wealth and (B) international trade. This investigation will 
draw attention to features of Hume's thought which are relevant to and 
important for our purpose, not only in this chapter, but in this thesis
as a whole.
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(A) In the area of national wealth the prevailing belief at the time 
was that of the mercantilists, who argued, briefly, that the wealth and 
prosperity of a nation is determined by its gold and silver stocks 
(i.e. its money). Thus, mercantilists argued that the government 
should institute policies which encourage the keeping of its gold and 
silver at home. The nation should not expend its gold and silver 
stocks, but, instead, seek to increase them, thus increasing its 
wealth.
Hume was eager to show the falsity of this position. He asks us to 
"[sjuppose four-fifths of the money in GREAT BRITAIN to be annihilated 
in one night...[W]hat would be the consequence?" (Essays 311). The 
consequence would not be that Britain was suddenly four-fifths poorer 
than the night before. Rather the result would be a decrease in all 
prices due to a fall in the proportion between money and goods. This 
change in the value of Britain's goods would increase Britain's 
exports, and there would be a "flowing in of money". "In how little 
time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and 
raise us to the level of all the neighbouring nations?" Soon, the 
price of British goods would rise and the "flowing in of money" would 
stop (Essays 311).
Again, Hume asks us to imagine that "all the money of GREAT BRITAIN 
were multiplied fivefold in a night" (Essays 311). The result would 
not be that Britain was suddenly five times richer, but rather an 
increase in the price of British goods (since prices depend on the 
proportion between goods and money) and a consequent decrease in 
British exports and an increase in cheaper foreign imports "in spite of 
all the laws [prohibiting imports] which could be formed" (Essays 311).
As a result, "our money [would] flow out; till we fall to a level with
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foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches" (Essays 311-12).
For Hume, then, "in the common course of nature", money will always 
be "proportionable to the art and industry of each nation" (Essays 
312). That is, the money in the world will always flow fron nation to 
nation until it is proportionate to the industry and commodities of 
each country. And this flow of money cannot be prevented: "[l]t is 
impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper 
level" (Essays 312). Laws designed to restrict the flow of money are 
"ineffectual" (Essays 313).
Thus, mercantilists are wrong in thinking that by expending its money 
a nation is made poorer, or that by hoarding and increasing its money a 
nation is made richer. They are also wrong in thinking that such a 
hoarding is practicable. Money "never will heap up beyond its level"
(Essays 324).
For Hume, the true wealth of a nation lies, not in its supply of gold 
and silver, but in its domestic industry: "[I]t is of no manner of 
consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a state, whether 
money be in a greater or less quantity." Rather, "real power and 
riches" result fron "a spirit of industry in the nation" and its "stock 
of labour" (Essays 288). Thus, "a government has great reason to 
preserve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may 
safely trust to the course of human affairs, without fear or jealousy" 
(Essays 326). And if a government does pay attention to its money 
supply, "it ought only to be so far as it affects [industry and labour- 
force]" (Essays 326; Essays 288).
(B) Hume complains that, today "all nations of EUROPE, and none more 
than ENGLAND" have put "numberless bars, obstructions, and imposts" on
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free trade (Essays 324). In England, this anti-liberalism in the area 
of trade was due to the influence of the mercantilists. Because of 
their belief that a nation's wealth depends on its money supply, 
mercantilists feared free trade. Such a practice could always lead to 
an imbalance of imports over exports, and thus deplete a nation's gold 
and silver stocks. Hume finds this fear mistaken. As we have just 
seen, he believes that money will inevitably move among nations until 
it is proportionate to the industry and commodities of each, and the 
imbalance of imports over exports can only lead (for a time) to a 
greater "flowing in of money". Thus, the mercantilists' fear of 
unrestricted trade is unfounded.
Hume is convinced that trade barriers are (on the whole) harmful. 
For example, trade barriers are responsible for the famines in France 
(Essays 309). But Hume does admit that in seme cases trade barriers 
are beneficial and must be erected. The wealth of a nation lies in its 
domestic industry. Thus a government must "preserve with care its 
people and its manufactures" (Essays 326): "A tax on GERMAN linen 
encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and 
industry. A tax on brandy encreases the sale of rum, and supports our 
southern colonies" (Essays 324). Tariffs which protect and encourage 
local industry are approved of by Hume. What he disapproves of are 
those tariffs which spring fron a jealousy with regard to money: "All 
taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as 
prejudicial or useless, but those only which are founded on the 
jealousy [with regard to money]" (Essays 324).
The prevailing view that free trade is harmful because it depletes 
money supply and impoverishes a nation ought to be rejected. In "Of 
the Jealousy of Trade", Hume argues against a second long standing
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argument against free trade, namely, that free trade will cause a 
nation harm by contributing to the prosperity and well-being of neigh­
bouring nations. Hume has no patients with this common "narrow and 
malignant opinion" (Essays 328) and deploys two arguments against it.
(i) Hume reminds his readers that two centuries ago the agricultural 
and manufacturing arts in Britain were "extremely rude and imperfect"
(Essays 328). Since then, they have greatly improved, and this 
improvement "has arisen from our imitation of foreigners" (Essays 328).
For Hume "the emulation, which naturally arises among__neighbouring
nations" is "an obvious source of improvement" (Essays 119). Thus, 
without the successes and advances of neighbouring nations, and without 
the rousing effects of imitation, "we should have been at present 
barbarians" and the manufacturing arts in Britain would "fall into a 
state of languor" (Essays 329). The prosperity of foreigners has 
benefited Britain in the past, and it will continue to do so in the 
future.
(b) As we have seen, domestic industry is important to Hume. It is the 
source of a nation's wealth, and has many beneficial consequences as we 
shall see in the next section. But in order for domestic industry to 
grow in size and strength there must be someone out there to buy our 
products: "[A] state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very 
far, where all surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and 
barbarism" (Essays 328). Thus, "if our neighbours have no art or 
cultivation, they cannot take [our products]...because they will have 
nothing to give in exchange." Just like "[t]he riches of several 
members of a community contribute to encrease my riches", the riches of 
foreign nations will contribute to the wealth of Britain (Essays 329).
In short, then, Britain has nothing to fear from free trade and the
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prosperity that such trade will grant to her neighbours. In fact 
Britain should strive to improve the wealth of neighbouring nations. 
For without prosperous and wealthy neighbours the result for Britain 
will be no exports, no imports, and nothing to emulate, and Britain 
will fall into an "abject condition" (Essays 331).
If the nations of Europe continue with their "narrow and malignant 
politics" of tariffs and restrictions, then they will be reduced to 
"the same state of sloth and ignorance that prevails in MOROCCO and the 
coast of BARBARY" (Essays 331). Hume hopes that European nations (es­
pecially Britain) will soon drop their trade barriers. He concludes: 
[N]ot only as a man, but as a BRITISH subject, I pray 
for the flourishing commerce of GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY 
and even FRANCE itself. I am at least certain, that 
GREAT BRITAIN, and all those nations, would flourish 
more, did their sovereigns and ministers adopt such 
enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other 
(Essays 331).
Of all nations, Britain has the harshest trade barriers. Hume 
demands that these barriers be removed. What would be the result for 
Britain if this demand were to be put into practice? The answer is: 
The progressive reform of Britain's social and political institutions 
(given that economic causes have social and political effects). In 
other words, Hume's demand that Britain change her policy regarding 
trade can be seen as a demand for progressive social and political 
change. To see this, we must investigate Hume's attack on another 
prevailing belief of his time, namely, the evil of luxury.
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IV
Commerce is important to Hume. Thus, he approves of those things that 
promote commerce. This is (partly) why Hume approves of luxury, for 
"luxury nourishes commerce" (Essays 277). But at the same time, luxury 
is also the result of commerce, its most significant result:
The profit is also very great, in exporting what is 
superfluous at home, and what bears no price, to 
foreign nations, whose soil and climate is not favour­
able to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted 
with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of 
commerce; and their delicacy and industry, being once 
awakened, carry them on to farther improvements, in 
every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade.
And this perhaps is the chief advantage which arises 
from a commerce with strangers. It rouses men from 
their indolence [i.e provides them with work, in­
dustry ]; and presenting the gayer and more opulent 
part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they 
never before dreamed of, raises in them a desire of a 
more splendid way of life than what their ancestors 
enjoyed (Essays 264).
As the above quote makes clear, commerce, industry, and luxury are in­
extricably intertwined for Hume. We have already noted Hume's approval 
of commerce and his view that commerce fuels industry. We now discover 
that Hume extends the relationship between commerce and industry to 
include luxury, and together these three items have beneficial 
economic, social, and political consequences: "[A] kingdom, that has a
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large import and export, must abound more with industry, and that
employed upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom which rests 
contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more power­
ful, as well as richer and happier" (Essays 263). Given Hume's 
approval of commerce and industry, and given the relationship between 
commerce, industry, and luxury, it cones as no surprise that in his "Of 
Refinement in the Arts", Hume defends luxury (or "great refinement in 
the gratification of the senses" (Essays 268)). And in doing so he was 
going against prevailing belief. By 1756 "some forty eighteenth-
century periodicals had already carried out prolonged crusades against 
22luxury." Luxury, it was argued, destroys morality, pronotes
effeminacy (thus limiting a nations ability to defend itself) and
threatens the existence of the state. Hume's aim is to show that this
23view is mistaken. On the contrary, "the ages of refinement are both
the happiest and most virtuous" (Essays 269). Thus, "[the] men of
severe morals" are wrong to "represent...[luxury] as the source of all
the corruptions, disorders, and factions, incident to civil government"
(Essays 269). In what follows I shall consider Hume's arguments
against the "severe moralists" (Essays 275), and his defence of luxury
24(and, therefore, of industry and commerce) in detail. This for two 
reasons:
(i) Such a detailed treatment will bring out a point in Hume's thought
which is important for the purpose of this thesis as a whole, namely,
that, in Hume's view, the modern luxurious commercial society is the
best of all societies. Those who deny the value of modern commercial
society, who "declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of
25remote ancestors" are wrong (Essays 278).
(ii) Second, such a detailed treatment will make it clear that, for
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Hume, the growth of luxury (and hence of industry and commerce) has a 
progressive inpact upon the economic, social, and political realms of a 
state. Hume's defence of luxury (and hence of industry and commerce) 
can be seen as a defence of progressive improvement.
Hume's defence of luxury revolves around defending the "mechanical 
arts" (or "arts of luxury" (Essays 256)) by means of which luxury is 
produced. He accepts the "received notion" that human happiness is 
made up of three elements, "action, pleasure, and indolence" (Essays 
269). Given that people are different, these elements will be (and 
"ought to be") "mixed in different proportions" in different people. 
But if any one element is lacking, then "the relish of the whole 
composition" will be destroyed (Essays 270). Now, Hume goes on to 
argue that people are happiest when they "are kept in perpetual 
occupation", making use of those "mechanical arts" by means of which 
items of luxury are produced. As a result of such work people, "enjoy, 
as their reward, the occupation itself, as well as those pleasures 
which are the fruit of their labour." Where a society has no industry, 
no "mechanical arts" (and, therefore, no luxury), "you deprive men both 
of action and of pleasure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their 
place, you even destroy the relish of indolence, which never is agree­
able, but when it succeeds to labour" (Essays 270). The production of 
luxury items, therefore, is essential to human happiness. But this is 
not all. Luxury feeds the "natural appetites" and quashes the "un­
natural ones" which usually grow as a result of a life of "ease and 
idleness" (Essays 270), a life which must follow where the "mechanical 
arts" or "arts of luxury" are not practised. Idleness, Hume thinks, is 
dangerous: "Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human
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life arise from idleness" (D 238).^ An idle life is filled with
nothing but vicious excesses. Take, for example, the Tartars. Nothing
but "beastly gluttony" and "drunkenness" and other such vices (Essays
271-72). In contrast "[t]he more men refine upon pleasure, the less
they will indulge in excesses of any kind" (Essays 271). For Hume,
27then, luxury contributes both to human happiness and to virtue.
A second advantage of the "mechanical arts" is that "[t]he mind
acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties" (Essays 270),
and this in turn contributes to the progress of the "liberal" arts (e.g
poetry, philosophy etc). In fact neither of these two sorts of art can
"be carried to perfection, without being accompanied, in some degree,
with the other" (Essays 270). As a result of this progress in the
manufacturing and liberal arts, "[p]rofound ignorance is totally
banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think
as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as
those of the body" (Essays 271). This is important. For as the minds
of people improve, as their knowledge of arts and sciences increases,
they become "more sociable" and are no longer "contented to remain in
solitude" but "flock into cities" (Essays 271). (For Hume, "a perfect
solitude is perhaps the greatest punishment we can suffer" (T 363). We
shall discuss Hume's views on the sociability of man in Chapter 4). In
cities, Hume thinks, people can satisfy their desire to "receive and
communicate knowledge; to show their wit or their breeding; their taste
in conversation or living, in clothes or furniture." As a result of
this contact, manners improve, "and the tempers of men, as well as
28their behaviour, refine apace" (Essays 271). In other words, progress 
in the "arts of luxury" leads, ultimately, to "an encrease of humanity" 
among the population. In societies with industry, commerce, and
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luxury people are less ferocious, less barbaric, less mean, less
ignorant and more knowledgeable, tender, and humane.
Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked
together by an indissoluble chain, and are found,
fron experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to
the more polished, and, what are commonly denomin-
29ated, the more luxurious ages (Essays 271).
Hume is now faced with a problem. If luxury makes people more tender 
and humane, then aren't the "severe moralist" right in condemning 
luxury for making people less suited to war, and therefore less able to 
defend their nation? Hume's answer is, No. While people in luxurious 
societies lose their "ferocity", they do not lose their "martial 
spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence of their 
country or their liberty" (Essays 274). The "mechanical arts" make 
people stronger in mind and body and, thus, more able to defend their 
nation. Further, people of great "politeness and refinement" have a 
high "sense of honour" making them better fighters. This sense of 
honour is a result of their "knowledge and good education." This 
increased knowledge also leads to greater "martial skill", a better 
insight into "the art of war". Finally, inhabitants of a luxurious 
commercial society will be able to return to civilian life once they 
have left the battle field without losing any of their humanity: 
"[A]fter the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men 
against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of 
the brute, and resume the man" (Essays 274).
In "Of Commerce" Hume brings out more good social consequences of the 
modern luxurious commercial state.
(i) Hume was aware of the nasty conditions in which the poor lived,
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conditions of "want, penury, hard labour, dirty furniture, coarse or 
ragged clothes, nauseous meat and distasteful liquor" (E II 248). He 
was interested in improving their condition. Thus, responding to those 
who complained that, due to high labour costs, British products were 
uncompetitive, Hume replied that this disadvantage "is not to be put in 
competition with the happiness of so many millions [of workers]"
(Essays 265). The improvement of the standard of living of the poor is 
another beneficial consequence of a luxurious corniercial society. For 
only in such a society can there be an "equality" of property, in the 
sense that "[e]very person...enjoy[s] the fruits of his labour, in a 
full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of 
life." Such an "equality", Hume thinks, is how things "ought to" be, 
for "such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes 
much less from the happiness of the rich than it adds to that of the 
poor" (Essays 265).
We should note here that, while Hume defends the "equality" of 
property in the sense that all ought to enjoy the fruits of their 
labour, he does not defend "perfect equality", that is, the equal 
distribution of goods among people (E II 194). Such equality, both 
history and common sense inform us, is both " impracticable" and 
"extremely pernicious to human society." (a) People differ in their 
"art, care, and industry" and, thus, "perfect equality" would soon be 
destroyed; (b) in order to ensure "perfect equality" government must 
institute both a "rigorous inquisition...to watch every inequality" and 
a "severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress [inequality]". But this 
is impracticable. It is also undesirable, for it would create a very 
despotic government; (c) "perfect equality", "destroying all subordina­
tion", would eliminate the nation's independent magistracy (E II 194).
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Perfect equality of possession among people ought never to be 
attempted. But equality in the sense of the enjoyment of the products 
of one's labour and of the "necessaries" and "conveniences" of life is 
a policy that ought to pursued in a state. And it can be pursued only 
in a modern corrmercial society, where, as we shall see in Chapter 5, 
the natural rules of justice are allowed to flourish unhindered.
(ii) In a luxurious commercial society there is (in a beneficial 
sense) equality of possession. Thus, in such a society there is a more 
fair distribution of wealth and the standard of living of all is 
greatly improved. This means that "any extraordinary taxes or 
impositions...[are] paid with more cheerfulness" given that no one rank 
in society is forced to shoulder the entire burden: "[W]hen the riches 
are dispersed among multitudes, the burthen feels light on every 
shoulder, and the taxes make not a very sensible difference on any 
one's way of living" (Essays 265).
(iii) "Time and experience", Hume declares, improve "the arts of 
agriculture" (Essays 256). They improve these arts to such a point 
that fewer and fewer people are needed on the land to produce the goods 
necessary to feed the nation. Thus, improvement in the arts of agri­
culture produces "superfluous hands" (Essays 256). The question now 
is, What is to be done with these "superfluous hands"? In a nation 
where the "arts of luxury" are practised, these "superfluous hands" 
would be directed into these arts, and thereby contribute to "the 
happiness of the state", since these arts "afford to many the 
opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherwise 
have been unacquainted" (Essays 256). But where there are no "arts of
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luxury" then there is always the fear that the sovereign will use the 
"superfluous hands" to contribute to "the greatness of the state"
(Essays 257). That is, there is always the fear that the sovereign 
will use these hands "in fleets and armies, to encrease the dominions 
of the state abroad, and spread its fame over distant nations" (Essays 
256). Where there are no industries to produce luxuries, then "the 
superfluities of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and manu­
facturers, may support fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than 
where a great many arts are required to minister to the luxury of 
particular persons" (Essays 256-57). Now, while Hume has no objection
to people being "employed in the service of the public" (Essays 257;
30Essays 263), he is greatly opposed to their being used by the state 
in order to fulfil a sovereign's colonial, military etc ambitions. 
Such a practice is "violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual 
course of things" (Essays 259). Any policy "which aggrandizes the 
public by the poverty of individuals" (Essays 260) is to be condemned. 
And such policies will be avoided in a state where the "arts of luxury" 
are practised. For, "the luxury of individuals must diminish the 
force, and check the ambition of the sovereign" (Essays 257). In other 
words, where there are "arts of luxury" the sovereign will have no 
"superfluous hands" to call upon in order to fight his ambitious wars 
for him, for such hands will be absorbed by the manufacturing and 
commercial sectors; and where there is luxury, the people will be 
happy, and happy people will not allow themselves to be used in their 
sovereign's violent wars and foreign adventures. Thus, luxury greatly 
diminishes the chances that people will suffer in the hands of an 
ambitious sovereign.
(iv) Where there are no arts for the production of luxuries, people
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will be occupied solely with agriculture. The agricultural, arts will 
improve so that in the end "there must arise a great superfluity from 
...[people's] labour beyond what suffices to maintain them" (Essays 
260-61). At this point, "[a] habit of indolence naturally prevails", 
for people will have no motivation to "encrease their skill and 
industry", and this is because there will be no luxury items, nothing 
"which may serve either to their pleasure or vanity", nothing in 
society for which they can exchange their "superfluity" (Essays 261). 
The results are disastrous. As mentioned "indolence" sets in. People 
begin to neglect the land. Skills begin to deteriorate, as does the 
desire to work, and thus the land which is cultivated "yields not its 
utmost." Suddenly, it might happen that "the public exigencies" call 
for the diversion of farm labourers into "the public service." But 
such people, being indolent and unskilled, are of little use to "the 
public". Further, as a result of this diversion, food production drops 
and land "cannot be be brought into tillage for some years." Without 
food, the army "must either make sudden and violent conquests, or dis­
band for want of subsistence". If the latter course is chosen, then 
the nation is vulnerable to foreign attack. And things are no better 
if the former course is taken, because, given the nation's deteriora­
tion in skills, its "soldiers must be ignorant and unskilful." In 
either case, then, "[a] regular attack or defence...is not to be ex­
pected" and ambitious neighbours will conquer the nation (Essays 261).
In contrast, in a society which "abounds in manufactures and mechanic 
arts", people will "study agriculture as a science, and redouble their 
industry and attention" (Essays 261). Given that in such a society 
there are luxury goods, agricultural superfluities can be "exchanged 
with manufactures for__commodities, which men's luxury now makes them
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covet" (Essays 261). In such a society, then, there is no fear of 
indolence, loss of skill, and a drop in food production. Further, in 
such a society, "in the exigencies of state", people diverted to public 
service can perform their tasks with skill and vigour and, given the 
existence of "superfluities", they and the rest of the nation can be 
fed with success (Essays 262; Essays 272).
So far we have seen that, for Hume, luxury, industry, and commerce
have beneficial social effects. However, Hume thinks that these
31elements have beneficial political effects too. We have already seen 
one way such effect: A modern luxurious commercial society provides 
the state with skilful and competent people who can be successfully 
diverted to public service. But providing competent people for service 
is not the only positive political consequence flowing from commerce 
and the "arts of luxury". There are more.
(i) As we have seen Hume thinks that the "arts of luxury" strengthen 
the mind and increase knowledge. One branch of knowledge which is 
increased is that of "the arts of government" (Essays 273). Such 
knowledge, Hume goes on to say, "naturally" makes sovereigns more mild 
and moderate, for it teaches them "the advantages of humane maxims 
above rigour and severity" (Essays 273). According to Hume, "[tjyrants
__produce rebels" (T 560). That is, subjects rebel because of the
"rigour and severity" of their sovereigns. Such treatment "drive 
subjects into rebellion, and make the return to submission impracti­
cable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon" (Essays 274). Thus, in a 
commercial society, sovereigns are less likely to drive their subjects 
to insurrection given their knowledge in the arts of government and 
their increased humanity. This combination of knowledge and humanity
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in sovereigns is highly beneficial to government by making society less
unruly: "Factions are__less inveterate, revolutions less tragical,
authority less severe, and' seditions less frequent. Even foreign wars 
abate of their cruelty" (Essays 274).
(ii) According to Hume manufacturing "is favourable to liberty, and has 
a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government"
(Essays 277). We have already cane across the term "free government"
and seen that under this heading Hume places both limited monarchies 
and republics. Here we should note Hume's definition of this form of 
government:
The government which, in common appellation, receives 
the appellation of free, is that which admits of a
partition of power among several members, whose uni­
ted authority is no less, or is commonly greater than 
that of any monarch; but who, in the usual course of 
administration, must act by general and equal laws, 
that are previously known to all the members and to 
all their subjects. In this sense, it must be owned, 
that liberty is the perfection of civil society
(Essays 40-41).
In other words, a free government is a government which embodies both 
the principle of the division of powers and the rule of law, in
contrast to the capricious rule of man. And "liberty is the perfection 
of civil society" in the sense that all members of society are
restrained by law, including those in power. Thus, Hume has a clear
preference for a government of laws, a system of government which gives
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no opportunity to those in power to rule arbitrarily. Note that Hume 
does not say here that liberty (in the sense of the rule of law, or the 
absence of arbitrary coercion) in conjunction with the principle of the 
division of powers is the perfection of society. In other words, he 
does not say that free government is the perfection of society. Per­
fection, he says, lies only in the absence of arbitrary coercion (or 
liberty). However, in Chapter 6 we shall see that, according to Hume, 
the rule of law is best secured under free government, and that this is 
one reason why he thinks that free government is the best form of 
government. This will come out clearly in Chapter 6.
So, to return to the subject under discussion, Hume thinks that
manufacturing "is favourable to liberty [i.e the absence of arbitrary
coercion]" and gives rise to free government. Hume also thinks that of
all forms of government, free governments are the only ones able to
foster manufacturing and commerce (Essays 92), though this was not true
of the ancient badly-contrived republics (Essays 419). Thus, Hume
believes that economic causes have political effects and political
causes have economic effects. But this is not all. As we shall see
now, Hume also thinks that economic causes have social effects, as do
political causes, and that social causes have both economic and
political effects. In other words, for Hume, the economic, social, and
political elements of society are intimately interrelated as causes and 
33effects. Now, where a society is "rude" and "unpolished" and has no 
manufacturing, no "arts of luxury", and, therefore, no commerce, people 
can occupy themselves only with agriculture, "and the whole society is 
divided into two classes, proprietors of land, and their vassals or 
tenants" (Essays 277). The relationship between these two classes is 
one of tyrant and slave. The peasants, due to their "poverty and mean-
32
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ness of spirit", are "necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery and 
subjection" (Essays 277). Further, given the poverty of the peasants, 
given that "poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common 
people" (Essays 198), and given the lack of luxuries in a "rude" 
society and, therefore, the lack of a reason to work hard, it follows 
that "the beggarly peasant has no means, nor view, nor ambition of 
obtaining above a bare livelihood" (Essays 299). Meanwhile, as the 
peasants suffer in their misery, the landowners "naturally erect them­
selves into petty tyrants" and will either submit to a sovereign in 
order that they can better fulfil their "hopes of tyrannizing over 
others" or will, "like the ancient barons", choose to keep their 
independence, fighting among each other and thus "throw[ing] the whole 
society into such confusion [ i. e the state of nature ], as is perhaps 
worse than the most despotic government" (Essays 277).
However, in a society "where luxury nourishes commerce and industry" 
and, agriculture, as we have seen, is practised as a science, peasants 
are able to cultivate the land properly and "became rich and inde­
pendent" (Essays 277). Their minds improve and the existence of luxury 
in society means that peasants are motivated to increase their labour. 
At the same time a new rank of men arises in society, "tradesmen and 
merchants" or "the middling rank" (Essays 277). These people are not 
prepared to submit to the tyranny of higher ranks (including the 
sovereign). Nor do they have any desire to suppress the lower ranks 
(Essays 277). What they desire is "equal laws" in order to "secure 
their property, and preserve them fron monarchical, as well as aristo- 
cratical tyranny" (Essays 278). In other words, the middle rank 
demands the rule of law. For without the security which canes with the 
rule of law and the absence of arbitrary coercion people will have no
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incentive to acquire private property, increase wealth, engage in 
commerce and industry etc. Further, without the rule of law society 
suffers in the area of knowledge. For "[f]rom law arises security: 
From security curiosity: And fron curiosity knowledge" (Essays 118). 
Thus, where rulers exercise arbitrary power "no improvement can ever be 
expected in the sciences, in the liberal arts, in laws, and scarcely in 
the manual arts and manufactures" (Essays 124). Clearly, such a situa­
tion is unacceptable to the "middling rank", for its prosperity depends 
greatly upon the advancement of art and science. For these reasons, 
then, this rank of men works hard to establish a government of laws, or 
even a free government (i.e the rule of law and the division of powers) 
knowing that "law...[is] the source of all security and happiness"
(Essays 124). In short, "[the] middling rank of men__are the best and
firmest basis of public liberty" (Essays 277).^4
In addition to this, the middle rank challenges the superior status 
of "the ancient nobility" by "becoming [their] rivals in wealth"
(Essays 264). Hume was not impressed by the nobility. Nobles are "too 
much immers'd in Pleasure...to hearken the Voice of Reason" (Essays 
546). They are full of "haughty indolence" and spend all day "dream- 
ting] of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies" (E II 249). They have 
"false ideas of rank and superiority" (Essays 448), and have no 
capacity for morality (Essays 548). The middle rank, however, is 
different. Members of this rank have "Wisdom and Ability, as well as 
.. .Virtue" and they have "a better Chance for attaining a Knowledge 
both of Men and Things, than those of a more elevated Station" (Essays 
547; Essays 551).^
The rise of luxury (and therefore of industry and commerce) in a 
state cause the rise of the middle rank, which in turn causes the rise
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of a government of laws or even a free government. Such a government 
strengthens commerce, luxury, and industry, which in turn strengthen 
the foundations of the middle rank, which in turn fuels commerce, 
luxury, and industry. And so on. As I said, for Hume, economic, 
social, and political elements are inextricably intertwined as causes 
and effects. And the "arts of luxury" contribute to an important 
political effect, namely, the rise of a salutary and beneficial (for 
both subjects and rulers) type of governance, governance by means of 
law, and even to the rise of a salutary and beneficial form of 
government, free government.
I want to end this part of our discussion by noting one last benefi­
cial social consequence of the "arts of luxury". As the above discus­
sion makes clear, in a society where the "arts of luxury" flourish the 
economic power of the common people increases. Further, in such a 
society a rich middle rank develops. In other words, in a luxurious 
modern commercial society "[a] too great disproportion [of wealth] 
among the citizens" is avoided, and there are no great extremes of 
wealth and poverty. There will be no very rich and no very poor, and, 
therefore, no very rich to oppress the very poor. As a result, in such 
a society, people will not be discouraged to work, increase wealth, 
improve technology etc: "[W]here the riches are in few hands, these
must enjoy all the power, and will readily conspire to lay the whole 
burthen on the poor, and oppress then still farther, to the discourage­
ment of all industry" (Essays 265). Hume thinks that inequality of
wealth is inevitable in a modern society (Essays 297-98). But, clearly,
36he also thinks that this inequality ought not to be great.
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V
It is clear that, for Hume, luxury is beneficial. A luxurious commer­
cial society is the best form of society. But the luxury that Hume 
defends is "innocent luxury" (Essays 278) in contrast to "vicious" or 
"excessive" luxury (Essays 279). The latter is to be avoided, for it 
"is the source of many ills" (Essays 280). For example, Hume thinks 
that "[a] rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to 
those in necessity a share of his superfluities" (T 482). But where a 
rich man wallows in excessive luxury, then he has "no ability for such 
acts of duty and generosity as are required by his situation and for­
tune" (Essays 279). However, Hume goes on to say that where innocent 
luxury7 cannot be practised, and the only choice is between excessive 
luxury and no luxury at all, then the former should be preferred. For 
where there is no luxury at all, there is only "sloth and idleness" and 
these "are more hurtful both to private persons and to the public" than 
excessive luxury (Essays 280):
When sloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life 
prevails amongst individuals, without society, with­
out enjoyment. And if the sovereign, in such a sit­
uation, demands the service of his subjects, the la­
bour of the state suffices only to furnish the ne­
cessaries of life to the labourers, and can afford 
nothing to those who are employed in the public ser­
vice (Essays 280).
Thus, luxury is beneficial, even when it is excessive. Luxury fuels 
commerce and also grows as a result of commerce. It is both the cause 
and effect of commerce. It causes agriculture and industry to
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flourish. It creates happy and prosperous societies. It creates 
virtuous people. It spreads humanity and refinement and brings people 
together into cities, freeing them from their "greatest punishment", 
solitude. It creates better soldiers. It gives rise to the middle 
rank. And, finally, it creates better sovereigns and better govern­
ments, free governments. Thus, the prevailing belief that luxury is 
pernicious is wrong: "Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and
conveniences of life...tend[s] to the increase of industry, civility, 
and arts [and] regulate[s] anew our moral as well as political 
sentiments...[It is] laudable or innocent...[not] pernicious and 
blameable" (E II 181).
VI
"Commerce nourishes luxury." Thus, where commerce is strong in a state 
and the "arts of luxury" flourish, that state will enjoy to the fullest 
the economic, social, and political benefits described above. But 
where commerce is hindered such enjoyment will also be hindered. Now, 
Britain is a commercial nation (Essays 92; Essays 282; Essays 576) and,
writing in 1752, Hume tells us that in the "last sixty years__.[t]rade
and manufactures, and agriculture, have encreased" in Britain (Essays 
508). However, as we have seen, Hume complains that, of all the 
European nations, Britain has the severest trade barriers. Thus, 
Britain is unable to reap the full benefits of strong commerce and man­
ufacturing. What benefits would Britain enjoy if unnecessary tariffs 
were removed (as Hume recommends they ought to be) and commerce, 
manufacturing, and luxury were allowed to fully flourish?
(A) We already know that, for Hume, economic causes have political
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effects and that strong coronerce and manufacturing give rise to free
government. Now, being a commercial and manufacturing nation, Britain
already has a free government, a limited monarchy. But, as we saw,
Hume takes it to be defective (even in its most perfect form). Hume's
call for unhindered commerce and strong manufacturing will, it seems,
have the effect of transforming Britain into the most perfect form of
37free government, a well-contrived republic. And this transformation, 
according to Hume's own principles, will not be a radical one, for he 
labels both limited monarchies and well-contrived republics free 
governments. Therefore, both share many political and constitutional 
fundamentals. Thus, Britain's transformation into a well-contrived 
republic will not disrupt that nation's pillars. We shall return to 
this point in Chapter 6 and discuss it in greater detail.
(B) With this change in form of government Britain will acquire as its 
independent magistracy the virtuous and able middle rank. And, like 
the above reform, this reform too will not be a radical one, but 
conservative/radical. For, as we already know, Hume thinks that in 
Britain, those in authority are the "gentry and merchants" (Essays 207) 
(though only the former ought to be since Britain has a monarchical 
form of government). Thus, the ascendency of the British middle rank as 
the nation's independent magistracy will not require any violent trans­
formation given that this rank is already in a position of authority.
(C) No doubt, flourishing commerce and manufacturing will improve the 
condition of Britain's poor, elevating most of them into the middle 
rank.
These are just some of the more important social and political 
changes that would be introduced into Britain if commerce (and there­
fore, manufacturing and luxury) were allowed to flourish unhindered in
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that country. To repeat a point made earlier, Hume's call for strong 
commerce, industry, and luxury is a call for progressive reform.
VII
Two important things have been established in this chapter. First, 
there can be no doubt that Hume's writings contain reformist recommend­
ations. Given this, and given that Hume is writing for the public, we 
can go back to the arguments in Chapter 1 which depended on 
establishing this point and embrace them with certainty: Hume is a
reformer. Second, it is clear that Hume puts forward conservative/ 
radical reforms. Hume is a reformer who, while never advocating the 
complete extirpation of what exists, is eager to overturn prevailing 
beliefs, practices, and institutions (where necessary) and is not 
reluctant to recommend reforms which deviate significantly from the 
public's past experience. He has no blind reverence for the 
established and is prepared to tamper in important ways with funda­
mental elements of the British state: The constitution, political
parties, the system of ranking etc. And since Hume wants his works to
be read by the public and has an "ambition__of contributing to the
instruction of the public" (T 271), an ambition he repeats even on his 
death-bed, we can say that he aims his progressive recommendations at 
the world outside his study. This, we should note, is true even of 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". Hume wrote this work for the public. 
There can be no doubt about this. First, this essay appears in the 
Essays and, as we saw, the "Advertisement" of this volume makes it 
clear that its contents had the public as its target. Second, in "Idea
of a Perfect Commonwealth" Hume tells us of his intention to conduct
CHAPTER 2 - 9 0
his inquiry into the best form of government "in as few words as 
possible." Why? Because a long work on this subject "would not, I 
apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard 
such disquisitions both as useless and chimerical" (Essays 514). In 
other words, Hume squares this work to the likes and dislike of the 
public, clearly indicating that he wants it to be read by the public. 
And, given his desire to instruct the public, it is clear that he wants 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" (and, in fact, all his works), not 
only to be read by the public, but to influence the public. Third, in 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth", Hume defends the practicability of 
the form of government he has constructed: "That the foregoing plan of 
government is practicable, no one can doubt, who considers the 
resemblance it bears to the canmonwealth of the United Provinces, a 
wise and renowned [republican] government" (Essays 526). But why would 
Hume seek to defend the feasibility of his Perfect Commonwealth unless 
he was interested in seeing it established, that is, unless here was 
interested in making a practical impact upon the public with "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth".
All this, I think, must sow seeds of doubt in our minds regarding the 
advise of those who tell us that, for Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" was just an amusement or a speculative exercise. But before we 
can take this essay seriously, more work needs to be done. First, we 
must respond to those who argue that Hume was restricted to conserva­
tive reformism. We must show that they are wrong and that there is 
room in Hume's thought for conservative/radical reformism. If we 
cannot show this, then the arguments of Chapters 1 and 2 collapse, and 
we will have no hope defending our position regarding "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth". Second, we have to show that "Idea of a Perfect
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Commonwealth" itself is a conservative/radical reform. For. if it is 
true (as some have argued) that this essay is a radical reform, while 
all we can show is that Hume is a conservative/radical reformer, (that 
is, if we cannot show that there is agreement and harmony between the 
nature of the reformism that Hume embraces, and the nature of the 
reforms advocated in "Idea of a perfect Canmonwealth"), then we must 
conclude that Hume did not write "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" with 
serious intent. The next three chapters will be devoted to the first
task.
CHAPTER 3
As mentioned in the "Introduction", Hume is taken to be a conservative 
reformer because certain important elements in his philosophy are seen 
as dictating conservative reformism. One such element that is commonly 
pointed to is the limitation Hume places on reason and the resultant 
central role that custom plays in his thought, a role summarised by 
Hume in his claim that "[cjustom, then, is the great guide of human 
life" (E I 44). As we saw in the "Introduction", scholars understand 
Hume as telling us here that, normatively, custom ought to be our guide 
of life and that any significant deviation fron the past ought to be 
avoided. Now, if this is Hume's view, then both the conservative/ 
radical reforms examined in the previous chapter and "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" itself could not have been put forward seriously by Hume. 
For these reforms do in fact deviate significantly from the past. In 
this chapter we shall see that the view usually ascribed to Hume 
regarding the normative question of our guide of life is mistaken. 
While it is true that, for Hume, custom does in fact guide human life, 
Hume does not tells us that this ought to be the case. Hume never tell 
us that we ought to move into the future and make improvements with an 
eye on past experience alone. Rather, his view is that humans ought to 
be guided by experience and reflection, that is, by the experimental 
method of reasoning. We saw in the "Introduction" that Hume is 
portrayed as limiting our choice of guides to either past experience or 
rationalist reason. Here we shall see that it is not the case that he 
imposes such a limitation. There is a third alternative, experimental 
reasoning. And this method of reasoning, we shall see, does not 
confine Hume to conservative reformism.
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According to Hume, "all human affairs, are entirely governed by 
opinion" (Essays 51), and our most important opinions (or beliefs) are 
those about absent or unobserved matters of fact, that is, beliefs 
about what exists which are not founded upon the "present testimony of 
the senses, or the records of our memory" (E I 26). These beliefs are 
the most important because it is on them that "the whole conduct of 
life depends" (E I 108). Without such beliefs we would be restricted 
to beliefs based on present perception and memory, and, thus, we would 
"never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural 
powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once 
of all action, as well as the chief part of speculation" (E I 45). 
For our purpose in this chapter it is important that we investigate 
how, according to Hume, our matter-of-fact beliefs about the unobserved 
are formed. This investigation will be brief, and many philosophical 
and interpretive questions and difficulties surrounding Hume's discus­
sion of belief-formation (and related issues) will be ignored. This is 
not the place to deal with them. They are not important for our 
purpose. What is important for us is that we understand how Hume 
thinks that our beliefs about absent matters of fact are formed so that 
we can in turn understand what he means when he calls custom the guide 
of life.
Hume labels the contents of the mind "perceptions" (T 1; E I 17) and 
then goes on to divide these into "impressions" and "ideas". The 
former are "all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make 
their first appearance in the soul" (T 1). They enter the mind "when we 
hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will" (E I 18).
I
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Impressions, then, arise as a result of our experiences. Ideas, on the 
other hand, arise from these very impressions. They are copies of im­
pressions and are used in thinking, remembering, reasoning etc (T 1; E 
I 18). Thus, there can be no mental activity without experience. But 
while ideas are copies of impressions, they differ from these in that 
they are "less forcible and lively" than impressions (El 18). They 
are "faint" copies of those perceptions from which they arise (T 1).
Now, Hume recognises two sorts of idea depending on the mental 
faculty to which they belong, the memory or the imagination (T 8. He 
also distinguishes between two types of impression, but this is not 
important at this point). There are two differences between these two 
types of idea. First, ideas of memory are more forceful than those of 
the imagination (T 9). Second, ideas of memory exist in the order in 
which they entered the mind by means of their corresponding impres­
sions. The memory does not manipulate its ideas, but simply recalls 
them in the order in which they were caused by impressions. Ideas of 
imagination, however, are different, for the imagination does rearrange 
its ideas as its sees fit: "[T]he imagination is not restrain'd to the 
same order and form with the original impressions." It has the "power
of variation" (T 9), that is, "the liberty__to transpose and change
its ideas" (T 10). It can combine its simple perceptions (those 
perceptions which "admit of no distinction nor separation" (T 2)), and 
separate its complex ones (those which "may be distinguished into 
parts" (T 2)). "[A]11 simple ideas may be separated by the imagina­
tion, and may be united again in what form it pleases" (T 10). In this 
way, the mind is able to acquire (complex) perceptions it has never 
directly experienced (though always from (simple) perceptions it has 
previously experienced) (T 3; E I 19). Ultimately, then, all contents
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of the mind are derived from experience.
The fact that Hume attributes to the imagination the "power of 
variation" suggests that, for him, the imagination is the faculty by 
means of which we fantasise, day-dream etc. And this is correct, but 
only partly. The imagination as "fancy" (T 10) is certainly responsi­
ble for our fantasising etc. But, this is not the only sense in which 
Hume uses the term "imagination". He also uses it to mean that faculty 
by means of which we think and reason (T 267). Hume calls the imagina­
tion in this sense "the understanding", and tells us that it is the 
owner of "the general and more establish'd properties of the imagina­
tion" (T 267). He also tells us that "[t]he understanding exerts 
itself after two different ways, as it judges fron demonstration or 
probability" (T 413). Elsewhere, he attributes our "demonstrative and 
probable reasonings" to the faculty of "reason" (T 117-18 fn. 1). 
Thus, it seems, that Hume uses the terms "understanding" and "reason" 
interchangeably. In this sense, that is, in the sense of reason or 
understanding, the imagination is not at liberty to arrange its ideas 
as it pleases. In this sense the imagination is directed by the 
principles of association: Resemblance, contiguity in time and place, 
and cause and effect (T 11; T Abstract 662; E I 24). These principles 
are responsible for "all the operations of the mind" and are "really 
to us the cement of the universe" (T Abstract 662). They unite or 
connect our ideas (E I 24), and are responsible for the mind's being 
"convey'd from one idea to another" (T 11; E I 23). They form "a kind 
of ATTRACTION" between our ideas, and cause the mind to "conjoin" them 
so that they occur in the mind with regularity and method (T 12-13). 
In general all three associative relations operate in the same way, by 
"producting] an association among our ideas, and upon the appearance of
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one idea naturally introduce another" (T 11). However, each principle 
achieves this task differently (E I 24).
Now, Hume tells us that the understanding or reason has two objects, 
namely "Relations of Ideas" and "Matters of Fact" (E I 25). Under the 
former heading Hume places those beliefs which are "either intuitively 
or demonstratively certain", that is, propositions of arithmetic, geo­
metry and algebra (E I 25; T 69-73). Such propositions "are discover­
able by the mere operation of thought" without any reference to what is 
"existent in the universe" (E I 25). Their truth can be discovered 
without any empirical investigation, by remaining solely within the 
realm of ideas, and "comparting] together" the ideas in the mind (T 
69). Thus, such beliefs are a priori. Further, the opposites of such 
beliefs are inconceivable. They cannot be denied without contradiction 
(E I 25).
However, propositions of matter of fact are different. First, they 
are empirical statements or statements about "real existence" (E I 26), 
and so cannot be discovered without empirical investigation (E I 24). 
Due to this (and here is the second difference) , "[t]he contrary of 
every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a 
contradiction" (E I 25). To use Hume's example, the matter-of-fact 
belief that the sun will not rise tomorrow is as intelligible as the 
contrary belief that it will rise tomorrow (E I 26). For this belief 
(like all beliefs about matters of fact) is not established by means of 
the comparison of ideas, that is, by either intuitive or demonstrative 
reasoning. Since beliefs about "real existence" do not depend upon 
relations of ideas, there is nothing self-contradictory about their 
opposites. Both are "conceived by the mind with the same facility and 
distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality" (E I 25).
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This quality of beliefs about matters of fact arouses Hume's curio­
sity and leads him to ask about "the nature of that evidence which 
assures us of any real existence or matter of fact, beyond the present 
testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory" (E I 26). We 
shall return to this question in a moment. But first an important 
point has to be made.
We have seen that, for Hume, propositions about relations of ideas 
cannot be denied without contradiction, unlike propositions about 
matters of fact. This suggests that, for Hume, certainty exists only 
in the realm of relations of ideas. Beliefs about matters of fact have 
no certainty. And this is what Hume tells us at one point: Only 
relations "depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge 
and certainty" (T 70). Like Locke before him, Hume reserves the term 
"knowledge" for propositions which are necessary: "By knowledge, I 
mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas" (T 124). 
Other propositions, that is, matter-of-fact propositions about what 
exists, are a matter, not of knowledge and certainty, but of "proba­
bility" (T 73-78). Later, however, Hume becomes dissatisfied with this 
division of reason, for he realises that there are sane matter-of-fact 
beliefs e.g the sun will rise tomorrow, which "exceed probability", 
that is, which are certain (T 124). Thus, while retaining his earlier 
strict definition of knowledge, Hume divides beliefs about matters of 
fact into two kinds, namely, "proofs" and "probabilities" (T 124). The 
former, like all matter-of-fact beliefs, are derived fron experience, 
but are "entirely free from doubt and uncertainty." The latter, 
however, "are still attended with uncertainty" (T 124). Hume makes 
this very same point in the first Enquiry. He criticises Locke for
holding that all propositions which are not demonstrative are merely
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probable and uncertain. For, if Locke is correct, then "we must say, 
that it is only probable all men will die, or that the sun will rise 
to-morrow." But this is absurd. Thus, "we ought to divide arguments 
into demonstrations [i.e knowledge], proofs, and probabilities", proofs 
being "arguments fron experience as leave no room for doubt and opposi­
tion", and probabilities being, again arguments fron experience, but 
which do leave rocm for doubt (E I 56 fn. 1). For Hume, then, it is 
not the case that we can cast doubt on all matter-of-fact beliefs. 
Sane beliefs of this kind, proofs, are "entirely certain", even though 
they are not, strictly speaking, knowledge. We shall return to this 
point later.
Let us now return to the question raised a moment ago. What is "the 
nature of the evidence which assures us of any real existence or matter 
of fact"? No such question about "evidence" arises in the case of 
beliefs established by means of intuition or demonstration, for such 
beliefs cannot be conceived of as false. Nor does this question arise 
in the case of matter-of-fact beliefs which are the result of either 
present sense-perception or memory. I have the belief that the sun is 
now rising because I now see it rising. And I have the belief that the 
sun rose yesterday because I saw it doing so and retain the memory. 
But what about matter-of-fact beliefs which are not founded on present 
perception or memory? Why do we believe with certainty that the sun 
will rise tomorrow? Since this is a matter-of-fact belief it is not 
susceptible of either demonstration or intuition and, thus, it is as 
conceivable as its opposite. There is nothing unintelligible about the 
contrary of any belief about "real existence" (E I 25). But if this is 
so, then why do we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow rather than
its equally intelligible opposite? What is it that "assures" us of our
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beliefs about absent or unobserved matters of fact?
Hume begins his answer by telling us that our assurance of such 
beliefs has to do with the associative principle of cause and effect: 
"[A]11 reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on the rela­
tion of cause and effect" (T Abstract 649). Only this principle of the 
imagination can take us "beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" 
(E I 26; T 74). How? In the past we have experienced a "constant 
conjunction" of two objects e.g flame and heat, and we remember this 
constant conjunction. "Without any farther ceremony, we call the one 
cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from 
that of the other" (T 87). Now, in cases where we "learn" that two 
objects are constantly conjoined as cause and effect, both objects must 
be present to the senses, and this repeated experience of conjoined ob­
jects is remembered. "But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning 
them, there is only one perceiv'd or remember'd, and the other is
supply'd in conformity to our past experience" (T 87). Thus, on the
2basis of memory and repeated past experience (or custom) the mind 
moves (i.e makes an inference) fron the idea of an experienced cause 
(or effect) to the idea of an unobserved effect (or cause). And it can 
make this move only by means of the associative principle of cause and 
effect. It is by means of this principle alone that we can make 
inferences from the observed to the unobserved and thus go beyond the 
data of immediate perception and memory. But note the central role 
that Hume attributes to custom in this process.
Custom also plays a key part in Hume's account of how we acquire 
knowledge of causes and effects. Such knowledge is not gained by means 
of demonstration or intuition, for reason in this sense "can never 
satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of
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another" (T 97; T 88-89; E I 27). Rather, it is only by means of past 
experience that we discover "that any particular objects are constantly 
conjoined with each other" (E I 27). Thus, "causes and effects are 
discoverable, not by reason but by experience" (E I 28).
So far, then we have the following: In the past we have experienced 
the constant conjunction of A's and B's. We label one cause and the 
other effect and remember this. Thus, when sometime in the future we 
acquire an impression or idea of A we expect B to follow. We make an 
inference fron the observed to unobserved on the basis of repeated past 
experience (or custom). Now, Hume goes on to say that in making such 
an inference, past experience is "extended to future times, and to 
other objects" (E I 33). As Hume puts it in his Abstract: "[A]ll 
reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition, that the 
course of nature will remain uniformly the same" (T Abstract 651; E I 
35). His next question is why we extend past experience into the 
future. What is the foundation of the "supposition" that nature is 
constant and that, therefore, the future resembles the past? This 
supposition is neither a relation of idea nor a matter of fact. Thus, 
it is the result neither of intuitive or demonstrative reasoning nor of 
probable reasoning (E I 35-36; T 89-90). Rather, it is founded on 
"some other principle of equal weight and authority...What that princi­
ple is may well be worth the pains of enquiry" (E I 41-42). Hume's 
enquiry leads to the conclusion that "[t]his principle is Custom or 
Habit" (E I 43).
The supposition, that the future resembles the past, 
is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is de­
riv'd entirely from fron habit, by which we are de­
termin'd to expect for the future the same train of
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objects, to which we have been accustom'd (T 134).
To understand this point we must note that, for Hume, people are by 
nature habit forming creatures, and habits are acquired as a result of 
repeated experience (T 198). Now, once a habit is acquired it is 
clung to and extended into the future, for "repetition of any particu­
lar act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or 
operation" (E I 43). We shall return to this quality that Hume 
attributes to the human mind in the next chapter when discussing his 
conservative conception of man. What is important for us now is that, 
for Hume, it the propensity of the mind to reproduce its operations as 
a result of repeated past experience, that is, custom, which explains 
why a causal relation experienced in the past is extended into the 
future. And, as we saw a moment ago, custom also explains why in the 
mind the ideas of A and B are associated as causes and effects, and 
why, when I see or have an impression of A, I acquire the thought or 
idea of B and expect it to follow. Thus, in a number of important 
ways, our inferences from the observed to the unobserved are founded on 
habit.
But Hume does not want to know merely how we come to have the idea or 
thought of an unobserved object. He wants to know why we have the 
belief that this unobserved object will follow the observed one. To 
answer this question Hume investigates the difference between having a 
mere idea and having a belief (E I 47).
Beliefs, for Hume, are ideas, but they differ fron other ideas 
(thoughts, fictions etc) in that they are more vivid or forceful. A 
belief is "A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT 
IMPRESSION" (T 96). A belief is "a peculiar feeling or sentiment"
which attends the way in which we apprehend certain ideas (T 623; E I
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48). "[B]elief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, 
steady conception [i.e idea] of an object" (E I 49). But how does an 
idea which is felt as a belief acquire its force or liveliness? 
Hume's answer is: As a result of a present impression and custom: 
"All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely fron 
some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary con­
junction between that and some other object" (E I 46). In other words, 
in the past we have experienced the constant conjunction of A's and 
B's. As a result of this repeated experience a mental habit is 
established and remembered. Thus, when an impression of A enters the 
mind the idea of B follows, and this idea becomes a belief by acquiring 
force from its associated impression A. This impression communicates 
some of its force to the idea, thus transforming it into a belief by 
giving it a feeling different to a mere idea (T 96; E I 49-50).
Thus, while a number of the Humean mind's propensities and principles 
unite in giving us our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact, at 
bottom there lies custom. Without the propensity to acquire habits and 
extend these into the future we would be unable to formulate beliefs 
about the absent past, present, and future, and without such beliefs 
life would be impossible. It is for this reason that Hume tells us 
that custom is "necessary to the subsistence of our species" (E I 55), 
and that "[c]ustom.. .is the great guide of human life" (E I 44). For 
he is convinced that without custom we would be unable to go beyond our 
present perceptions and memories, thus bringing life to a halt.
[C]ustom, or if you will__the relation of cause and
effect...peoples the world, and brings us acquainted 
with such existences, as by their removal in time and 
place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory.
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By means of it I paint the universe in my imagina­
tion, and fix my attention on any part of it I 
please__[E]very thing___which I believe__ [is] no­
thing but ideas; tho' by their force and settled 
order, arising from custom and the relation of cause 
and effect, they distinguish themselves from the 
other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the 
imagination [i.e fancy] (T 108).
Thus '"[t]is not, therefore, reason, which is the guide of life, but 
custom" (T Abstract 652).
From what we have said so far it might appear that Hume denies that 
reason plays any part in the realm of matters of fact. Isn't this 
exactly what Hume is saying in the short quote immediately above? No. 
Hume makes it very clear that in formulating our matter-of-fact
3beliefs we do reason. We have already noted that Hume describes the 
movement from an observed cause (or effect) to an unobserved effect (or 
cause) as an "inference". This inference is a type of reasoning: "We 
infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not 
only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others" (T 
97 fn. 1). And by Book I, Part III, Section XIV of the Treatise Hume 
thinks that he has "explain'd the manner, in which we reason beyond our 
immediate impressions, and conclude that such particular causes must 
have such particular effects" (T 155). Thus, we do reason about 
matters of fact, but the reasoning here is not intuition or demonstra­
tion. Rather it is probable reasoning (or "moral reasoning" as he also 
calls it (E I 35). And at the heart of such reasoning, as we have 
seen, lies custom: "According to my system, all [probable] reasonings 
are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but
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by inlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any 
object" (T 149). This "strong conception" is a belief or lively idea 
and is the result of probable reasoning.
Our matter-of-fact beliefs do spring from a form of reasoning. Thus, 
when Hume tells us that custom, and not reason, is the guide of life he 
is telling us in short-hand that our beliefs are the result of probable 
reasoning, in contrast to intuitive or demonstrative reasoning. He is 
not telling us that reasoning plays no part at all in their formation.
II
We can now understand why Hume thinks that custom is "the great guide 
of human life." For, according to him, custom lies at the heart of 
that type of reasoning we use in order to formulate our most important 
beliefs. When we reason about matters of fact we depend upon repeated 
past experience. This is how nature has determined we should operate. 
And this, Hume thinks, is fortunate for us, for intuition and demon­
stration are of no use in the realm of "real existence". They are 
"uncertain" (E I 106). When reasoning about what exists people are, in 
fact, guided by custom (fortunately).
I underline the words "in fact" in the above sentence in order to 
emphasis a point that should, by now, be clear: That by telling us 
that custom is the guide of life Hume is not speaking normatively but
4descriptively. Having examined as an anatomist how humans in fact 
formulate beliefs about unobserved matters of fact, Hume states as his 
scientific, descriptive, conclusion that humans are guided by custom. 
But does he say that always and everywhere custom on its own ought to 
be humanity's guide? No, for "custom__may be fallacious and deceit-
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ful" (E I 159). "Custom may lead us into sane false comparison of 
ideas" (T 116). Thus, on its own custom can lead to mistakes when
reasoning about "real existence".
Though experience be our only guide in reasoning 
concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, 
that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in 
some cases is apt to lead us into errors (E I 110).
Hume declares that "[a] wise man proportions his belief to the
evidence" (E I 110), and that the wise person collects his evidence by 
means of "diligent observation" (E I 110), that is, by reflecting upon 
experience. As a result of such reflection a wise man will sometimes 
find that his experience of an event is "infallible" in the sense that 
it is not countered by opposite experiences. In such a case "he 
expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his 
past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event" 
(E I 110). At other times, however, the wise man will find that his 
experience of an event varies. Then, "he proceeds with more caution: 
He weighs the opposite experiments... and when at last he fixes his 
judgement, the evidence exeeds not what we properly call probability" 
(E I 111). Thus, both proofs and probabilities are established as a 
result of experience and reflection, and while we can use the former as 
a guide of life, we ought to do so only after we have engaged in 
careful reflection or "diligent observation". For the natural human 
propensity to collect and be guided by past experience is "fallacious 
and deceitful".
Hume the anatomist discovers that we have a natural propensity to 
acquire and be guided by custom. But he also discovers that this 
natural propensity, like all others, can lead us astray "if not cor-
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rected by experience and reflection" (NHR 33-34; my emphasis). For 
Hume, then, our guide of life must not be custom on its own, but the 
experimental method of reasoning.
We have already discussed the experimental method of reasoning, and 
there is no need to repeat this discussion here. But it is important 
that we return to one point made during that discussion, namely, that, 
for Hume, "we can expect assurance and conviction" from the experi­
mental method of reasoning (T 273). Does this mean that this method of 
reasoning gives us knowledge? No. Experimental reasoning is matter- 
of-fact reasoning, or probable reasoning, corrected by reflection. But 
probable reasoning, even when corrected, can never give knowledge. As 
we saw, knowledge in Hume's strict sense can only spring from intuition 
or demonstration. Does this mean that the conclusions of experimental 
reasoning are always uncertain? Again, no. For, we must recall that, 
according to Hume, probable reasoning provides us with either "proofs" 
or "probabilities", and proofs (such as "the sun will rise tomorrow" or 
"all men must die") are certain. As we noted earlier, they "leave no 
room for doubt" and are "entirely free from doubt and uncertainty." 
Probabilities, however, are "attended with uncertainty", though Hume is 
convinced that sane probabilities e.g when we have "a hundred uniform 
experiments, with only one that is contradictory", approach proofs in 
their certainty and "reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assur­
ance" (E I 111; my emphasis). Thus, the experimental method of reason­
ing, being a type of probable reasoning, cannot give us "knowledge", in 
Hume's strict sense, but it can give us certainty (in the case of 
proofs), and even in the case of probabilities it can sometimes produce 
beliefs which come close to certainty. And this, Hume thinks, is all 
we need to get on with the business of life.
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Before moving on it is important that we deal with a problem caused 
by what has been said in this section. Earlier in this thesis I 
emphasised that, as a mitigated sceptic, Hume uses nature as his guide. 
But now it appears that I have contradicted this claim. For I have 
said that, while Hume thinks that nature has provided us with past 
experience alone as our guide of life, he ignores this guide and 
instead turns to experimental reasoning. Thus, it seems that in 
recommending experimental reasoning Hume is turning his back on nature. 
But this is not so. For one thing, while this method does not follow 
past experience blindly, it does, as we have seen, make important use 
of it. Further, this method of reasoning itself is natural to us. We 
saw in Chapter 1 that the aim of experimental reasoning is "to render 
all our principles as universal as possible" (T Intro xiv). Now, Hume 
thinks "that from our earliest Infancy we make continual Advances in 
forming more general Principles of Conduct and Reasoning; that the 
larger Experience we acquire, and the stronger Reason we are endow'd 
with, we always render our Principles the more general and compre­
hensive; and what we call Philosophy is nothing but a more regular and 
methodical Operation of the same kind" (D 151; first two emphases 
mine). Thus, experimental reasoning is natural to humans.
But this now gives rise to a new problem. If nature has given us as 
guides both past experience alone and past experience corrected by 
reflection (i.e experimental reasoning), how are we justified in 
choosing the latter as our guide above the former? According to Hume
"concerning the choice of our guide__[we] ought to prefer that which
is safest and most agreeable" (T 271). Thus, we are warranted in cho­
osing as our guide of life experimental reasoning over past experience 
alone because the former is more salutary and beneficial than the
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latter. With experimental reasoning "we may only expect greater 
Stability, if not greater Truth, from our Philosophy, on account of its 
exacter and more scrupulous Method of proceeding" (D 151).
Ill
I have spent so much time on Hume's discussion of how matter-of-fact 
beliefs are formulated and how they ought to be formulated because this 
discussion is of great importance to us. For reasoning about matters 
of fact plays a central role in Hume's account of how our beliefs about 
moral and political values are formulated.
We noted above that Hume places beliefs about arithmetic, algebra etc 
under the heading of "relations of ideas" while beliefs about "real 
existence" are placed under the heading of "matters of fact". But what 
about beliefs regarding moral and political values? Where do these 
belong in Hume's division? Nowhere. For Hume thinks that opinions 
about such values spring neither fron intuitive nor demonstrative nor 
probable reasoning. They are neither relations of ideas nor matters of 
fact (T 463-69). Rather, they are derived fron "sane impression or
sentiment" and are "more properly felt than judg'd of" (T 470). 
Briefly, and without dealing with the many problems and questions 
surrounding this issue (for they are not important for us), the 
feelings or impressions fron which values are derived are feelings of
5approval (or approbation) and disapproval (or disapprobation) (T 471) 
and are "nothing but particular pains or pleasures" (T 471). The 
approval or disapproval we feel Wien contemplating a quality or action 
and label it virtuous or vicious, is pleasing or painful respectively. 
And here we should note that, for Hume, "[w]e do not infer a character
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to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases 
after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous" 
(T 471). Hume adds that these feelings are of a "peculiar kind" (T 
472) in that they are disinterested or impartial: '"Tis only when a 
character is considered in general, without reference to our particular 
interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it 
morally good or evil" (T 472). Moral approval and disapproval arise 
fron "the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind"
(T 614). As Hume puts it in the second Enquiry, virtue is "whatever 
mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation; and vice the contrary" (E II 289).
Finally, Hume thinks that these feelings of approval and disapproval 
are universal. They belong to all. Thus, our opinions of value in the 
area of morals and politics spring from "some sentiment common to all 
mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation" (E II 
272). But what "object" is approved of or disapproved of? What, 
according to Hume, does this sentiment approve of or disapprove of in a 
character or action in order to decide its moral status? "It appears, 
that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or 
moral excellence, but on account of its being useful, or agreeable to a 
man himself or to others" (E II 336; T 591). Thus, our beliefs about 
value are the result of impartial and universal feelings of approval or 
disapproval that we experience when we find something useful or agre­
eable to ourselves or others. This is how all people in fact formulate 
moral and political judgements (and it is clear that Hume believes that 
this is how they ought to).
Given that Hume thinks that our opinions about value spring from 
"sentiments cannon to all mankind" it might appear that, for him, all
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people will arrive at the same beliefs about what is morally and 
politically valuable. But this is not so: "The principles upon which
men reason in morals are always the same; though the conclusions which 
they draw are often very different" (E II 335-36). Hume does not want 
to deny that people arrive at different conclusions about moral and 
political values, but "all differences...in morals may be reduced 
to__one general foundation" (E II 336), namely, approval or disap­
proval of what is useful or agreeable.
So, Hume thinks that our opinions about value in the area of morality 
and politics do not spring fron any sort of reasoning. However, he 
does think that one type of reasoning, namely, reasoning about matters 
of fact, or probable reasoning, does play a central role in our formu-
7lation of such values. For, as the above discussion makes clear, 
utility or usefulness features in our formulation of moral and poli­
tical judgements. In fact Hume thinks that the important artificial 
virtues (justice, allegiance etc) are virtues because our experience of 
their usefulness gives us a feeling of approval. The beneficial conse­
quences or usefulness of justice, allegiance etc is "the sole cause of 
our approbation" of them (T 578; E II 183). As for the natural virtues 
these are partly approved of because of their utility (E II 181-82). 
Thus, for Hume, "[i]n all determinations of morality...public utility 
is ever principally in view" (E II 180). Given this role played by 
utility in the formation of value judgements, Hume is convinced that, 
reason must enter for a considerable share in all de­
cisions [about usefulness or utility]__since nothing
but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of 
qualities and actions, and point out their benefici­
al consequences to society and to their possessor
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...And a very accurate reason or judgement is often 
requisite, to give the true determination, amidst 
such intricate doubts arising fron obscure or oppo­
site utilities__[R]eason, when fully assisted and
improved__instruct[s] us in the pernicious or use­
ful tendency of qualities and action (E II 285-86).
Clearly, the "reason" which Hume talks about in the above quote is 
probable reasoning, for Hume is talking about the production of beliefs 
about causal relations, beliefs which are used to determine the utility 
of "qualities and actions" in the moral and political realms, and, 
thus, assist us in determining what is valuable in these areas, what 
ought to be approved of or disapproved of. Now, earlier we saw that, 
for Hume, moral judgements are made from the impartial point of view of 
the spectator. Thus, when using probable reasoning to discover "the 
pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions", we do so as 
spectators.
For Hume, then, reasoning (as impartial spectators) about matters of 
fact (i.e probable reasoning), and the matter-of-fact beliefs such 
reasoning produces about causal relations, are employed by us in our 
formulation of moral and political beliefs. Now, we already know that, 
in the realm of "real existence", past experience can lead to false 
conclusions, and that to avoid this problem reflection is required. In 
other words, to reason justly about "real existence" and acquire sound 
beliefs in this area, experimental reasoning is necessary. Given that 
matter-of-fact reasoning, and matter-of-fact beliefs, play a role in 
our value judgements, it follows that past experience (on its own) can 
lead to mistaken beliefs in the area of value. Such mistaken beliefs, 
Hume thinks, can be rectified by the experimental method of reasoning:
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If any false [moral] opinion, embraced from appear­
ances, has been found to prevail; as soon as father
experience and sounder reasoning have given us 
juster notions of human affairs, we retract our 
first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of 
moral good and evil (E II 180; my emphasis).
People have made, do make, and will continue to make mistakes about 
beliefs in the area of value. Such mistakes are the result of unsound 
reasoning. We noted earlier that, according to Hume, the foundations 
"upon which men reason" and acquire their moral beliefs are universal, 
but that "the conclusions they draw are often very different" (E II 
335-36). Not only are they different, but many times mistaken. This 
is because men do not reason correctly. As a result, their moral 
sentiments are led astray. The experimental method of reasoning can 
correct the direction of these sentiments (which, of course, must be 
those of the spectator) and supply people with the correct moral 
beliefs and values: "[T]he original principles of [approval and
disapproval]...are uniform...[but] erroneous conclusions can be 
corrected by sounder reasoning and larger experience" (E II 336; my 
emphasis). Thus, while moral and political rules and standards are not 
derived from reason, but from the sentiments of human nature, experi­
mental reasoning (fron an impartial point of view) can (and must) guide 
and correct these sentiments. Moral and political rules and standards 
cannot be (and ought not to be) established independently of human 
nature. But impartial experimental reasoning can (and ought to) beg
used to direct human nature to its proper rules and standards.
And here we should note that, what is true of moral and political 
rules and standards, is also true of moral and political ends. Accord-
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ing to Hume, "the ultimate ends of human action [including moral and 
political ends] can never...be accounted for by reason, but recommend 
themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, with­
out any dependance on the intellectual faculties" (E II 293). Hume has 
been taken as telling us here that reason plays no role in the choice
9of moral and political ends. These ends are adopted non-rationally. 
But this is not so. Hume makes it clear that the sentiments upon which 
ends are founded are those of "blame or approbation" (E II 294), senti­
ments which, as we have seen, belong to the spectator.1^ Given this, 
it seems that when Hume tells us that ends are not founded upon reason, 
the "reason" he has in mind is intuitive or demonstrative reason. As 
spectators, armed with experimental reasoning, we can determine which 
ends ought to be approved or disapproved of by our sentiments. Ends 
are not founded on rationalist reason, nor are they established inde­
pendently of human nature. But, at the same time, it is also true that
the ends which ought to be pursued must be established with the help of
11impartial experimental reasoning.
Impartial experimental reasoning can (and must) be used to improve 
our moral and political beliefs (rules, standards, ends, values). Of 
course, these beliefs which will not be "knowledge" (in Hume's strict 
sense), given that probable reasoning is involved in their formulation. 
They will be either proofs or probabilities, that is, they will either 
be certain and completely free from doubt, or there will be some degree 
of uncertainty about them. And here we should note that Hume believes 
that moral and political beliefs can be held with certainty. Thus, 
Hume talks of "eternal and immutable" political principles (Essays 18), 
of "eternal political truths" (Essays 21) and of "maxim[s] in politics, 
which we readily admit as undisputed and universal" (Essays 374). That
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Hume believes that certainty is possible in the moral and political
realms should be clear from the previous chapter. Hume never doubts
that hereditary monarchies are superior to elective ones. He never
doubts that parties of principle and of affection are disruptive while
parties of interest are "reasonable and excusable". He never doubts
12the value of luxury, commerce, etc. Thus, allied with the experi­
mental method of reasoning, mitigated scepticism,
preserv[es] a proper impartiality in our judgements,
and wean[s] our minds fron all those prejudices,r i 3 iwhich we may have imbibed fron education or rash 
opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident prin­
ciples, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to 
review frequently our conclusions, and examine accu­
rately all their consequences; though by these means 
we shall make both a slow and a short progress in 
our systems; are the only methods, by which we can 
ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stabi­
lity and certainty in our determinations (E I 150).
But it should be emphasised here that the "truth" and "certainty" with 
which Hume holds his moral and political beliefs is not that of a 
dogmatist. Hume is a mitigated sceptic and, as we have seen, mitigated 
sceptics hold their beliefs with "modesty", "humility" and "reserve", 
and have no "prejudice against antagonists."^
The experimental method of reasoning can (and ought to) be used (from 
the point of view of a spectator) to improve our moral and political 
beliefs. Hume gives us a number of examples. In the past it was 
thought that charity "to common beggars" was praiseworthy. But today, 
experience and reflection show us that this view is false. Experi-
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mental reasoning also shows us the falsity of the long held political 
beliefs that tyrannicide ought to practised, and that "[1]iberality in 
princes is...a mark of beneficence", and of the moral/political belief 
that luxury is evil (E II 180-81). The experimental method of reason­
ing, then, can (and ought to) be used to dislodge old pernicious moral 
and political values and replace them with new and sound ones.
And with this we arrive at what is for us a very important conclu­
sion, namely, that Hume has a method of reasoning which allows him, 
indeed requires him, to break away from the past where necessary and 
formulate moral and political beliefs which are new and novel. Hume's 
method of reasoning does not saddle him with any sort of conservative 
reformism. But neither, we should note, does it leave room in his 
thought for radicalism. Past experience (particularly of man's nature) 
plays a central role in the experimental method of reasoning. Thus, 
the results of this method are connected to the past. We must never 
ignore the past when pursuing a better future in the realm of human 
affairs. We must never use a priori reasoning as our guide. Those who 
do are "[m]en of bright fancies", and "may. ..be compar'd to those 
angles, whom the scripture represents as covering their eyes with their 
wings" (T 267). Thus, Hume dismisses "any fine imaginary republic, of 
which a man may form a plan in his closet" (Essays 52). Such 
"political projectors" who seek reform on the basis of an a priori 
plan, ignoring the past, ignoring man's nature, and relying only on 
their "bright fancies", ought to be avoided: "Of all mankind there are 
none so pernicious as political projectors, if they have power; nor so 
ridiculous, if they want it" (Essays 647). Rationalist reasoning is a 
dangerous guide of human life. But this does not mean that the only 
way forward is on the basis of custom alone. Our choice is not limited
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to these two alternatives. There is, Hume thinks, a third way, 
experimental reasoning, a method of reasoning which leaves room for 
conservative/radical reformism.
IV
Hume never tells us that the customary and well-established in society
ought to be blindly preserved. As Stewart says "[Hume's] History of
England...abounds in outspoken denunciations of certain prevalent
opinions and established laws and institutions as bad, iniquitous,
15disgusting, irrational, violent, barbarous." But not only is this
work awash with condemnations of well-established practices and 
beliefs. In it we also find Hume approving of significant deviations 
from such practices and beliefs. A few examples from The History of 
England will bring out both these points.
Elizabeth had made Ireland part of the Kingdom. But "the more
difficult task remained; to civilize the inhabitants, to reconcile them 
to laws and industry, and to render the subjection durable and useful 
to the crown of England." This task was achieved by James I. How? 
Partly by abolishing a number of "Irish customs, which supplied the 
place of laws, and which were calculated to keep that people for ever 
in a state of barbarism and disorder." The pernicious customs in 
question which James was right to extirpate included that of Brehon 
which punished all criminals, including murderers, "by fine or 
pecuniary mulct", and the customs of Gavelkinde and Tanistry which 
dealt "with the same absurdity in the distribution of property" (H 5 
47). Thus, in order to civilize and bring law and order to the Irish, 
James, with Hume's full support, had to abolish a number of that
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people's long-established destructive customs.
Hume also endorses the progressive reforms that James introduced in 
the religious practices of the Scottish and the English. Hume approves 
of the Scottish Reformation. It "proved so salutary in the conse- 
quenses" (H 5 67). Among the beneficial results of the overthrow of 
the "ancient religion" was that it brought the church under "the 
regular execution of justice" (H 3 324). But the new religion laboured 
under a great imperfection, namely, its "species of devotion" (H 5 68). 
Briefly, the form of devotion of the Scottish church was "the most 
naked and most simple imaginable", having neither ceremonies nor rites, 
but involving only "contemplation of the divine Essence, which dis­
covers itself to the understanding only." But this type of devotion, 
Hume thinks, has adverse consequences. It creates people who are 
"independent and disorderly", who have "a contempt of authority" and 
lack tolerance. Further, it creates people with "a gloomy and sullen 
disposition" (H 5 68). For these reasons Hume approves of James' 
efforts to alter the Scottish church's form of devotion by introducing 
into it ceremonies and rites and furnishing churches with organs and 
"the finer arts", and generally with things that "please the senses" (H 
5 68-69). Hume approves of the way "James shocked, in so violent a 
manner, the religious principles of his Scottish subjects" (H 5 73). 
At the same time, he also endorses James' efforts to reform the 
religious principles of the English by trying, as he did with the 
Scottish church, "to infuse cheerfulness into...[their] dark spirit of 
devotion" (H 5 73).
Remaining with the reign of James I, we find Hume approving of the
1604 Commons' aim "to give liberty to the trading part of the nation__
to free the landed property fron the burthen of wardships, and to
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remove those remains of the feudal tenures, under which the nation 
still laboured" (H 5 20-21). Again, Hume speaks with approval of the 
fact that, in the Commons of 1610 "[t]he leading members [of that 
House], men of independent genius and large views, began to regulate 
their opinions, more by the future consequences which they foresaw, 
than by the former precedents which were set before them; and they less 
aspired at maintaining the ancient constitution, than at establishing a 
new one, and a freer, and a better" (H 5 42).
V
Hume never says that we ought to be guided blindly by our past beliefs. 
Past experience is important, but on its own it is dangerous. It must 
be improved by further experience and reasoning. Only then will we 
have an adequate guide of life and be able to successfully break away 
fron the past (where necessary) and embark upon the correct path. 
Importantly, the reforms advocated in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
are the result of experimental reasoning (as we shall see in Chapter 
6). This method ought to be our guide in all areas of life. "Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth" ought to be our guide in the political area of
life.
CHAPTER 4
As mentioned in the "Introduction", a further element of Hume's philo­
sophy that scholars point to in order to support their claim that Hume 
is restricted to conservative reformism is the picture of man he gives 
us as a fundamentally conservative being who clings to the established. 
If this picture is correct and Hume thinks that people cannot be 
significantly reformed and will not, as a matter of fact, embrace ideas 
which deviate significantly from what they know, then it is nonsense to 
talk of his desire to make a practical impact on the public realm 
either with the non-conservative reforms that we investigated in 
Chapter 2 or with "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". In this chapter I 
hope to show that the usual conservative picture of the Humean individ­
ual is incorrect. In section I we shall see that the Humean individual 
has a strong propensity to cling to the established (a propensity which 
has a number of sources). There can be no doubt about this. However, 
while it is true that Hume thinks that humans have a strong 
conservative streak, we shall see in section II that he also thinks 
that humans are not prepared to rot in the patterns of thought and 
action with which they are familiar. There are times, Hume thinks, 
when people do in fact break away from what they are used to. In this 
chapter, then, we shall see that while scholars are right to point to 
the conservative tendency of the Humean individual, they are wrong to 
ignore what we might call the progressive tendency of this individual, 
that is, a tendency to abandon the customary in favour of something
better. The ownership of such a tendency by the Humean individual is,
1of course, important for our purpose.
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As mentioned, in this section I want to put forward as forcefully as 
possible the view that the Humean individual is a conservative 
creature. This is not because I believe that this view is wholly 
correct. As I said, I do not. However, there is a strong element of 
truth in this position, and it must be brought out. I shall uncover 
the conservatism of the Humean individual by revealing his tendency to 
cling to the existing and established. This tendency, as we noted in 
the "Introduction", has a number of sources: (a) A direct natural 
"affection" for the customary; (b) a desire for a good reputation, and 
(c) a desire for order and stability (and fear of the unknown). All 
three of these qualities of the Humean individual contribute to his 
holding on to those practices and beliefs with which he is acquainted. 
We shall investigate each of them in turn.
I
A.
One reason why the Humean individual clings to the established is 
because he has a natural propensity to do so. To see this, we should 
begin by noting that, for Hume, we are by nature habit-forming 
creatures: "[Hjabit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, 
and derives all its force from that origin" (T 179). The propensity to 
acquire habits is "a principle of human nature" (E I 43). In fact, 
Hume calls this principle "ultimate" in the sense that we are unable to 
"give the cause of this cause" (E I 43; T 179). He also tells us that 
it is one of our "natural instincts" (E I 46-47), "a species of 
instinct or mechanical power" (El 108; E l  159). In other words, the 
propensity to acquire habits has been given to us by nature. And
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since, as we have already noted, "[n]ature will always maintain her 
rights" (E I 41), it follows that we cannot but acquire habitual 
patterns of thought and behaviour.
But how are habits acquired? As a result of exposure to repeated 
experiences: "[C]ustom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions" 
(T 198); "[W]e call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past 
repetition" (T 102). Thus, repeated exposure to a regularity produces 
a habitual pattern of thought or behaviour: "[W]hen we have been 
accustom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes 
from the first to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes 
reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it" (T 147).
Now, once a habit has been formed we cling to it, for "a constant 
perseverance in any course of life produces a strong inclination and 
tendency to continue for the future" (T 133). Once we have formed a 
mental or behavioural habit (on the basis of repeated past experience), 
this habit stays with us and duplicates or replicates itself given that 
"repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to 
renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reason­
ing or process of the understanding" (E I 43). Repeated experience (or 
custom) gives us "a facility in the performance of any action or the 
conception of any object; and afterwards a tendency or inclination 
towards it" (T 422). That is, exposure to a repeated experience 
produces an ease in the performance of the practice acquired as a 
result of that exposure, which in turn produces in us a tendency to 
continue with that practice.
Thus, according to Hume, humans have a natural inclination, not only 
to acquire habits or customs, but also to cling to them. Once we 
experience a mental or behavioural regularity its performance becomes
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customary and it will reproduce itself into the future. In one passage, 
Hume graphically describes the relationship between humans and their 
customary practices and beliefs as one of "affection": "Such is the 
effect of custom, that it not only reconciles us to any thing we have 
long enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us pre­
fer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known 
to us" (T 503; my emphasis). According to Hume, then, we are greatly 
attached to what we are used to, to the customarily established, and
prefer it even when it is less valuable, rational or beneficial than an
2alternative course of action or thought. Thus, even though "[n]othing 
surely can be more absurd and barbarous than the practice of duelling" 
(E II 335; H 3 169), and even though it is contrary to the "severity of 
law and authority of reason", still this practice is "far from being as 
yet entirely exploded." This is due to "the prevailing force of 
custom" (H 3 169). Again, throughout history, the Commons was never 
kind with money. In 1625 the Commons clung to this practice and turned 
down Charles I's request for increased taxation, even though (Hume 
thinks) there were good reasons for not doing so. Why? Because 
"[hjabits, more than reason, we find, in every thing, to be the 
governing principle of mankind" (H 5 159).
For Hume, humans have a natural affection for the customary, so that 
"custom...[is] the principle by which men are almost wholly governed in 
their actions and opinions" (H 3 192). This, Hume thinks, is how 
humans in fact operate, though, as we saw in the previous chapter, he 
does not think that it is the way they ought to operate.
B.
A second reason why the Humean individual clings to the established
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practices and institutions of his society is because of his desire for 
a good reputation. To properly understand this desire (and how it 
contributes to Humean man's conservatism) we should begin by noting the 
natural sociability of Humean man.
As we shall see later, the Humean individual seeks society in order 
to satisfy his biological and economic needs. But this is not the full 
story. For even without such needs he would still seek the company of 
others, because, given his nature, he receives satisfaction form such 
company. Why? According to Hume, we receive great pleasure fron our
forceful perceptions: "[T]he vivacity of__[an] idea gives pleasure"
(T 453; T 353; T 121-22). As a result of acquiring "a lively sensation 
...[t]he blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the 
whole man acquires...vigour" (T 353). Thus, those things which have 
the consequence of enlivening our perceptions are sought after by 
humans because of the pleasure that such enlivening gives. Now, Hume 
thinks that chief among the things that have the result of enlivening 
our ideas are other people:
Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as present­
ing the liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational 
and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates 
to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to 
his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us 
see, in the very instant of their production, all 
the emotions which are caus'd by any object (T 353).
And here we should recall Hume's view noted in Chapter 2 while discus­
sing the beneficial consequences of manufacturing and commerce, that 
people "flock into cities" in order to to communicate (Essays 271), 
that is, in order to receive lively perceptions.
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Now, this cormunication of perceptions, of feelings and beliefs, 
among human minds is the the result sympathetic perception: '"[T]is
after this manner [i.e sympathy] we enter deep into the opinions and 
affections of others, whenever we discover them" (T 319). Here we 
should note that Humean sympathy is not an emotion or feeling, but "a 
very powerful principle in human nature" (T 577; T 618). It is a
3mental mechanism. How does this mechanism work? Briefly, and without 
attempting anything like a thorough examination of this complex 
"principle", Hume thinks that "[t]he minds of all men are similar in 
their feelings and operations" (T 575) so that "we never remark any 
passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we 
may not find a parallel in ourselves" (T 318). In other words, there 
is a fundamental resemblance among men in respect of their feelings, 
sentiments, passions etc. As a result of this resemblance, we can, on 
the basis of "external signs in the countenance and conversation" of 
another person, acquire an idea of that person's passion or opinion (T 
317). We know from our own experiences that certain types of behaviour 
are caused by a certain passion, or certain passions. Given that human 
minds resemble each other in their operations, we can, Hume thinks, 
make an inference from that person's behaviour to the passion or 
passions that cause that behaviour. In this way we acquire an idea of 
the other person's passion. Hume thinks that an idea of another's 
belief can be acquired in the same way (T 320-21), a belief being 
nothing more than a lively perception (as we saw in Chapter 3).
But sympathetically perceiving another's passion or opinion involves 
more than just acquiring an idea of his passion or opinion. It in­
volves making that idea one's own. It involves acquiring an enlivened 
idea which is felt as our own (T 317; T 427). The idea we receive
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(sympathetically) of another's passion or opinion is experienced as our 
own once it is enlivened. How does this newly received idea become
enlivened? According to Hume "the__impression of ourselves is always
intimately present with us" and, being an impression, it is always 
"lively" (T 317; T 320). Given that there is a resemblance among 
humans, the lively impression of ourselves cones to be associated in 
the mind with the idea we acquire of another's passion or opinion. 
Resemblance, then, is the associative relation which lies at the heart 
of sympathetic perception. Hume goes on to say that the other two 
associative relations (contiguity and causation) also play a part in 
enlivening our newly acquired ideas. (In the next chapter we shall 
have to investigate the exact role played by these three associative 
relations with regard to sympathetic perception.) "All these relations 
[ of association]...convey the impression or consciousness of our own 
person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others" (T 318). 
Once an associative relation is made between the lively impression of 
ourselves and the idea we acquire of another's passion or opinion, this 
impression transmits some of its force to that idea. And, as a result 
of this transmission of force, the idea of the other's passion or 
opinion becomes enlivened and is felt as our own. In this way, then, 
the natural mechanism of sympathy enables us to "enter deep into the 
opinions and affections of others" (T 319). Sympathy removes us fron 
our own private worlds and brings us in touch with the rest of 
humanity. As Stewart puts, Humean sympathy enables us to "escape fron 
the egocentricity (or particularity) of primary perception."4
Let us now return to the sociability of man. Sympathy is responsible 
for the communication of impressions and ideas among people. It
intensifies our perceptions, and humans, Hume thinks, derive great
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satisfaction fron intense perceptions. But sympathy can operate only 
in the company of others. In order for a person to sympathetically 
perceive the perceptions of others, and thereby intensify his own 
perceptions, he must, obviously, be around others. Thus, according to 
Hume, the desire for sympathetic perception contributes to our search 
for society, for on its own the mind "immediately languishes" (T 421). 
"The mind...[is] insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment" and 
thus seeks those things, primarily other humans, that will give it "a 
lively sensation, and agitate the spirits" (T 352-53). Thus, man is 
naturally driven to seek society. He is "the creature of the universe, 
who has the most ardent desire for society...A perfect solitude is, 
perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer" (T 363).
That humans are fundamentally social beings is important for us, for, 
according to Hume, humans have a great desire for a good reputation: 
"There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation" (T 
501). And, as we shall see, the desire for a good reputation can be 
satisfied only in the company of others, only in society. As we shall 
also see, this desire for a good reputation is responsible, Hume 
thinks, for our further desire to conform and cling to the established 
norms of society. To fully understand this idea we must begin with a 
brief investigation into Hume's analysis of the passion of pride, for 
it is this passion which leads us to seek a good reputation. This 
discussion of pride must be preceded by a brief insight into Hume's 
account of the passions.
According to Hume, passions are impressions, or rather, impressions 
of "reflection" (T 7) or "secondary impressions" (T 275), in contrast 
to "impressions of sensation" (T 7) or "original impressions" (T 275). 
Under the latter heading Hume places those impressions derived from
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"the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the 
application of objects to the external senses" (T 275), that is, im­
pressions which "make us perceive heat and cold, thirst and hunger, 
pleasure and pain" (T 8; T 275). Under the former heading he places 
impressions derived from "sane of these original ones, either imme­
diately or by the interposition of its ideas" (T 275). Thus, impres­
sions of reflection are derived fron already present impressions or 
ideas. Examples of such impressions are desire, fear, hope, and 
generally "the passions and other emotions resembling them" (T 275; T 
8).
Now, Hume divides passions into "direct" and "indirect" ones. Both 
types of passion "arise immediately fron good or evil, fron pain or 
pleasure" (T 276), that is, both direct and indirect passions have what 
Hume calls a "cause" (T 330) in the sense that they are aroused by the 
pain or pleasure we feel after we have acquired the idea of a pleasant 
or painful object. However, there is an important difference between 
these two types of passion: Indirect passions, unlike direct ones, 
have, not only a "cause" (i.e the idea of a good or evil object) but 
also what Hume calls an "object" (T 329), that is, they are directed 
either to oneself or to another. Both direct and indirect passions 
"proceed fron the same principles [pleasure and pain]" but only the 
latter "proceed...by the conjunction of other qualities [i.e the idea 
of oneself or of another person]" (T 276).
For Hume, the indirect passion of pride is a complex mental state 
resulting from the "double relation of ideas and impressions" (T 286). 
The details of this "double relation" are not important for us. All we 
need to know is that pride, as an indirect passion, has a "cause", 
namely, the idea of a good or pleasant object, and an "object", namely,
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oneself; and that pride is the result of the association in the mind 
between the idea of a good object and the idea of oneself. Humility, 
the passion which Hume contrasts to pride, takes the same form, only 
that its "cause" is a painful object. The next question is what kind 
of pleasant objects cause pride when associated with the idea of 
oneself.
As objects of pride Hume lists: Property and wealth, virtue, wit, 
beauty, rank, family (T 297; T 307-09; T 320; T 599). Here we should 
note that, for Hume, if these items give pleasure and thus cause pride 
it is because they are approved of by the public. The public values 
e.g property. Thus, property becomes a good or pleasant object and 
when associated with ourselves gives pride. Whether or not an object 
has value and can be classified as pleasant (and, therefore, gives 
pride) depends on the opinion of society: "[C]ustom and practice...
have settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly 
contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by 
means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to 
observe in preferring one object to another" (T 294). Further, a 
pleasant object will give us pride only when society sees that this 
object is in fact associated with us: "[T]he pleasant or painful
object [must] be very discernable and obvious, and not only to our­
selves, but to others also" (T 292; T 390). For Hume, the individual 
lives in the eyes of the public.^ This will come out clearer in a 
moment.
Apart from property, wealth, etc, another cause of pride, Hume thinks 
is the good opinion others have of us, that is, a good reputation:
"But besides these original causes of pride__there is a secondary one
in the opinions of others... Our reputation, our character, our name are
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considerations of vast weight and importance" (T 316). Now, according 
to Hume, "[i]t is in order to fix and confirm their favourable opinion
of themselves, not fron any original passion, that__[people] seek the
applause of others. " In other words, whether or not we think we have 
a good reputation depends on society's opinion of us: "Men always
consider the sentiments of others in their judgement of themselves" (T 
303). And, as we have seen, it is by means of sympathy that we 
perceive the sentiments of others. Thus, "the pleasure, which we 
receive from praise, arises from a communication of sentiments" (T 
324). According to Hume, then, the possession of a pleasant (socially 
approved) object causes pride. One such object is a good reputation. 
But whether or not we have a good reputation depends on the opinion 
that others have of us. And we come to know the opinion that others 
have of us by means of sympathy.
Now, Hume thinks that chief among those goods that give us a good 
reputation is conformity to what the public approves of morally. Thus, 
[b]y our continual and earnest pursuit of a charac­
ter, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our 
own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and 
consider how they appear in the eyes of those who 
approach and regard us. This constant habit of sur­
veying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps 
alive all the sentiments of right and wrong (E II 
276).
Conformity to the social standards of right and wrong is applauded by 
the public, particularly conformity to the standards of justice: "There 
is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and 
nothing on which our reputation depends more than our conduct, with
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relation to the property of others" (T 501). And given, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, the connection between justice and allegiance 
(for Hume, the duties of allegiance "are invented chiefly for the sake 
of" a better "execution of justice" (T 543)), it comes as no surprise 
that, in Hume's view, actions which are not consistent with the duties 
of allegiance (i.e rebellion) are regarded by the public as immoral (T 
545). This indicates that, for Hume, people will avoid anti-govern­
mental actions in order not to harm their reputation and will, in fact, 
strive to abide by the duties of allegiance in order to acquire a good 
name.
Thus, since people desire a good reputation, and since chief among 
those things which contribute to their good reputation is conformity to 
moral standards, particularly the rules of justice and allegiance, it 
follows that people will make every effort to conform to these rules in 
order to win the approval of the public and, thereby, enhance their 
reputation. For, "[t]he most inviolable attachment to the laws of our 
country is every where acknowledged a capital virtue; and where the 
people are not so happy, as to have any legislature but a single 
person, the strictest loyalty is, in that case, the truest patriotism" 
(E II 335).
What we have, then, is the following: Given people's desire for a 
good reputation, they will refrain from straying from what society 
approves of in the area of morality. And since the moral virtue which 
contributes greatest to our good reputation is justice it follows that 
people will strive to abide by the rules of justice. Given this, and 
given that the rules of allegiance exist for the sake of justice, it 
follows that people will also strive hard to adhere to the rules of 
allegiance. They will, it seems, never think of changing their object
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of allegiance, but always remain loyal to the existing government. It 
seems, then, that the Humean individual's desire for a good reputation 
has very conservative consequences.
C.
Up to this point we have seen that the Humean individual clings to 
the established because (a) he has a natural propensity to do so, and 
(b) because he has a desire for a good reputation (though this will 
lead him to cling only to his moral/political practices and institu­
tions and not to non-moral/political ones). But there is a third 
reason why the Humean individual will adhere to the established, 
namely, his desire for stability and order. According to Hume, we have 
a "love of order" (T 504 fn. 1). This love canes out clearly in Hume's 
conjectural account of the origin of justice and government. We shall 
look at this account in the next chapter. Here, we shall turn our 
attention to a number of other passages and we shall see that, accord­
ing to Hume, the desire for stability leads humans to adhere to their 
established and familiar practices.
According to Hume, hope and fear are direct passions (T 439). This 
means that these passions arise as a result of acquiring the idea of a 
good or pleasant object (in the case of hope), or the idea of an evil 
or painful object (in the case of fear). Hume thinks that the objects 
which cause hope and fear have an existence, for us, which is un­
certain. That is, hope and fear are produced by good and bad objects 
"concerning whose reality we are doubtful" (T 440). Now, Hume tells us 
that given "that human nature is in general pusilanimous", when we are 
confronted with an object in whose existence we are not sure whether to 
believe or disbelieve, we are more likely to feel fear than hope (T
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446), for there is "[a] principle of the connexion of fear with 
uncertainty" (T 447), so that objects with the quality of uncertainty 
frighten us. Uncertain ideas lack vivacity, and since, as we have 
seen, vivid ideas give pleasure, it follows that weak and uncertain 
ones cause pain: "As the vivacity of the idea gives pleasure, so its 
certainty prevents uneasiness, by fixing one particular idea in the
mind, and keeping it fron wavering in the choice of its objects__As
'tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought, and to 
transport us suddenly fron one idea to another, it must of consequence 
be the occasion of pain" (T 453). In other words, ideas which lack the 
force of certainty, which are unstable, are avoided by the mind because 
of the pain they cause. The mind finds peace and relief in certainty, 
and what is more certain than our stable and habitual patterns and 
practices? Thus, by making it a principle of the mind that there is a 
connection between uncertainty and uneasiness, Hume shows us his belief 
that the human mind loves order and stability, and that therefore it 
prefers the customary and established.
Hume also tells us that an idea causes pain when it is "strange", 
that is, new or novel. When the mind is confronted with the unfamiliar 
it becomes fearful: "The suddenness and strangeness of an appearance 
naturally excite a commotion in the mind...This commotion...naturally 
produces... the sensation of fear" (T 446; my emphasis). Since the mind 
is pained by "strangeness", by anything new which upsets its stable 
expectations, it will prefer the stability of the customary to the 
instability of the new and novel. As we noted earlier: "The mind 
finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects, to which it is 
accustom'd, and naturally prefers them to others, which, tho', perhaps, 
in themselves more valuable, are less known to it" (T 355).
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As the above quote fron T 446 makes clear, the Humean mind is also 
pained by the sudden appearance of a perception. According to Hume, 
"every thing that is unexpected affrights us" (T 446). And [t]is a 
quality of human nature... cannon both to mind and body, that too sudden 
and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and that however any objects 
may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alteration gives uneasi­
ness" (T 453). In other words, when our habitual patterns of thought 
and behaviour, our customary expectations, are not met, but are 
violently disturbed, we becane uneasy. The implication is that we find 
comfort in the stable and therefore in the habitual. We desire 
stability and the habitual can give us this.
II
On the basis of what has been said so far it would seem that the non­
conservative reformer has an impossible task before him. Humean man's 
natural affection for the customary, his desire for a good name, and 
his love of order and fear of the new and unknown all seem to combine 
to ensure that he will never deviate in any significant way from that 
which is established. However, this is not so.
As Laursen notes, Hume knows very well that, as a matter of fact,
7
people do quit their habitual patterns of thought and behaviour. Thus, 
we find Hume talking about "all the variations, which human affairs, in 
their incessant revolutions, are susceptible of" (T 533). According to 
Hume, "since the fall of Greece and Rome...many changes have arrived in 
religion, language, laws, and customs" (E II 336). "Of Eloquence" 
begins with the following sentence: "Those, who consider the periods 
and revolutions of human kind, as represented in history, are enter-
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tained with a spectacle full of pleasure and variety, and see, with 
surprize, the manners, customs, and opinions of the same species 
susceptible of such prodigious changes in different periods of time"
(Essays 97). And in "Of the Standard of Taste" Hume displays his impa­
tience with those who "make no allowance for the continual revolutions 
of manners and customs" (Essays 246), while in "Of National Characters" 
he tells us that "[t]he manners of a people change very considerably 
from one age to another; either by great alterations in their govern­
ment, by the mixtures of new people, or by that inconsistency, to which 
all human affairs are subject" (Essays 205-06). All this indicates 
that, for Hume, even though humans have a strong propensity to cling to 
the established, they also have a propensity to abandon it. Later, we 
shall see how these two conflicting propensities can be reconciled. At 
this point, however, we should make clear that the Humean individual's 
tendency to break away from the established also comes out (importantly 
for us) in Hume's discussion of the maintenance of government, that is, 
of the "surprizing.. .easiness with which the many are governed by the 
few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own 
sentiments and passions to those of their rulers" (Essays 32).
According to Hume, it cannot be that the many are governed by the few 
as a result of force, for "FORCE is always on the side of the governed 
[i.e the many]" (Essays 32). And even in those cases where a ruler's 
power does depend on the force of his army "he must, at least, have led 
[his army]...by their opinion" (Essays 33). Thus Hume is led to the 
conclusion that "[i]t is, therefore, on opinion only that government is 
founded" (Essays 32). Only opinion (or belief) can explain how and why 
the many follow the few. This phenomenon cannot be explained by either 
fear, self-interest, or affection. The latter two have a restricted
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scope. Only some members of society will be moved to support the 
government by either self-interest or affection for the ruler. And, 
anyway, self-interest can function only once a ruler is in power 
(Essays 34). This latter point applies to the principle of fear too. 
Fear can operate only once a ruler is in a position to wield power and 
carry out his threats (Essays 34).
The opinion which, according to Hume, maintains government, is of 
"two kinds, to wit, opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT" (Essays
33) . Hume further divides opinion of right into "right to POWER and 
right to PROPERTY" (Essays 33). "Upon these three opinions, therefore, 
of public interest, of right to power, and of right to property, are 
all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many"
(Essays 34). For our purposes the important opinions are those of 
interest and right to power.
Opinion of Interest: The interest here is not, as we have seen, self- 
interest or "expectation of particular rewards" (Essays 34). Rather, it 
is "public interest", that is, "the general advantage which is reaped 
from government" (Essays 33). What "general advantage" is provided by 
government? "[Sjecurity" (Essays 33) and "general protection" (Essays
34) . As we have seen, Hume thinks that people desire stability and 
order and (as we shall see) they achieve this by establishing go­
vernment. Having established a government people see that it provides 
them with security, and after repeatedly experiencing this "general 
advantage" provided by the established government they form the habitu­
al belief that this advantage will continue into the future. Thus, 
they give this government their support, a support founded on habit.
However, we should note that Hume thinks that people will abandon
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this habitual belief (and, thus their government) once they see that it 
is no longer the case that their government serves the public interest 
of stability and order. Having investigated the way in which humans 
operate in this area, Hume the anatomist comes to the conclusion that 
when deciding whether or not to support their government people always 
take into account its "evident tendency to the public good" (T 561). 
For "common sense", tells them that "the safety of the people is the 
supreme law", so that when obeying a government no longer serves the 
"public utility" but, instead, would lead to "public ruin", people will 
withdraw their support for that government (Essays 489): "Government 
is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the 
tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the 
natural obligation to obedience" (T 552). Hume goes on to say that 
"'tis certain, that all men have an implicit notion of [this train of 
thought ]... and are sensible, that they owe obedience to government 
merely on account of the public interest" (T 553). This, Hume thinks, 
is how people in fact reason, and in the next chapter we shall see that 
he thinks that this is how they ought to reason.
Opinion of right to Power: I think that the best place to begin our 
analysis of this opinion is with Hume's historical account of the 
origin of government. (Hume also gives us a conjectural account of the 
origin of government which we shall look at in the next chapter). In 
this account government arises fron "a state of war" (Essays 39; Essays 
468). But this war is not a war among members of the same society. 
Rather, it is a war between different societies: "[Governments]...arise 
from quarrels, not among men of the same societies, but among those of 
different societies" (T 540). In these wars "the pernicious effects of
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disorder are most sensibly felt" (Essays 40), and, to fight such wars 
successfully, in order to overcome the disorder they cause, a society 
sees the need for a leader who will coordinate its actions. Once such
a leader emerges, then "[a] long continuance of that state__enure[s]
the people to submission" (Essays 40; my emphasis). In other words, 
once a leader emerges in society to help fight wars efficiently, in 
order that stability may be maintained, and this leader remains in 
power for a long period, thereby exposing the people to a repeated 
experience, the people, given their tendency to acquire habits and 
cling to these, grow accustomed to the ruler and retain him (and his 
successors) in power. In the eyes of the people, government is
"sanctified by time" (HGB 225 fn. 4). So powerful is the sanctity of 
time (and custom) that "men, once accustomed to obedience, never think 
of departing frort that path, in which they and their ancestors have 
constantly trod" (Essays 39).
[Sjubjects...suppose themselves born under obliga­
tions of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much 
as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain 
parents... Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, 
that most men never make any enquiry about its ori­
gin or cause...Or if curiosity ever move them; as 
soon as they learn, that they themselves and their 
ancestors have, for several ages, or from time imme­
morial, been subject to such a form of government or 
such a family; they immediately acquiesce, and ac­
knowledge their obligation to allegiance (Essays 470).
It is this sanctity bestowed upon a government by time and custom that 
lies at the heart of Hume's account of the opinion of right to power.
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In the case of this opinion, people form the habitual belief that a 
government is worthy of support as a result of time and custom: "Time 
and custom give authority to all forms of government" (T 566). Once 
people have, over a period of time, repeatedly experienced the rule of 
a government, they form (as always when exposed to repeated experi­
ences) the habitual belief that this government has the right to rule. 
And, like all habits, this one too is extended into the future. Time 
and custom give a government the "sanction of antiquity" (Essays 33), 
and cause a people to form an "attachment...to their ancient govern­
ment" (Essays 33).
However, while it is true that, for Hume, "[ajntiquity always begets 
the opinion of right" (Essays 33), it is also true that he thinks that 
people will abandon a government even if it is backed by time and 
custom. In an important passage Hume presents us with the following 
thought experiment:
For instance; a government is establish'd for many 
centuries on a certain system of laws, forms, and 
methods of succession. The legislative power, es­
tablish'd by this long succession, changes all on a 
sudden the whole system of government, and intro­
duces a new constitution in its stead. I believe 
few of the subjects will think themselves bound to 
comply with this alteration, unless it have an 
evident tendency to the public good: But will think 
themselves at liberty to return to the antient 
government (T 561; my emphasis).
Now, whatever else is going on here, it is clear that, according to 
Hume, if the people see that changing an established practice is
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beneficial to the public interest, then they will accept this change. 
They are even willing to abandon an "antient government" and embrace a 
new constitution if this is in the public good! It seems, then, that 
in the eyes of the Humean individual public interest has priority over 
"antiquity" and the sanctity of time. Whether or not people follow 
their "antient government" depends on whether or not it contributes to 
the public interest. To take a concrete example: The authority of the 
Stuarts was founded solely on the habitual opinion of right to power: 
"[T]he house of Stuarts, was possessed of a very extensive authority 
— [T]his authority was founded merely on the opinion of the people, 
influenced by ancient precedent and example. It was not supported 
either by money or by the force of arms" (H 5 128). However, even 
though the rule of the Stuarts had the "sanction of antiquity", the 
people, were not reluctant to overthrow James II. Why? Because James 
threatened the public good. According to Hume, in the century or so 
before the Stuarts came to power "a new plan of liberty, founded on the 
privileges of the conrnons" was emerging in England as a result of the 
rise of the "middle rank of men" (H 4 384). Further, due to the rise 
of Puritanism, the people were beginning to support the cause of civil 
liberty (H 4 123-24). Thus, by the time the Stuarts came to power, the 
people were in full support of the ideals of liberty, limited monarchy, 
and the independence of parliament. Unfortunately, the Stuarts failed 
to recognise this and clung to "exhalted notions of monarchy and the 
authority of princes" (H 5 45). They clung to the practices of 
absolutism, including the king's "dispensing power", the power that 
allowed the king to overturn any act of parliament by decree. This 
power, however, was inconsistent with the people's ideas of an 
independent parliament and civil liberty. Thus, "the nation thought it
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[i.e the dispensing power] dangerous, if not fatal to liberty" (H 6 
476) and saw the need to overthrow James. He was a threat to liberty, 
a threat to the public good. His rule was inconsistent with what the 
public took to be its utility.
According to Hume, antiquity supports a government, but only so long 
as the people also think that this government is acting in their in­
terest. It seems, then, it is not the case that people "once 
accustom'd to obedience, never think of departing from that path, in 
which they and their ancestors have constantly trod" (Essays 39). Hume 
is clearly overstating his case here. Hume states his case clearer at 
T 561 above where he links in the minds of people rule, and long 
established rule in particular, with a concern for the public interest. 
An even better statement of this position comes out in "Of the Original 
Contract" where Hume tells us that only "[w]hen people are so happy" 
(my emphasis) will they answer the question, "[Tjo whan is allegiance 
due? And who is our lawful sovereign?" with the answer "Our present 
sovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from ancestors, that have 
governed us for many ages" (Essays 481). Thus, again we see that, 
according to Hume, whether or not a sovereign makes a people "happy", 
whether or not his rule is in their interest, plays the important part 
in determining whether or not a people will give this sovereign their 
allegiance.
Thus, as with the habitual opinion of interest, the habitual opinion 
of the right to power will be abandoned by the people if they think it 
is necessary to do so. That Hume thinks that people do in fact abandon 
their object of allegiance, even if it is sanctioned by time and 
custom, is important for us. For the introduction of the Perfect 
Commonwealth will, of course, require that people alter their object of
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allegiance. If Hume's view was that people always resist such an 
alteration, then clearly we would have to question the seriousness of 
"Idea of a Perfect Conmonwealth", given that such a view would preclude 
the possibility of the Perfect Conmonwealth's being introduced into the 
public realm. But this is not Hume's view. Rather, his view is that 
people do in fact withdraw their allegiance from an established sove­
reign, for "all men__are sensible, that they owe obedience to govern­
ment merely on account of public interest" (T 553). When a ruler no 
longer serves the public good, then people will abandon him. This, 
according to Hume the anatomist, is the way people as a matter of fact 
operate. In the next chapter we shall see that Hume thinks that this 
is the way people ought to operate, and that there are times when they 
ought to with withdraw their allegiance from an established ruler.
So, while it is true that people will support that ruler who has time 
and custom on his side, it is also true that sometimes, in the name of 
public interest, such rulers are abandoned. Hume knows that people do 
in fact turn against their governments. He knows that "[w]hoever 
considers the history of the several nations of the world" will 
uncover, not only their "conquests, increase, and diminution" but also 
"their revolutions" (T 562). Hume knows that "[a]11 human institu­
tions, and none more than government, are in continual fluctuation" 
(Essays 494-95). And The History of England is filled with examples 
of such fluctuations.
But now we have a problem. We have seen that the Humean individual 
is deeply concerned about his reputation, and that he thinks that what 
contributes most to his good reputation is conformity to society's 
moral standards, including the duty of allegiance. But now we discover 
that the Humean individual is in fact prepared to abandon his object of
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allegiance. Thus the question arises of how the Humean individual, who 
has such a concern for his reputation, will find it possible to neglect 
his duty of allegiance and abandon his government. It seems that for 
the sake of a good reputation he will not turn his back on his govern­
ment, even a bad one. But, in fact, he does. How are we to solve this 
problem?
I think that the best way we can deal with this problem is by linking 
the Humean individual's desire for a good reputation, not with obedi­
ence to government as such, but with obedience to a government which is 
in the public interest. Given that Hume thinks that a person will in 
fact cease to be loyal to his government if that government does not 
promote the good of the public, we can say that, for Hume, a person's 
reputation (in the case of the duty of allegiance) depends, not upon 
obedience to government, but, rather upon obedience to a government 
which serves the public good. Thus, if someone resists a government 
which is seen by the people as having a tendency to the public good, 
then his reputation will suffer. However, if he resists a government 
which all can see does nothing for the public good, and is even 
contrary to this good, then such resistance will not harm his reputa­
tion. This is the best way we can solve our problem, I think. And 
clearly, there is room for such a position in Hume's thought.
Ill
It would be very surprising if Hume held the view that people never 
abandon the beliefs, practices, and institutions which they are used 
to. If he did he would never have sought to modernise the science of 
man, put it "on a new footing" (T Intro xvii), and then try to expose
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it to the public. He would never have sought to get "the republic of
letters__[to] shake off the yoke of authority... [ so that men can
become] accustom[ed]__to think for themselves (T Abstract 644). He
would never have had the ambition of introducing into the public realm 
the new and novel ideas investigated in Chapter 2. The fact that he 
did shows us, I think, that he did not hold the view that people are 
always so conservative that they never abandon the established.
Of course, Hume does not think that people will renounce the estab­
lished at the drop of a hat. This should be clear from what was said 
in section I above. As we saw, Hume talks about the deep affection 
that we have for custom, the fear and uneasiness caused by new ideas 
which disrupt our customary expectations, and the comfort we find in 
what is familiar. We cannot ignore these passages. But I think that 
in these passages Hume is overstating his case. It would be surprising 
if Hume, whose works contain new ideas which were written for the 
public, believed it to be an absolute truth that humans always cling to 
the customary and always fear new and novel ideas. For otherwise he 
would never have presented the public with such ideas. But he did, and 
this indicates that in those passages in which Hume rigidly talks about 
our aversion to the abandonment of the customary and the fear and pain 
caused by novel ideas, he is overstating his case.
The conservative tendency of the Humean individual must be taken 
seriously. But we must also take seriously Hume's talk of "continual 
revolutions of manners and customs" (Essays 246); we must take 
seriously his condemnation of pernicious established beliefs; we must 
take seriously his attempt to introduce new ideas into the public 
realm. To over-emphasise Hume's conservative conception of the 
individual and ignore what we might call the progressive tendency he
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attributes to the individual, is wrong.
If it is true that Hume attributes to man a conservative and a 
progressive tendency, then it might seem that he has given us an 
inconsistent picture of man. I don't think so. I think these two 
tendencies can be reconciled. To see this we must turn to a passage in 
the Treatise in which, I think, Hume gives us his true view about the 
relationship between people and new ideas, a view which reconciles the 
conservative and the progressive tendencies that (as we have seen) he 
attributes to man; a view which, thus, takes both these tendencies 
seriously. At the beginning of Section 10, Part III, Book I of the 
Treatise, Hume, talking about the reception of his novel views by the
public, tells us that "education__prevails... in the world, and is the
cause why all systems [including his own] are apt to be rejected at 
first as new and unusual" (T 118; my emphasis). Now, as we have seen, 
for Hume, education is founded on repeated experience or custom (T 
116-17). Thus, Hume's claim in the above quote is this: Given the 
authority that custom has over the human mind, ideas which are not in 
harmony with the public's customary expectations, ideas which are "new 
and unusual", are very likely to be rejected by the public. But only 
"at first", as the above quote makes very clear. Thus, as the public 
comes to see the truth of Hume's new and novel ideas (or of anyone 
else's for that matter) they will cane to embrace these, abandoning 
false established ideas in the process. This is exactly what happened 
with "Harvey's doctrine of the circulation of blood" (H 6 154). At 
first it was met with hostility as people clung to their well- 
established "factious or superstitious prejudices." But eventually 
this true doctrine was accepted. "[S]low is the progress of truth in 
every science" Hume laments (H 6 154), given people's tendency to cling
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to what they are used to and their fear of the new. But there is 
"progress", there are "revolutions" in the area of habits and people 
do, eventually, come to embrace new ideas, new ideas that "at first" 
shocked them and were, thus, rejected. Beliefs, practices, and 
institutions are subject to change, significant change, even though 
people have a propensity to cling to the established. While the Humean 
individual's affection for his familiar patterns of thought and 
behaviour is strong, and while he has an inherent dislike for the 
novel, neither this affection nor this dislike are so strong as to 
cause him to rot in the established. For Hume there is progress, but, 
as Stewart notes, it is slow: "All advances towards reason and goodg
sense are slow and gradual" (H 1 359).
All this, of course, is important for our purpose. For if Hume's 
view was that people are so conservative that they never accept ideas 
which deviate significantly fron what they have inherited, then we 
would have to side with those scholars who argue that Hume was a 
conservative reformer, and regard as amusements both the conservative/ 
radical reforms we investigated in Chapter 2 and "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" itself. But humans are not, in Hume's view, fundamental­
ly conservative. They are, Hume thinks, capable of embracing new and 
novel ideas and (as we saw) are even prepared to accept significant 
reforms made to their established constitution if such reforms have "an 
evident tendency to the public good" (T 561). Of course, they have a 
deep conservative streak, and this precludes the possibility of 
reforming them radically. But we are not arguing here that Hume was a 
radical reformer. We are not trying to show that there is room in his 
thought for radical reformism. What we are trying to show is that he 
was a conservative/radical reformer and that there is room for such
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reformism in his thought. Hume's conception of man as a being with a 
conservative and a progressive streak leaves such rocxn. It is in 
harmony with the picture of Hume the reformer we are trying to promote
in this thesis.
CHAPTER 5
As mentioned in the "Introduction", our aim in this chapter will be to 
investigate the third and final reason why scxne have argued that Hume 
is confined to conservative reformism, namely, because, for him, 
society is held together by the habitually founded conventional rules 
of justice and allegiance. Given this view, it is said that Hume could 
not have endorsed the introduction into society of any reforms which 
were not conservative. For any attempt to reform society in a non­
conservative fashion would threaten the habits supporting justice and 
allegiance, thus bringing down society. In this chapter I want to show 
that, while it is true that, for Hume, society is supported by the 
habits of justice and allegiance, this does not dictate that he is 
restricted to being a conservative reformer. The role Hume assigns to
habit in keeping society together is consistent with his being a
1
conservative/radical reformer.
I
Justice, for Hume, is made up of three elements, namely "the stability 
of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance 
of promises" (T 526). Together, these elements form "The Laws of 
Nature" (T 484; T 509n; T 526; E II 305).^ Now, there can be no doubt 
that, for Hume, society coheres as a result of these three rules of 
justice. Again and again Hume expressly makes this point. To note 
just a few passages:
[Wjithout justice, society must immediately dissolve 
and every one must fall into that savage and soli­
tary condition, which is infinitely worse than the
CHAPTER 5 - 148
worst situation that can possibly be suppos'd in so­
ciety [i.e the state of nature] (T 497).
'Tis on the strict observance of...[justice] that 
the peace and security of human society entirely de­
pend__[Justice is) absolutely necessary to the sup­
port of society (T 526).
[By justice] alone they can preserve society, and 
keep themselves fron falling into that wretched 
and savage condition, which is commonly represented 
as the state of nature (T 534).
[JJustice is founded entirely on the interests of 
society...in order to preserve peace among mankind 
(Essays 489).
It is clear, then, that, for Hume, without justice there can be no 
society. Justice supports society. Now, Hume thinks that the rules 
of allegiance to government exist for the sake of justice:
[0]ur civil duties are connected with our natural, 
that the former are invented chiefly for the sake of 
the latter; and that the principle object of govern­
ment is to constrain men to observe the laws of 
nature (T 543).
OBEDIENCE is a new duty which must be invented to 
support that of JUSTICE; and the tyes of equity must 
be corroborated by those of allegiance (Essays 38).
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Given the relationship between justice and allegiance, and given 
that justice supports society, it is clear that, for Hume, the rules 
of allegiance to government are as necessary for the continued exist­
ence of society as are the rules of justice. Both justice and alle­
giance support society. But what supports justice and allegiance?
According to Hume, these "are not supported by any original in­
stinct of nature" (Essays 480), and this is why Hume labels justice 
and allegiance "artificial virtues" (e.g T 484; T 546; T 577; LG 30-
331). Justice is not the "immediate offspring of any natural motive 
or inclination" (T 532; my emphasis. The reason for this emphasis 
will become clear later). "[Tjhose impressions, which give rise to
__[the] sense of justice, are not natural to the mind of man" (T
496). And the same is true of allegiance: "Our primary instincts 
lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to seek 
dominion over others: And it is reflection only, which engages us to 
sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and public 
order" (Essays 480). True, as we shall see later, Hume thinks that 
justice and allegiance are founded on human nature, and are not 
invented by man. But neither corresponds directly to any natural 
affection. What, then, enables these two virtues to gain hold and 
flourish? The answer, we shall see, is custom, or habit. Without 
certain habits there can be neither justice nor allegiance, and, 
therefore, no society. Our task in the next section will be uncover 
these important habits. We shall do this by investigating Hume's 
conjectural account of how civil society arises. But here I should 
warn the reader that, in this investigation, I shall focus only on 
those aspects of this account which are important for our purpose 
(i.e to reveal the customs underlying justice and allegiance). What
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is not relevant for us will be either ignored or dealt with very 
briefly. Unfortunately, we have no time for side-trips.
II
In giving us his conjectural history of civil society, Hume investi­
gates the interaction between the nature of man, on the one hand, and
4man's external situation, on the other. We have already noted that 
Hume takes human nature to be constant. Having discovered, in his 
role as an anatomist, the principles of this constant nature, Hume 
explains why humans come to embrace the rules of justice and allegi­
ance by investigating the interaction between these principles and 
the general condition of human life. Justice is the result of 
"inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain 
qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects" 
(T 494). And the same is true of allegiance. Both arise "fron the 
circumstances and necessity of mankind" (T 477), from the "nature and 
situation of man" (E II 194). What is this "nature and situation" 
which gives rise to the artificial virtues of justice and allegiance?
According to Hume, man's "first state and situation may justly be 
esteem'd social" (T 493), for "[m]an...[is] born in a family" (Essays 
37). The family is inseparable from the human species, given that it 
is based on two principles which are themselves an inseparable part 
of human nature, namely, "the natural appetite betwixt the sexes" and 
the "natural affection" that parents have for their children (T 486). 
But even as part of a family, man is unable to acquire the goods he 
needs and wants (T 484-85). This desire for goods, "avidity", is 
very strong in man: "This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and
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possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, 
perpetual, [and] universal" (T 491-92). What people must do in order 
to satisfy their "avidity" and supply themselves and their loved ones 
with what they need and want is to venture outside their intimate
5circles and establish an economic or commercial society. Such a 
society "is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men" (T 526). 
It is "necessary to their well-being and subsistence" (T 489). For, 
it is only by means of a commercial society, only by means of econo­
mic relationships with those outside their intimate circle, that each
individual "is able to supply his defects__By [economic] society all
his infirmities are compensated" (T 485).
From self-interested reasons, therefore, humans venture out of 
their intimate circles and begin to associate with others to gain 
"additional force, ability, and security" (T 485), acquiring those 
goods they need and want for themselves and their intimate circle. 
But there are not enough goods to satisfy the "avidity" of all. 
There is, in other words, a condition of scarcity (T 487). Now, Hume 
thinks that man's affection is naturally limited to his intimate 
circle. People have "no...love of mankind, merely as such" (T 481). 
"[W]e are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection" (T 
519), and when people do "extend their concern beyond themselves, 
'tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common 
life, to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance" (T 
534). This limited benevolence of man, in conjunction with the 
external condition of scarcity, means that we begin to compete and 
come into conflict with each other over the scarce external goods we 
desire so much for ourselves and our intimate circle. Each person's 
possessions are "expos'd to the violence of others__while at the
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same time, there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every 
one's desires and necessities. As the improvement, therefore, of 
these goods is the chief advantage of [economic] society, so the 
instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the 
chief impediment [to economic society]" (T 487-88).
How, then, can people overcome the problems caused by instability 
and scarcity, and acquire the advantages of economic society? Not by 
changing their nature and either replacing their limited benevolence 
with extensive benevolence or by eradicating their avidity. Such a 
thing is impossible: "[People] cannot change their natures" (T 537). 
Nor by making external goods abundant. This a dream or "idle 
fiction" (T 494). Instead, people must change their circumstances. 
How? By instituting rules of private property, rules which will 
stabilise possession and introduce order. And here we should note 
that these rules are not contrary to human nature, they are not 
contrary to man's limited benevolence and natural avidity. Rather, 
they redirect these qualities, put a bridle on their "heedless and 
impetuous" exercise, and thus enable humans to better satisfy their 
nature (T 489; T 526).
So, in Hume's conjectural account of the rise of justice, "' tis 
only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men, along with 
the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice 
derives its origin" (T 495). Once people have stepped outside their 
intimate circles and come into contact with strangers, violence 
erupts as a result of (a) the scarcity of desired external goods (b) 
man's selfishness and (c) his avidity. At this point people see that 
they must rectify this bad condition. And they do this, Hume thinks, 
by turning to the rules of justice. These rules are established by
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means of "a convention enter'd into by all members of the society", a 
convention whose aim it is "to bestow stability on the possession of
__[external] goods, and leave everyone in the peaceable enjoyment of
what he may acquire by his fortune and industry" (T 489). This con­
vention arises once each person sees, as a result of reflection and 
experience, that it is in his interest to leave the possessions of 
others alone provided that others leave his possessions alone (T 
490). In the pre-economic society each person is "sensible" of the 
value of property rules and that such rules are in his interest (T 
498; T 490). Now, after "repeated experience of the inconveniences 
of transgressing [the rules of property]" (T 490; my emphasis) people 
begin to reveal both their desire for rules of justice, for such 
rules are in their own interest, and their readiness to respect the 
property of others on the condition that others respect theirs: 
"Every one expresses this sense [of interest] to his fellow, along 
with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on 
condition that others will do the same" (T 498; T 490). Thus, 
"gradually", by "slow progression", the trust and confidence among 
people increases as "this [repeated] experience assures...[them]
still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all__
[their] fellows, and gives__[them] a confidence of the future
regularity of their conduct" (T 490; my emphasis).
As a result of this future assurance, founded on repeated experi­
ence, or custom, people, one by one, begin to adhere to the rules of 
property and "[t]his becomes an example to others" until "justice 
establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement" (T 498; T 
490). But this convention or agreement is not the result of any 
promise, "[f]or even promises themselves... arise from human conven-
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tions." Rather it develops in the same way that the agreement 
between rowers develops: "Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do 
it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises 
to each other" (T 490; E II 306).
Thus the rules of property stabilisation come into effect, not as a 
result of anything as formal as a promise, but slowly, as a result of 
each person's seeing that transgressing such rules is not in his own 
interest, expressing this to others, and then cautiously adhering to 
such rules as repeated experience show him that he can do so safely, 
"in expectation that others are to perform the like" (T 498). Re­
peated experience, that is, custom gives each person this important 
expectation, important because tis only on expectation of this,
7that__[people's] moderation and abstinence are founded" (T 490).
We have seen that the rules of property stabilisation are not em­
braced as a result anything as formal as a promise. This means that 
these rules must be such that they are capable of being adopted with­
out the need for promises or contracts etc. This is why, in part, 
Hume thinks that the rules of property embraced by people are those 
of "present possession", "occupation", "prescription", "accession", 
and "succession" (T 503-13). For these rules are natural to man in 
the sense that they arise from the natural relations of resemblance,
o
contiguity, and cause and effect (T 504 fn. 1; T 509 fn. 2). They 
are obvious to people, and, thus, people can agree on them without 
the need for any formal procedures. This is an important point to 
which we shall return later in this chapter.
We mentioned earlier that Humean justice involves more than just 
rules of property stabilisation. It also involves rules for the 
transference of property by the consent of the owner, and the rule
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that promises mast be kept. Like the rule for stable property, these 
rules result from experience of, and reflection upon, the inconveni­
ences (to one's own interest) their absence cause, and a slow and 
cautious agreement or convention that they should be embraced (T 514- 
26). And, as in the case of the rule of property stabilisation, 
underlying these conventions is the necessary expectation of each 
person that all those around him will abide by the rules of consent 
and promise, an expectation founded on the repeated experience 
(custom) of each that all others realise that it is in their interest 
to abide by these rules and, as a result, behave accordingly (T 521).
Thus justice (and, therefore, society itself) is founded in a sig­
nificant way on habitually acquired expectations. For Hume, custom 
plays a central role in the maintenance of justice (and therefore of 
society). But this is not the only way in which custom supports 
justice. There is, as we shall see later, a second way.
So far in Hume's conjectural history, the society that has 
developed has adopted rules of justice, but it has established no 
government. This, however, soon changes, for, according to Hume, if 
economic society is to survive, then it must be supported by govern­
ment. That is, it must be transformed into a "political society" (a 
term Hume uses often e.g T 530; T 538; T 554; E II 205; Essays 37).
Briefly, while Hume thinks that no society can exist without rules 
of justice, he does think that there can be society without govern­
ment (T 541; T 539). However, this is true only when society is in 
its "infancy" and "the pleasures of life are few, and of little 
value" (T 539). Here, there is no reason to stray from the path of 
justice, for what your neighbour has you also have (T 553). Further, 
in a small, "uncultivated" society, people can still see that it is
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in their inmediate interest to abide by the rules of justice. In such
a society, "this motive [of self-interest]__is sufficiently strong and
forcible" to support obedience to the rules of justice without the 
need for government (T 499). However, "when society has become 
numerous, and has encreas'd to a tribe or nation, this interest is more 
remote; nor do men readily perceive, that disorder and confusion follow 
upon every breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted 
society" (T 499). Further, as the population grows "there must 
immediately arise an inequality of property" (Essays 297-98), so that a 
person will no longer have the same goods as his neighbour. This 
emerging gap between rich and poor breeds jealousy and conflict. The 
result of all this is that "in large and polish'd societies" people 
cannot, "of themselves" observe the rules of justice (T 543). In such 
societies the advantages to be gained by abiding by the rules of 
justice (order and stability) become distant, while the advantages
gained by violating these rules (the acquisition of others' goods that
one does not have) become near and proximate (T 535).
According to Hume, people have a natural inclination to prefer the 
near to the distant (T 428), and it is in order to remedy this "narrow­
ness of soul" (T 537), this "frailty or perverseness of our nature"
(Essays 38), that people establish government. For, in their more
reflective and calm, moments, people will "always give the preference
to whatever is in itself preferable." They "always__prefer the
greater good" (T 536). When people sit back in their "large and
polish'd societies" and reflect on their short-sighted behaviour, they 
see that the advantages which result fron abiding by the rules of 
justice are greater, "more preferable", than those that result from 
their violation. Thus they see that they must abide by the rules of
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justice. However, people have no natural motive to abide by these 
rules. And their nature cannot be changed (T 537). They will always 
prefer the near to the remote. The only remedy, they discover, is to 
"change their situation, and render the observance of justice— [their] 
immediate interest" (T 537; Essays 38). How do we change our situa­
tion? By establishing government, that is by appointing as rulers men 
whose immediate interest is the enforcement of the rules of justice (T 
537; Essays 38).
Thus, in Hume's conjectural account of the origin of government it is 
the natural and strong human desire for order and stability which gives 
rise to government. "Order in society, we find, is much better main­
tained by means of government" (Essays 38-39; Essays 466; Essays 480). 
The purpose of government is to protect us in our persons and property 
by strictly enforcing the rules of justice. We can now understand why, 
for Hume, society, or at least a large commercial society, cannot exist 
without the rules of allegiance to government.
Now, according to Hume, once political society (that is, economic 
society supported by government) has been established, people are no 
longer moved to be just from self-interest, but from a sense of justice 
(T 500). That is, adherence to justice acquires the status of a moral 
virtue. In political society the rules of justice are "naturally 
attended with a strong sentiment of morals" (T 579-80). The question 
we must investigate is: How does the sense of justice arise? How is 
justice raised to a moral status?
According to Hume, "a sympathy with public interest is the source of 
the moral approbation which attends that virtue [i.e justice]" (T 499- 
500). The rules of justice benefit all people in society. Their 
violation is harmful. Thus, when these rules are adhered to they cause
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pleasure to people, while when they are violated they cause pain. Now, 
earlier we noted the human quality of sympathetic perception. It is 
this quality which enables us to escape fron our own subjectivity and 
feel the perceptions of others, even of strangers, approving, as 
spectators from a general or impartial point of view, of those 
perceptions which cause them pleasure and disapproving of those which 
cause them pain. Thus, whenever justice is breached and people who are 
treated unjustly are pained "[w]e partake of their uneasiness by 
sympathy; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, 
upon the general survey, is call'd Vice" (T 499). Similarly, when 
rules of justice have been adhered to and those who benefit feel 
pleasure, we as observers feel pleasure as a result of sympathy "and 
whatever produces satisfaction...is denominated Virtue" (T 499). Hume 
goes on to say that this is "why the sense of moral good and evil 
follows upon justice and injustice" (T 499).
But now we have a problem. To see this problem we must return to our 
discussion of sympathy in Chapter 3. There we noted that the associ­
ative relation of resemblance lies at the heart of the mechanism of 
sympathy. If we can sympathise with another person at all, it is 
because there is a resemblance between him and us. But here it is 
important to note that the associative relation of resemblance is not 
enough to fully convey to us (by means of sympathy) the force of 
another's belief or feeling. For, according to Hume, "[t]he sentiments 
of others have little influence, when far remov'd from us, and require 
the relation of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves 
entirely" (T 318). Ties of blood, "being a species of causation", have 
the same effect, as does "acquaintance", which is a habitual relation 
(T 318). Thus, if we are to fully sympathise with another person, then
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the fact that there is a resemblance between him and us is not enough. 
He must also be either spatially or affectionately near us. If 
sympathy is founded only on resemblance, then it will be weak. For 
sympathy to be strong and complete it must also be founded on either 
contiguity or causation (blood-ties) or "acquaintance" (friendship). 
This indicates that, for Hume, sympathy works best within a limited 
(either spatial or affectional) range.
Now, elsewhere, Hume tells us that "[w]e sympathize more with...our 
acquaintance, than with strangers" (T 581), and "the company of 
strangers is agreeable to us for a short time, by inlivening our
thought__[ but ] the company of our relations and acquaintance must be
peculiarly agreeable, because it has this effect in a greater degree, 
and is of a more durable influence" (T 353). In fact, "the relation of 
blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of 
parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, 
as the relation lessens" (T 352). In other words, for Hume, there is a 
hierarchy of sympathetic perception. Sympathy operates best, most 
powerfully, when it is founded on the relation of causation (blood- 
ties). And it also operates powerfully when founded on "acquaintance" 
(friendship), though not as powerfully as it does in the case of blood- 
ties. The power of sympathy lessens when it is founded on contiguity 
(this will cane out clearer in a moment), and is weakest when it is 
founded on resemblance alone.
So, Hume thinks that sympathy is at is strongest when it operates 
within the boundary of our intimate circle of affection (family and 
friends). Of course, this does not mean that we do not sympathise with 
strangers. But on the basis of what has been said, it is clear that, 
for Hume, in the case of strangers, sympathy will work "entirely" only
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when these strangers are spatially near us, otherwise their perceptions 
will have "little influence" (T 318), being founded only on the rela­
tion of resemblance. Thus, "sympathy with persons remote from us [is] 
much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous" (E II 229). 
But here we should note that sympathising with contiguous strangers has 
a significantly different result fron sympathising with loved ones and 
friends. For, unlike sympathising with members of our intimate circle, 
sympathising with strangers does not make me "willing to sacrifice any 
thing of my own interest, or cross any of my passions, for his 
satisfaction" (T 586). When we sympathise with a contiguous stranger, 
we feel his e.g pain or pleasure and this causes us to disapprove or 
approve of that thing which causes him pain or pleasure (T 586; T 
588-89) and elevate the former to a vice and the latter to a virtue. 
However, we do not make sacrifices for him. In the case of a 
contiguous stranger, sympathy does not lead us to actively seek his 
good, as it does in the case of a loved ones.
It is clear, then, that, for Hume, sympathy operates best within the 
limits of one's intimate circle. And even when it extends to stran­
gers, these strangers must be contiguous. And here is our problem. 
For in our brief outline above of Hume's account of how justice becomes 
a virtue, we noted Hume's talk of "a sympathy with public interest" (T 
499-500), thus indicating that, in his view, sympathy can be extended 
to non-contiguous strangers. Hume thinks that "[sjympathy interests us
in the good of mankind" (T 584), and that "we have no__ extensive
concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that 
principle, which takes us far out of ourselves, as to give us the same 
pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others" (T 579), and the 
"others" here are not only loved ones and contiguous strangers, but
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also non-contiguous strangers. Thus, Hume thinks that we can sympa­
thise with strangers even when they are not contiguous ("the public" or 
"society"). He calls this type of sympathy "extensive sympathy" (T 
586) and it is responsible for the moral status of justice (in a large 
society). For Hume, then, sympathy can operate, not only in the narrow 
realm of one's intimate circle and, less powerfully, in the narrow 
realm of contiguous strangers, but also in the more extensive realm of 
the public or society. The question we must investigate is how the 
boundary of sympathy (which is naturally narrow) can be extended to 
include strangers who are not contiguous, i.e "the public". How does 
"extensive sympathy" (and, therefore, the moral status of justice in a 
large society) arise? The answer, we shall find, is "Custom".
According to Hume, in a large society, "the sense of justice and in­
justice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artificially, tho' 
necessarily from education, and human conventions" (T 483; my 
emphases). Now, since the sense of justice in a large society depends 
on "extensive sympathy" it seems that this "extensive sympathy" which 
causes us to take an interest in the public good and gives us "our 
sentiments of virtue" (T 586), including justice, is also the result of 
"education, and human conventions." If this is correct, then we can 
say that for Hume, while it is true that by nature sympathy is limited, 
its scope can be extended artificially, by education, and it is because 
of such education that we can cane to sympathise with the public good. 
Let us investigate this idea.
When Hume asks why people in their "civiliz'd state" (political 
society) adhere to the rules of justice he points to the sense of 
justice people have acquired as a result of having been "train'd up 
according to a certain discipline and education" (T 479). Hume thinks
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that "the public instructions of politicians, and the private education 
of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in 
the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of 
others" (T 533-34). Hume repeats this educative task of politicians 
and parents a number of times (e.g T 500, T 534). For our purpose now,
9it is the education provided by politicians which is important.
Now, given that, for Hume, "no principle of the human mind is more
natural than a sense of virtue" (T 484; my emphasis), Hume has no
patience with the view that "fashion, vogue, custom, and law...[are]
the chief foundations of all moral determinations" (E II 333). He
refuses to believe that such distinctions are created or invented by
1 npoliticians (T 500; T 533; T 578; E II 214). However, he is con­
vinced that politicians can play a role, through education, in pro­
moting virtue: "[Politicians may assist nature in the producing of
those sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some 
occasions, produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular 
action... [Politicians can.. .extend the natural sentiments beyond 
their original bounds" (T 500; T 521). Those who argue that "all moral 
distinctions arise from education" are wrong. But they are right when 
they go on to say that such distinctions can be "encouraged, by the art 
of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and subdue their 
natural ferocity and selfishness which incapacitated them for society." 
Hume goes on to say that this "education" by politicians, "a powerful 
influence", is able, not only to take "beyond their natural standards,
the sentiments of approbation and dislike" but can "even__create,
without any natural principle, a new sentiment of this kind" (E II 
214). Of course, sympathy is not a sentiment, but a natural principle 
of the imagination (T 557; T 618). But given that education can extend
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the "sentiments of approbation or dislike", and given, as we have seen,
that it is by means of these sentiments (through sympathy) that we
approve of justice and disapprove of injustice, it follows that
11education can also extend the scope of the principle of sympathy.
Thus, the politician can improve on what nature has provided,
including, it seems, the principle of sympathy. In other words, the
politician, working with nature's raw materials, can, by means of
education, inculcate the virtue of justice in his subjects by extending
the scope of their sympathy to include the public interest and thereby
help to transform them into a beings fit for life in a political
society. Thus, we can say that, according to Hume, education is one of
12the state's primary tasks. But what tools of education will the
politician use to achieve his aim of extending sympathy and instilling
the virtue of justice? According to Hume,
that general virtue and good morals in a state, which
are so requisite to happiness, can never arise fron
the most refined precepts of philosophy, or even the
severest injunctions of religion; but must proceed
entirely from the virtuous education of youth, the
13effect of wise laws and institutions (Essays 55).
Thus, the educative tools of the politician are wise laws and wise
institutions. Now, as we have seen, for Hume, education is founded on
"custom and repetition" (T 116). Thus, it is by repeatedly exposing
their subjects to "wise laws and institutions" that the politicians
will achieve their task of promoting virtue. "Habit", Hume declares,
is... [a] powerful means of reforming the mind, and implanting in it
14good dispositions and inclinations" (Essays 170-71). The habits
acquired as a result of repeated exposure to "wise laws and institu-
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tions" have the effect of extending the naturally narrow boundaries of 
sympathy and furnishing people with the good disposition and inclina­
tion of sympathising with the public good.
We should emphasise the importance of the politician's task here. We 
know that, according to Hume, people naturally have their intimate 
circle as the most powerful object of their concern and affection. 
They have little or no natural affection for strangers. This fact 
about humans, Hume thinks, is "directly destructive of society" (T 
492), for people are prepared to harm those outside their intimate 
circle in order to benefit those lying within it. "[IInstead of 
fitting men for large societies, [limited natural affection] is almost 
as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness" (T 487). The 
politician's task is to regulate this fact about humans. He does not 
seek to do this by extirpating man's natural affection for his loved 
ones. Such a thing would be not only impracticable (given that human 
nature can never be changed), but also harmful. As we noted in Chapter 
1, Hume thinks that " [ s ] overeigns must take mankind as they find them" 
in the sense that they must respect human nature, and any "improve­
ments" they introduce into society must "comply with the common bent of 
mankind." Reformers must never violate human nature, for this is 
"violent" or harmful. Rather they must "give it all the improvements 
of which it is susceptible" (Essays 260). And this is exactly what the 
politician here is doing. He is improving on what nature has provided. 
By means of education (repeated exposure to good laws and institutions) 
he expands the boundaries of natural sympathy, thus inculcating in 
people the "extensive sympathy" they must have in order to able to 
extend their sentiments of approval and disapproval, raise justice to 
the level of a virtue, and live together in an economic society. And
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we should note that this task of the politician is an on going one. 
For people by nature love their intimate circle more than their 
extensive or wider one and, thus, there is always the fear that people 
will slide back into their natural limited concerns (T 582). To 
prevent this, politicians must never abandon their educative role. 
They must never cease to inculcate in their subjects those habits which 
ultimately lead to the elevation of justice to a virtue.
Parental education also assists in the installation of justice as a 
virtue. Parents,
are induc'd to inculcate on their children, from 
their earliest infancy, the principles of probity, 
and teach them to regard the observance of those 
rules, by which society is maintain'd, as worthy and 
honourable, and their violation as base and infamous.
By this means, sentiments of honour may take root in 
their tender minds, and acquire such firmness and so­
lidity, that they may fall little short of those 
principles (T 500-501).
In the previous chapter we saw that, according to Hume, people adhere 
to virtue because of their strong desire for reputation. We now dis­
cover that another reason for this adherence is the education they 
receive by politicians and parents: "As publick praise and blame 
encrease our esteem for justice; so private education [the education of 
children by parents] and instruction [the education of the public by 
politicians] contribute to the same effect" (T 500). Thus, education 
plays a fundamental role in the establishment and maintenance of 
justice in political society. But, as we have already noted, for Hume, 
education is founded on "custom and repetition" (T 116). Thus, we
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discover another major way in which, for Hume, custom supports justice 
and, therefore, keeps society together. Custom plays the same role in 
the area of allegiance.
According to Hume, once government has been established, "the 
separate interest, which we have in submission" produces "a separate 
sentiment of morality" (T 554). In other words, in political society 
allegiance acquires a moral status. How? Given the significant role 
that government plays with respect to justice, we find actions which 
are designed to harm government (such as "seditious and disloyal 
actions") as "highly prejudicial to public interest" (T 545). As a 
result of extensive sympathetic perception, any anti-governmental 
action "naturally gives us an uneasiness... and makes us attach to them 
the idea of vice and moral deformity" (T 545). Thus, obedience to 
government, that is, allegiance, acquires a moral status the same way 
that adherence to the rules of justice does. And, the extensive 
sympathy which ultimately founds of the duty of allegiance is (again as 
in the case of justice) caused by "[ejducation, and the artifices of 
politicians" (T 546). It is this education that places a "morality on 
loyalty" and makes people see "all rebellion with a greater degree of 
guilt and infamy" (T 546). Thus, like the virtue of justice, the 
virtue of allegiance is supported by education, or custom. (And, again 
like justice, allegiance is also supported, as we saw in previous 
chapter, by the desire for a good reputation, though, ultimately, all 
virtue, Hume thinks, springs fron man's nature.)
Once government is established it is, as we have already noted, 
"sanctified by time" (HGB 225 fn. 4), so that once people have been 
repeatedly exposed to the rule of that government, they, being the 
habitual creatures that they are, form the habitual belief that this
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government has the right to rule. Once people "learn, that they them­
selves and their ancestors have, for several ages, or from time imme­
morial, been subject to such a form of government or such a family; 
they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge their obligation to alle­
giance" (Essays 470) (though, as we saw in the previous chapter, Hume 
is overstating his case here. He knows that people do in fact abandon 
well-established governments which are sanctified by time). This 
indicates that in Hume's view, the strongest rule of allegiance for 
people is what he calls "long possession" (T 556). But given that 
"[a]ll human institutions, and none more than government, are in 
continual fluctuation" (Essays 494-95), that is, given that rulers are 
toppled and governments vanish, it follows that people cannot always 
appeal to long possession as their rule of allegiance. In this case 
they appeal to one of the other rules, namely, "present possession" (T 
557), or "conquest" (T 558), or "succession" (T 559), or "positive 
laws" (T 561). Like the rules for the distribution of property, these
rules for the distribution of authority are founded on the natural
15workings of the mind.
Ill
So far in this chapter we have seen that, for Hume, human well-being 
depends upon economic society, and that such society depends upon the 
rules of justice. Now, while justice is founded upon sentiments 
natural to man, to gain hold and flourish as a virtue in a "large and 
polish'd" economic society, it requires (a) the expectation of each 
member of society that those around him will adhere to the rules of 
justice in the future, an expectation founded on habit, (b) the educa-
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tion of the people by their parents and politicians, an education which 
is also founded on custom, (c) the desire for a good reputation (some­
thing we also saw in the previous chapter), and (d ), government. 
"[N]umerous and civiliz'd societies cannot subsist without government" 
(T 553-54), for in such societies people, "of themselves", cannot abide 
by the rules of justice. Government is needed in order to enforce 
justice, without which there can be no large economic society. Govern­
ment itself is founded on the moral duty of allegiance which, like the 
duty of justice, depends on custom and (as we saw in the previous 
chapter) the desire for a good reputation.
If all this is correct, then it is clear that, in a number of 
important ways, habit keeps Humean society together. Without certain 
habitual patterns of thought and behaviour human well-being must 
suffer, for without such patterns there can be no justice, no 
allegiance, no government and, therefore, no large economic society. 
This presents us with two serious problems.
A.
Habitual adherence to the rules of justice plays a central role in 
holding Humean society together. Thus, as we noted in the "Introduc­
tion", scholars have claimed that, for Hume, any innovations introduced 
into society must be conservative. Is this correct? Does what Hume 
have to say about justice restrict him to conservative reformism? No.
To see this we must recall (and keep in mind) that Hume presents us 
with the rules of justice after he has examined the interaction between 
the immutable principles of human nature and the external world. Now, 
as we have already noted, Hume labels justice an "artificial virtue"
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for "t±ie sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, but 
arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conven­
tions" (T 483). However, n[t]o avoid giving offence", Hume warns that, 
when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use 
of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial.
In another sense of the word; as no principle of the 
human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so 
no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an 
inventive species; and where an invention is obvious 
and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said 
to be natural as anything that proceeds immediately 
from original principles, without the intervention of 
thought or reflection (T 484)
Thus, in an important sense, justice is natural, namely, in the sense 
that it is "obvious and absolutely necessary" to man. It obviously and 
necessarily arises among humans given their nature and the external 
conditions they must face. It is "inseparable" fron the human species 
(T 474; T 526; E II 307). This is why Hume calls the rules of justice 
"Laws of Nature", for they are "common to" and "inseparable from" the 
human species" (T 484). After realising that they must live together, 
but seeing that this is not possible without the existence of certain 
rules, humans obviously and necessarily (naturally) adopt as their 
rules the rules of justice that Hume himself uncovers in the Treatise. 
And this point came out in the above discussion. Thus, justice (as 
presented to us by Hume) "extends to all times and places...It is 
obvious, and discovers itself on the first formation of society. All 
these causes render the rules of justice steadfast and immutable; at
least as immutable as human nature" (T 620).
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Now, all this should make it clear that in putting forward the rules 
of justice Hume does not see himself as inventing something new. Hume 
the anatomist subjects man to empirical scientific scrutiny and dis­
covers that when men come to see that they need rules in order to live 
together, the rules that in fact spring to their minds are those that 
he himself uncovers. For these are the rules that nature has provided. 
Men everywhere, in all societies, when they think of the rules of 
justice, think of the rules that Hume has presented us with. Thus, 
defending himself in A Letter fron a Gentleman against those who 
attacked him for classifying justice as an artificial virtue, Hume 
declares: "Has he not expressly asserted, That Justice...is so natural 
to Man, that no Society of Men, and even no individual Member of any 
Society, was ever entirely devoid of all Sense of it?" (LG 31; my 
emphasis).
The rules of justice (Hume is convinced) are a description of 
principles that everyone already knows and recognises. They have 
always been, and always will be, in the minds of men. How could they 
not, given that they naturally and necessarily arise from immutable 
human nature? But this is not all. Hume is also convinced that the 
natural rules of justice are part of every society. They are universal 
and exist in every society: "The convenience, or rather necessity, 
which leads to justice is so universal, and everywhere points so much 
to the same rules, that the habit takes place in all societies" (E II 
203). Hume's view about the universality of justice, should not sur­
prise us. For we already know Hume's view that there can be no society 
without the rules of justice, that is, the natural rules of justice 
that he has uncovered for us. Thus, where there is a society we must 
find there the natural rules of justice, the Laws of Nature. But this
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does not mean that, according to Hume, in every society these rules are 
respected and perfectly realised. As mentioned, the rules of justice 
are rules for the promotion of commerce, and as we shall see in the 
next chapter, Hume does not think that every form of government is 
favourable to commerce, that is, not every form of government allows 
the natural rules of justice, the laws of nature, to find full expres­
sion. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 2, Hume thinks that the only form 
of government which ensures a flourishing commercial sector, that is, 
which ensure the flourishing of the natural rules of justice, is free 
government (Essays 92) (though Hume thinks that this was not true of 
the ancient badly-contrived republics). Hume knows that the world is 
full of sovereigns who are "transported by their passions into all the 
excesses of cruelty and ambition" (T 552), and devise all sorts of 
pernicious systems of justice for their political societies. But even 
in such societies the natural rules of justice are lurking somewhere. 
They must be, for we are still dealing with a society and, therefore, 
with a body which incorporates the natural rules of justice, though 
these are hindered to an enormous degree. If this is correct, then it
seems that, for Hume, the natural rules of justice are the "basic
16principles" of society (as Stewart calls them), in the sense that no 
society can exist without them, even if in that society they are not 
fully realised and are prevented from running their natural course.
According to Hume, the natural rules of justice exist in every 
society, even in a society ruled by a despotic form of government 
where, as we shall see in the next chapter, property is highly unstable 
and commerce is impossible. But even such a society has as its pillars, 
its "basic principles", the rules of justice which are provided by wise 
nature, though they are not allowed to flourish and exist in an un-
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stable or hindered form. And Hume must think that the inhabitants of 
such a pernicious political society are aware of these natural rules. 
For, as we have just seen, he thinks that these rules are "obvious" and 
"necessary" so that no man "was ever entirely devoid of all Sense of 
it". Thus, for Hume, those governed by imperfect rules of justice are 
aware that something is wrong with their political society. They are 
aware that the rules of justice that nature has provided are not being 
observed. They are aware that the rules of justice which spring from 
immutable human nature and which every society has as its central 
pillars (for otherwise it could not be a society) are not being allowed 
to run their natural course, as they ought to be, and as Hume thinks 
they ought to be.
Now, we have been told that Hume is restricted to being a conserva­
tive reformer because, for him, society is supported by justice, which 
in turn is supported by habits, and these habits must not be upset. To 
avoid upsetting them, only conservative reforms must be introduced into 
society. But why shouldn't we upset the habits of justice when the 
system of justice they support deviates from the one provided for us by 
nature? Why shouldn't we introduce into a society whose existing 
system of justice (and, therefore, the habits supporting this system) 
is not consistent with the "laws of nature", progressive reforms 
designed to allow these laws to flourish unhindered? Would allowing 
the laws of nature to flourish in a society where they have so far been 
hindered or deformed bring down that society? No. For we are not 
uprooting the "basic principles" of society, but allowing them to be 
fully realised. True, such a task would involve uprooting old habits 
of justice and introducing into society new habits to support the new, 
natural system of justice. But this task will not plunge us into the
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state of nature. For, as we know, the new system of justice to be 
introduced is "natural to Man". No human has ever being, or ever will 
be, "entirely devoid of all Sense of it." Thus, the introduction of 
this new and natural system of justice (and the new habits supporting 
it) will be easy, in the sense that it will not traumatise the public. 
For, not only is the public already aware of this system, but it has a 
natural predilection towards it. And this latter point is important. 
For Hume thinks that "the less natural any set of principle are, which 
support a particular society, the more difficulty will a legislator 
meet with in raising and cultivating them" (Essays 260). But the rules 
of justice as uncovered by Hume are natural, and thus, it will not be 
difficult to get the public to embrace them and the habits upon which 
they is founded. And, no doubt, the politicians we met earlier in this 
chapter, those politicians whose task it is to improve on what nature 
has provided and inculcate "extensive sympathy" in the minds of the 
people, will assist the public in forming the new habits of justice by 
means of wise laws and institutions.
For Hume, justice (as he has uncovered it) supports society, and 
habits support justice. But there is no reason why Hume would not 
allow the introduction of non-conservative reforms into an unjust 
society whose aim was to replace an existing pernicious system of 
justice (and the habits underlying it) with that system of justice (and 
the necessary habits) which has been ordained by nature. Such non­
conservative reforms would not dissolve society. How could they given 
that they seek the full realisation of the very things that keep 
society together, the Laws of Nature, Laws which are "natural to Man".
Of course, for us, the important question is whether all this is 
consistent with taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously. We
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shall deal with this question in the next chapter. Here, our aim has 
been only to deal with the separate question of whether what Hume has 
to say about justice restricts him to conservative reformism. The 
answer is, No. Hume's theory of justice is consistent with his being a 
conservative/radical reformer.
Keeping in mind what we have said so far, we can now turn our 
attention to a second problem.
B.
In the previous chapter we dealt with the problem of how the Humean 
individual could in fact withdraw his loyalty from an existing govern­
ment and transfer it to a new one given that (a) he is a habitual 
creature and "once accustomed to obedience, never thinks[s] of
departing fron the path, in which__[he] and___[his] ancestors have
constantly trod" (Essays 39), and (b) he has a great concern for his 
reputation, and the thing which contributes most to his good name is 
adherence to the standards of morality including, of course, the duty 
of allegiance. But we saw that, in the case of (a) the Humean 
individual does in fact depart fron the political path he has inherited 
from his ancestors and, in the case of (b) that the Humean individual's 
reputation is not founded on allegiance to the existing government as 
such, but to the existing government when it serves the public good. 
Both (a) and (b) are important conclusions for us. For the introduc­
tion of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain will require the public 
to change its object of allegiance. Given that Hume thinks that the 
public is capable of making such a change it follows that one cannot 
argue that we cannot take "Idea of a Perfect Ccmmonwealth" seriously on
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the ground that Humean individual is incapable of transferring his 
allegiance.
But now a further problem arises for us in this area. As we have 
seen, Hume thinks that in "large and polish'd societies" government is 
necessary in order to uphold the rules of justice, without which 
society would be plunged into the state of nature. For Hume, govern­
ment, and therefore the duty of allegiance and the habits supporting 
it, is absolutely essential if humans are to live together in large 
societies. In view of this position it seems that, for Hume, people 
ought never to transfer their allegiance from one government to another 
for such a thing would disturb their habits of allegiance, thus 
interfering with the enforcement of justice by government and thus 
plunging society into the state of nature. The Humean individual might 
be capable of transferring his allegiance, but it seems that, according 
to Hume, he ought never to do such a thing. If this is Hume's view, 
that is, if Hume thinks that we ought never to change the object of our 
allegiance for fear of disturbing the habits which support this 
allegiance, then how can he be a non-conservative reformer? In which 
case we cannot take seriously the idea that he wishes to bring the 
Perfect Commonwealth into being in Britain. For the progressive reform 
of introducing the Perfect Commonwealth into the nation will require 
people to change their object (and therefore their habits) of 
allegiance. Our problem, then, is whether or not Hume thinks that 
people ought to change their object of allegiance.
We saw above that there is no reason why Hume would be opposed to the 
uprooting of a society's pernicious system of justice in order to allow 
that system provided for us by wise nature to flourish. Given this, 
and given (as we already know) that, for Hume, the task of government
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is to enforce justice, why can't we say that Hume would allow the 
public to overthrow a pernicious government (i.e a government which 
enforces a harmful system, of justice) and replace it with one which 
will ensure the blossoming of the natural rules of justice? And, as we 
shall see now, there is roan for such a position in Hume's thought.
When Hume canes to discuss the normative standard for the distribu­
tion of political power, he tells us that "the strongest title to 
sovereignty", the title which "is justly regarded as sacred and 
inviolable" is "the concurrence" of the five rules of allegiance which 
we noted earlier and which he has derived fron human nature (T 562). 
But Hume makes it very clear that this title is subordinate to public 
utility. The sovereign in whom these rules concur has a "sacred and 
inviolable" title only "[wjhere the public good does not evidently 
demand a change" (T 562). Thus, just as people (in Hume's view) do in 
fact make the public good their normative standard for determining 
whether or not to support a government, Hume too makes the public good 
his normative standard of political legitimacy. In all areas of every­
day life, Hume was prepared to side with the common-sense views of the 
people (e.g T 272; T 552; E l  161; E II 170; E II 194). And what does 
common sense tell us in the area of allegiance?
[C]ommon sense teaches us, that, as government binds 
us to obedience only on account of its tendency to 
public utility, that duty must always, in extraordin­
ary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend 
obedience, yield to the primary and original obliga­
tion. Salus populi suprema Lex, the safety of the 
people is the supreme law (Essays 489).
Hume repeats the same basic argument in the Treatise. He asks whether
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people have a "moral obligation__to submit to a tyrannical government
against their own and the public interest" (T 551). His answer is 
"No". For government is established by people in order "to procure 
themselves sane security against the wickedness and injustice of men, 
who are perpetually carried, by their unruly passions, and by their 
present and immediate interest, to the violation of all the laws of 
society" (T 551). Thus, if rulers are ever "transported by their 
passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition" and no longer 
satisfy our interests, then "we may resist the more violent effects of 
supreme power, without any crime or injustice" (T 552). Hume concludes 
by asking, What principle of human nature causes humans to submit to 
government? Custom? No. True, as we have seen, people do obey 
government from habit, but this is only once government has been 
established. But, "what motive first produces those instances of 
submission, which we imitate, and that train of actions, which produces 
the custom?" His answer is "interest" (T 553). Interest gives rise to 
the habit of submission. Where this interest ceases, so does the 
habit. Interest is the principle of human nature which produces 
government, allegiance, and the habits underlying allegiance, and it is 
this principle which Hume makes the normative standard of allegiance. 
Thus,
if interest first produces obedience to government,
the obligation to obedience must cease, whenever the
interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a con-
17siderable number of instances (T 553).
Hume does not have much to say about self-preservation. But what he 
does say is important for us. According to Hume, self-preservation, 
"the love of life", is one of the "instincts originally implanted in
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our natures" (T 417). It is one of man's "stronger motives" (E II 186) 
and "'tis not ignorantly nor causally we perform those actions, which 
tend to self-preservation" (T 176). But not only is self-preservation 
an instinct. It is also a right, a right which springs fron the 
"necessity of self-preservation" and which is intimately linked to our 
"right of resistance":
[I]n limited monarchies, 'tis certain, that people 
still retain the right of resistance; since 'tis 
impossible, even in the most despotic governments, 
to deprive them of it. The same necessity of self- 
preservation, and the same motive of public good, 
give them the same liberty in the one case as in 
the other (T 563-64).
Thus, "[t]he right of self-preservation is unalienable in every
18individual, much more in every community" (Essays 362). No indivi­
dual can ever be deprived of the right of resistance. Nor can any 
cornmmity. Thus, where a community sees that its preservation, its 
interest or good, is being threatened by its government, it has the 
right to dispose of that government.
It is clear, then, that Hume does allow people to change their object 
of allegiance. This does not mean that Hume allows people to overthrow 
their existing government whenever they might feel that it is not 
serving their interest. In the long quote above from Essays 489 Hume 
tells us that rebellion is justified only "in extraordinary cases". 
And at T 553 (quoted above) he tells us that we have a right to rebel 
when government violates our interest "in any great degree, and in a 
considerable number of instances." Elsewhere he talks of "[resistance 
...being admitted [only] in extraordinary emergencies" and adds that "I
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must confess, that I shall always incline to their side, who draw the 
bond of allegiance very close, and consider an infringement of it, as a 
last refuge in desperate cases, when the public is in the highest 
danger, from violence and tyranny" (Essays 490). Hume never tells us 
what an extraordinary emergency is, what a desperate case is, what type 
of governmental violence endangers the public etc. But this is con­
sistent with the outrage he expresses against those "preposterous" 
people, namely, "preacher[s] or casuist[s]", who spend all their time 
"stating all the cases, in which resistance may be allowed" (Essays 
490-91). Such an activity is dangerous for it does nothing but 
encourage people to rebel. But people ought not to be encouraged in 
this way. Not because there is something sacred about established 
governments, but because (a) rebellion is almost always followed by 
civil war, anarchy, and violence (Essays 490; T 553) and (b) people who 
are encouraged to rebel acquire "a disposition to rebellion" which in 
turn "forces...[governments] into many violent measures which they 
never would have embraced" (Essays 490). That is, a rebellious 
population causes rulers to adopt harsh, despotic methods.
Hume agrees that "obedience is our duty" but adds that this is so 
only "in the common course of life" (Essays 490). In the "uncommon" 
course, where it is clear that the established government has no 
interest to serve the public good, rebellion is justified. But here, 
the purpose of the rebellion should not merely be to overthrow the 
existing harmful government, but also institute a better government, 
one which has as its aim the promotion of the public interest.
Now, clearly, the removal of a government which violates the natural 
rules of justice, and its replacement with one that respects these 
rules, would be in the public interest and, therefore, would be con-
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doned by Hume. For, "the equal distribution of justice, and free
enjoyment of property...[are] the great objects for which political
society was at first founded by men, which the people have a perpetual
and inalienable right to recal, and which no time, nor precedent, nor
statute, nor positive institution, ought to deter them from keeping
19ever uppermost in their thoughts and attention" (H 1 445). It seems, 
then, that Hume would approve of the removal of a government which did 
not respect the "great objects" of political society i.e "the equal 
distribution of justice, and free enjoyment of property". And such a 
thing can be achieved without having to worry about upsetting the 
existing habits of allegiance and, thereby, throwing society into the 
state of nature. For the habits of allegiance to an existing 
pernicious government are weak, if not non-existent. We have already 
noted Hume's view that allegiance to government is (and ought to be) 
determined by interest. Now, according to Hume "though men be much 
governed by interest; yet interest itself, and all human affairs, are 
entirely governed by opinion" (Essays 51). Given this we can say that 
where opinion about a government is low, because the people believe 
that government does not have its (i.e the people's) interests in mind, 
allegiance to that government will also be low, since allegiance itself 
is based upon interest. It is opinion about interest which produces 
habits of allegiance. Thus, when opinion about interest changes, the 
habits vanish. And, as we already know, Hume thinks that people in 
fact use the standard of public utility in determining their allegiance 
to an existing government. Thus, where the existing government does 
not serve the public good, the habits of obedience to this government 
will have deteriorated, due to unfavourable opinion. All this, no
doubt, will make the establishment of a new salutary government easier.
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And the new opinions and habits of allegiance necessary to support this 
new government will be easily formed. For the new government will have 
as its aim the public good, the realisation of those natural rules of 
justice which the people are already aware of and naturally approve of. 
Thus, the people will give this new government their full support with­
out much effort, and, due to favourable opinion, they will easily form 
the new habits of allegiance necessary to support this government. And 
the good education provided by the politicians will facilitate the 
formation of these new habits.
Further, we should note that resistance does not undermine what we 
might call "the principle of subordination". According to Hume "[a]ll 
men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and 
order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for 
the maintenance of society" (Essays 38). In other words, people know 
that without justice there can be no society. And, on the basis of our 
discussion in this chapter we can say that they also know (from 
repeated experience) that without government there can be no justice. 
Thus, in overthrowing an existing government, people will know that 
they must quickly institute a new one. Rebellion will cause people to 
change their object of allegiance and to abandon their habits of 
allegiance to the existing government (habits which, as we noted above, 
will be weak given that this government does not serve the public 
interest). But it will not cause them to abandon their habitual belief 
that government is essential to the continued existence of society 
(where the society is "large and polish'd"). If this is correct, then 
it seems that, for Hume, resistance (if conducted properly and only 
when necessary) will not plunge society into the state of nature. For 
while resistance will cause the extirpation of existing (weak) habits
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of allegiance to a bad government, it will not cause the extirpation of 
the habitual belief that subordination to government is necessary.
In the previous chapter we saw that, for Hume, people do in fact 
change their objects of allegiance. We now discover that he also 
thinks that there are times when people ought to change this object 
and, importantly, that this can be done without destroying society. 
Whether all this is consistent with taking "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" seriously is something which we shall tackle in Chapter 8. 
What is important here is the separate question of whether Hume's 
discussion of allegiance restricts him to conservative reformism. And 
the answer is, No. If this is correct, then in this chapter we have 
established that there is nothing in what Hume has to say about either 
justice or allegiance (and the role that custom plays in supporting 
these virtues) which prevents us from labelling Hume a "conservative/ 
radical reformer". And this is an important conclusion for us.
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Hume is a reformer and his writings have as their aim the instruction 
of the public. He attacks a wide variety of well-established beliefs 
that exist in the public realm, and does not hesitate to recommend 
reforms which take the public well beyond what it knows. He never 
recommends reforms that will completely remove society's institutions, 
beliefs, and practices, and the principles that support them. But, as 
we saw a number of times in Chapter 2, he does recommend reforms that 
will alter these elements in significant ways. And importantly, 
neither the method of reasoning that he normatively recommends, nor his 
conception of man, nor his views about justice and allegiance and the 
part habit plays in supporting these virtues, prevent him fron putting 
forward such reforms. These elements of Hume's philosophy do not re­
strict him to conservative reformism. If all this is correct, then we 
can say that Hume is a conservative/radical reformer. But this is not 
enough for our purpose. Our purpose is to show that Hume wrote "Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth" so that the form of government it outlines 
might one day be established in Britain. Thus, as I explained in the 
"Introduction", we must show, not only that Hume is a conservative/ 
radical reformer, but also that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" itself 
is a conservative/radical reform for Britain. For if we can only show 
that Hume is a conservative/radical reformer, but cannot overturn the 
view that the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain 
will require massive and wholesale reformation of that nation's 
economic, social, and political systems, then we can do nothing else 
but join the ranks of those who have argued that Hume never meant "Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth" to be taken seriously. If we cannot show 
that there is harmony between the type of reformism that Hume embraces 
and the type of reform that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is, then
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we are in trouble. Thus, our task in this Chapter will be to show that 
there is such harmony, and that, for Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Corrmon- 
wealth" is, in the case of Britain, a conservative/radical reform.
But this will not be our only task. We have already noted that, (a) 
for Hume, reforms must not be "violent" in the sense that they must not 
violate the common course of nature (Essays 260), and (b) Hume condemns 
plans of government which are designed by men in their "closet[s]"
(Essays 52) i.e plans of government which are the result of abstract 
theorising. Thus, if we are to show that "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" ought to be taken seriously, then we must show, not only that 
the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain will be a 
conservative/radical reform, but also that his plan of government is 
not a "violent" reform (in the above sense), and that it is not the 
result of abstract theorising. Thus, we have three tasks in this 
chapter.
Our first will be to show that, in the case of Britain, "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth" is not a radical reform, but a conservative/ 
radical one. We shall do this by showing that Hume's Britain and 
Hume's Perfect Commonwealth are close economically, socially, and 
politically, so that, while the introduction of Perfect Commonwealth 
into Britain will bring with it novelties and innovations, it will not 
completely uproot that nation's economic, social, and political 
principles (and the beliefs, practices, and institutions they support).
Now, as we have already mentioned, for Hume, limited monarchies and 
republics are both forms of "free government". Thus, the first step in 
our first task must be to investigate what Hume has to say about these 
two types of free government. This investigation is best pursued in 
the wider context of Hume's views about the strengths and weaknesses of
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the various forms of government. Here I should warn the reader that I 
shall discuss these views in some detail. While this detailed discus­
sion is not important for our purpose in the present chapter, it will 
be of great importance in the next. However, since, as I said, the 
task we are presently pursuing is best dealt with in the wider context 
of Hume's discussion of the various forms of government, rather than
having to return to this topic in the next chapter, it is best for us,
1I think, to deal with it in detail now.
I
While discussing Hume's defence of luxury against the "severe moral­
ists" in Chapter 2 we noted his clear preferences for a government of 
laws and for a luxurious commercial society. A state which embodies 
the rule of law and which fosters a society with flourishing manufact­
uring and commercial sectors best meets the needs of the people and the 
ends of political society. Now, we also noted in that chapter Hume's 
view that, in a polity, economic, social, and political elements are 
intimately intertwined as causes and effects. What is important for us 
here is the view that political causes have social and economic 
consequences. Thus, as we already know, with free government cane: 
The establishment of the middle rank as society's independent 
magistracy, flourishing commerce and manufacturing, the production of 
luxuries, the incentive to work, increased wealth, improvements in 
technology and agriculture, etc. This idea that political causes have 
social and economic effects is important and should be kept in mind as 
this chapter progresses.
According to Hume, the form of government which can never have the
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social and economic consequence that he finds desirable is absolute 
"barbarous" monarchy (e.g the Ottoman empire). This form of government 
is a despotism, a government of man, not of law, where the ruler wields 
"arbitrary power" (Essays 116), and where "he delegates his full 
[absolute and arbitrary] power to all inferior magistrates" he appoints 
(Essays 117). Given that rulers and their officials govern in an 
arbitrary manner, absolute "barbarous" monarchies are "oppressive and 
debasing" (Essays 116), turning subjects into "slaves in the full and 
proper sense of the word" (Essays 117). Subjects are at the mercy of 
the whims of their ruler and his officials, and thus lack the 
"security" that comes with a government of laws (Essays 117), security 
which is necessary for the economic and the social/cultural improvement 
of mankind (Essays 124). And here we should note that what also 
contributes to the slavery and insecurity of the people in "barbarous" 
monarchies is the fact that in this form of government all rank depends 
upon the "commission" of the ruler alone (Essays 22). In other words, 
"barbarous" monarchies lack an independent magistracy to lead the 
people and protect them from the king.
Thus, of all forms of government, a "barbarous" monarchy least meets 
the ends of political society. It fails to protect the people and is 
opposed to stability and the rule of law and, thus, to the growth of 
commerce and the benefits that flow from such growth. It is the worst 
of all forms of government (though it is to be preferred to the state 
of nature (Essays 277)), and Hume warns the British public that if it 
is not careful Britain might be left with a despotic and barbarous 
regime (Essays 499-500).
Not all absolute monarchies are "barbarous". Some, Hume thinks, are 
"civilized", and, according to him, most of the monarchies of western
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Europe are of this type (Essays 402). Hume was very much, impressed 
with this form of government. He condemns those who "in a high poli­
tical rant" disparagingly label such a government as "Tyranny" (Essays 
125), and wrote to the Abbe le Blanc: "I abhor, that low practice, so 
prevalent in England, of speaking with Malignity of France" (L I 194), 
France being "the most perfect model of pure monarchy" (Essays 95). 
The reason why Hume has little patience with those who blindly attack 
absolute "civilized" monarchy is because this form of government 
"afford[s] tolerable security to the people, and may answer most of the 
ends of political society" (Essays 125). Security is possible in an 
absolute "civilized" monarchy because, unlike a "barbarous" one, it 
embodies the rule of law: "It may now be affirmed of civilized 
monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that 
they are a government of Laws, not of Men" (Essays 94).
In Chapter 2 we saw that Hume associates the rise of the rule of law 
in a state with the rise of "tradesmen and merchants" or the "middling 
rank". The desire of this group for security of property and freedom 
from the arbitrary rule of monarchs and aristocrats leads them to 
"covet equal laws" (Essays 277-78). In view of this link between the 
rule of law and the rise of the middle class, it might be thought that 
since absolute "civilized" monarchies embody the rule of law, they also 
have a middle rank and, thus, strong trading and manufacturing 
sectors. But this is not so, and we shall see why in a moment. How, 
then, do absolute "civilized" monarchies come to have the rule of law? 
Hume's answer is: "Emulation".
Hume thinks that the first governments to arise in the world were 
"barbarous" monarchies (Essays 115). Now, large states tend towards
absolutism, while smaller ones turn towards republicanism (Essays 119;
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Essays 527). Thus, the world soon became populated by large absolute 
"barbarous" monarchies and small ancient republics (or "barbarous" 
republics as Hume sometimes calls them (Essays 118)). The direction a 
state took in the early ages of the world depended upon its size.
These small "barbarous" republics were the worlds first free 
governments, distributing power among several bodies and embracing the 
principle of the rule of law. In these states "frequent elections by
the people__[placed] a considerable check upon authority", and rulers
were also restrained by "general laws and statutes" (Essays 117), for 
"a republic necessarily, by an infallible operation, gives rise to LAW"
(Essays 118). Now, Hume thinks that the rise of the rule of law was 
possible only in the small "barbarous" republics, never in the large 
"barbarous" monarchies, for "[mjonarchy, when absolute, contains even 
something repugnant to law" (Essays 118). Absolute "barbarous" 
monarchy, by its very nature, discourages the invention of law, for 
"such a form of government...knows no other secret or policy, than that 
of entrusting unlimited powers to every governor or magistrate, and 
subdividing the people into many classes and orders of slavery" (Essays 
124; Essays 125).
Given that the ancient republics were governments of law, they were 
able "to secure the lives and properties of the citizens, to exempt one 
man from the domination of another; and to protect every one against 
the violence or tyranny of his fellow-citizens" (Essays 118). This 
meant that all sorts of improvements were possible in these free 
states, improvements in the arts, sciences, and knowledge. For, 
"[f]rom law arises security: From security curiosity: And from 
curiosity knowledge" (Essays 118). Thus, Hume calls the ancient
republics "the only proper nursery for the arts and sciences" (Essays
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119). This growth in the areas of knowledge and the arts led to 
greater humanity among the inhabitants (both rulers and subjects) of 
these republics, given, as mentioned earlier, that knowledge and the 
liberal arts lead to an "encrease of humanity" (Essays 271; Essays 
170). The humanity of rulers was increased, not only as a result of 
progress in the arts and sciences, but also as a result of the dis­
covery of "the arts of government". According to Hume, it was in the
ancient republics that "the arts of government__[were] first invented"
(Essays 125). It was in these republics "that knowledge, which is
requisite to instruct__[rulers] in the advantages, arising fron a
better police, and more moderate authority" first emerged, for such 
knowledge, like all other knowledge, can only arise as a result of the 
security that caries with the rule of law (Essays 118). We noted in 
Chapter 2 that, according to Hume, subjects rebel because of the harsh­
ness of their rulers and that once sovereigns have acquired knowledge 
in the "arts of government" they learn "the advantages of humane maxims 
above rigour and severity" and begin to rule with "mildness and 
moderation." The result of such rule is greater stability and order 
among the ruled (Essays 273-74).
Seeing these advantages of the rule of law, Hume thinks that absolute 
"barbarous" monarchs transformed their states into governments of law. 
As a result of the power of "the emulation, which naturally arises 
among...neighbouring states" and which is "an obvious source of 
improvement" (Essays 119), absolute "barbarous" monarchies lifted them­
selves out of the misery of despotism and became absolute "civilized" 
monarchies. Thus, every "civilized" monarchy "owes all its perfection 
to the republican... It must borrow its laws, and methods, and institu­
tions, and consequently its stability and order, from free governments.
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These advantages are the sole growth of republics" (Essays 125).
Here, a further characteristic of "civilized" monarchies ought to be 
noted. According to Hume, this form of government discourages the 
growth of factions, for a monarch is "exempt from private jealousies or 
interests" and, thus, he need not pander to any group for support 
(Essays 125). However, we should note, that this does not mean that 
factions never develop in absolute "civilized" monarchies. Hume makes 
it clear that "absolute governments...[are ] not wholly free from them 
[i.e factions]" (Essays 55). How could they be given that factions 
arise naturally among humans (Essays 55). However, in absolute 
"civilized" monarchies, the "soil" is not "the richest" to nourish such 
"plants" (Essays 55). All forms of government, Hume thinks, give rise 
to factions, from republics (where they grow best (Essays 55)) to 
barbarous despotisms (where they are suppressed and, therefore are 
"more real and more pernicious" (Essays 59-60)). But in "civilized" 
monarchies factionalism is less severe. Given Hume's ardent opposition 
to factions (noted in Chapter 2), this characteristic of absolute 
"civilized" monarchies is something in its favour.
The fact that absolute "civilized" monarchies embody the rule of law 
means that such monarchies enjoy great benefits: "Property is there 
secure; industry encouraged; the arts flourish; and the prince lives 
secure among his subjects, like a father among his children" (Essays 
94). As a result of its "laws, and methods, and institutions", (all of 
which are borrowed form republics) this form of government provides 
society with "stability and order" (Essays 125).
From what has been said, it would seem that absolute "civilized" 
monarchies foster the growth of a large and strong comnercial society. 
For they provide people with the necessary order and stability they
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need to safely acquire private property and thus to expand the nation's 
commercial and manufacturing sectors. However, absolute "civilized" 
monarchies do not have this result, and this is one of the weaknesses 
of this form of government.
Given the rule of law, property is secure in a "civilized" monarchy. 
In fact, "[p]rivate property seems to me almost as secure in a civil­
ized EUROPEAN monarchy, as in a republic" (Essays 92-93; Essays 125). 
But security is not enough for commerce to flourish. What is also 
needed is the appropriate system of ranking, a system which promises 
rank on the basis of those qualities which encourage people to seek 
advancement in the areas of commerce and manufacturing. Free govern­
ments have such a system. Here, as we noted in Chapter 2, rank is 
determined on the basis of "industry and riches" (Essays 93), and thus, 
people seeking rank in such a system government will seek to be 
successful in commerce, for only commercial success gives one "industry 
and riches". But in an absolute "civilized" monarchy, rank is based on 
"[b]irth, titles, and place" (Essays 93), qualities which do not cane 
with being successful in the areas of trade and manufacture. Thus, 
while in a "civilized" monarchy commerce can flourish, it will not. It 
will not because, wanting status, those engaged in commerce "will be 
tempted to throw up their commerce, in order to purchase sane of those 
employments, to which privileges and honours are annexed" (Essays 93). 
Hume concludes: "Corrmerce, therefore, in my opinion, is apt to decay 
in absolute governments, not because it is there less secure, but 
because it is less honourable" (Essays 93). It is less honourable 
because in an absolute "civilized" monarchy the qualities and skills of 
traders, manufacturers and the "middle rank" generally, are not valued 
or honoured and, therefore, do not secure high status. As a result,
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trading, manufacturing, and commerce will suffer in an absolute 
"civilized" monarchy. In order for commerce to develop in a state what 
is required is not only security of private property, but also the 
appropriate system of ranking. An absolute "civilized" monarchy 
satisfies the first condition, but not the second.
Given the feebleness of commerce and manufacturing in absolute 
"civilized" monarchies, and given, as we saw in Chapter 2, that Hume 
thinks that there is a connection between the growth of commerce and 
the improvement of the conditions of the poor, it follows that in 
"civilized" monarchies the poor remain in conditions of misery: "The 
poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infallible effect 
of absolute monarchy." Hume, as we saw, had the desire to improve the 
condition of the poor. The fact that absolute "civilized" monarchies 
do not contribute to this end is clearly something else in the dis­
favour of this form of government. Hume does not go on to say that the 
condition of the poor will necessarily improve in a free government, 
but he thinks that this form of government is likely to have such a 
result (Essays 265).
Hume thinks that absolute "civilized" rmonarchies are governments of 
law. But what does this mean? It means that everyone, including 
"[e ]very minister or magistrate, however eminent, must submit to the 
general laws, which govern the whole society" (Essays 125). But there 
is one exception: "In a civilized monarchy, the prince alone is unre­
strained in the exercise of his authority, and possesses alone a power, 
which is not bounded by any thing but custom, example, and the sense of 
his own interest" (Essays 125). This situation, however, is dangerous, 
which is why, when Hume declares that absolute "civilized" monarchies 
"answer most of the ends of political society" he adds that this is so
CHAPTER 6 - 1 9 3
only when the ruler is "just and prudent" (Essays 125). But there is 
no guarantee that this condition will be met. For such monarchies are 
hereditary, and Hume thinks, as we saw in Chapter 2, that hereditary 
monarchies leave too much to chance. One is never sure of the 
character of the person who will end up on the throne. Hume brings out 
the the dangerous nature of hereditary absolute monarchy by asking us 
to " [c]ompare the FRENCH government under HENRY III and HENRY IV." In 
the former case there was "[oppression, levity, artifice on the part 
of the ruler; faction, sedition, treachery, rebellion, disloyalty on 
the part of the subjects." In the latter case, however, "the govern­
ment, the people, every thing seemed to be totally changed; and all 
frcm the difference of the temper and conduct of these two sovereigns. 
Instances of this kind may be multiplied, almost without number"
(Essays 15). In Chapter 2 we saw that Hume complains that in a 
hereditary limited monarchy the monarch can be restrained by the other 
elements of the constitution but never perfectly. As a result, the 
character of the king plays a role in the operations of government, 
thus making such monarchies inherently unstable. This problem is even 
greater in an absolute hereditary monarchy where the king is in no way 
restrained, and this fact "is one of the great inconveniences attending 
that form of government" (Essays 15).
As we know, this problem cannot be solved by replacing the hereditary 
monarch with a elected one. Hereditary monarchy is far superior to 
elective monarchy (Essays 18), and, thus, hereditary absolute monarchy 
is superior to elective absolute monarchy. But even hereditary 
absolute monarchy is seriously defective given that there is no 
guarantee that the person who inherits the throne will be of suitable 
character. True, modern humans are more humane and gentle than their
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ancestors. Knowledge, science, and art increase humanity, and these 
are far stronger in the modern world than in previous ages. Today, the 
nations of Europe are all "polite and learned" (Essays 99; Essays 91). 
Thus, Hume is convinced that "[o]ur modern education and customs instil 
more humanity and moderation than the ancient" (Essays 94). And this 
is true, not only of ordinary people, but also of rulers (whose 
humanity is further increased by the arts of government). According to 
Hume, no modern European absolute monarch is "so bad as TIBERIUS, 
CALIGULA, NERO, or DOMITIAN." But, still, "[i]t must...be confessed, 
that, though monarchical governments have approached nearer to popular 
ones, in gentleness and stability; they are still inferior" (Essays 
94). They are inferior because they cannot exclude the possibility 
that a Henry III will come to the throne and bring with him harsh rule, 
instability, and sedition.
For Hume, absolute "civilized" monarchies embody the rule of law, but 
only imperfectly. For under such a form of government, all are bridled 
by the law except the monarch. He is in a position to exercise arbi­
trary power and this can cause severe problems. We noted in Chapter 2 
that, for Hume, the rule of law is "the perfection of civil society"
(Essays 41). Absolute "civilized" monarchies fail to attain this 
perfection.
Here we should note that there is another source of instability in a 
modern absolute "civilized" monarchy. In order to function properly, 
monarchies require that the people have "a superstitious reverence for 
princes" (Essays 119): " [Monarchies... [receive] their chief stability 
from a superstitious reverence to...princes" (Essays 126). But, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Hume believes that in the modern world there is no 
such reverence. Today, any talk of the king as God's lieutenant on
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earth provokes (to Hume's approval) nothing but laughter (Essays 51). 
Such a change in attitude contributes to the weakening of the monarch's 
authority.
For Hume, a modern state requires a form of government which gives no 
opportunity to the ruler to exercise his power in an arbitrary fashion. 
A modern state also requires a form of government which allows a com­
mercial society to flourish. Absolute "civilized" monarchies fail to 
meet both these requirements.
In addition to absolute "barbarous" and "civilized" monarchies, Hume
distinguishes a third type of monarchy, namely, limited monarchy.
Hume's favourite example of this form of government is Britain. And if
we can draw any general conclusions from What Hume has to say about
Britain's limited monarchy, then it seems that he believes that this
2form of government functions quite successfully in the modern world.
Limited monarchy is a form of free government (Essays 10; Essays 265; 
Essays 493), meaning, first, that it is a form of government which 
divides power among several bodies (thus checking the power of the 
hereditary monarch) and, second, that it is a form of government which 
embodies the rule of law. The rule of law arises in a limited monarchy 
because of the "mutual watchfulness and jealousy" of the various parts 
(Essay 12). In the case of Britain's free government, under which 
"every man is restrained by the most rigid laws" (Essays 31), the 
republican element of the constitution must "for its own preservation 
...maintain a watchful jealousy over the magistrates, to remove all 
discretionary powers, and to secure every one's life and fortune by 
general and inflexible laws (Essays 12). Given that limited monarchies 
subject all to equal laws, they can foster great progress. And when, 
through luck, the various parts of the constitution are properly
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balanced, the nation flourishes. Remaining with the British example of 
limited monarchy, Hume declares that, as a result of sixty years of
"uninterrupted harmony__between our princes and our parliaments",
Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has 
flourished almost without interruption: Trade and 
manufactures, and agriculture, have encreased: The 
arts, and sciences, and philosophy, have been culti­
vated__And the glory of the nation has spread it­
self all over EUROPE; derived equally from our pro­
gress in the arts of peace, and fron valour and 
success in war. So long and so glorious a period 
no nation almost can boast of: Nor is there another 
instance in the whole history of mankind, that so 
many millions of people have, during such a space of 
time, been held together, in a manner so free, so 
rational, and so suitable to the dignity of human 
nature (Essays 508).
Hume agrees with the "established opinion, that commerce can never 
flourish but in a free government" (Essays 92). And, a limited mon­
archy, being a type of free government, fosters a luxurious commercial 
society. This comes out in the above long quote. Now, we noted Hume's 
view that in order for a strong commercial sector to grow in a state 
what is required is not only the rule of law but also a system of 
ranking which dispenses status on the basis of "industry and riches". 
Hume attributes to Britain such a system of ranking, as we saw in 
Chapter 2. And, of course, the growth of commerce means that in a 
limited monarchy the material condition of the people is very likely to 
improve. Also, since knowledge and the arts flourish in a limited
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monarchy (as the above long quote makes clear) it follows that the 
inhabitants of such states are more moderate, gentle, and humane. This 
is true of both subjects and rulers. Thus, since the seventeenth 
century, "the tempers of men" in Britain have become "more civilized" 
and the government relies less on "those violent exertions of pre­
rogative" (H 5 179). Today "ENGLAND__is remarkable__ for humanity,
justice, and liberty" (Essays 414 fn. 100).
Limited monarchy, then, is "a species of government" which has "many 
advantages". But, at the same time it has one "unavoidable disadvant­
age": It is inherently unstable (Essays 46): "[A]11 human governments, 
particularly those of a mixed frame, are in continual fluctuation" (H 5 
160). One source of instability is the loss of all superstitious 
reverence for the monarch. The British, as we noted in Chapter 2, have 
overcane this problem by means of royal patronage. But Hume is not 
convinced that this practice will always work, especially in times of 
"shock or convulsion" (Essays 51). But the main source of instability, 
as we already know, is the inability to perfectly balance the various 
parts which make up the constitution of a limited monarchy: "[It is 
not ] possible to assign to the crown such a determinate degree of 
power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counterbalance to the 
other parts of the constitution" (Essays 46). This is the great 
problem with limited monarchy, a problem which can arise, but is not 
inherent, in the second type of free government that Hume distinguish­
es, namely, republics.
Hume distinguishes between two types of republic, the well-contrived 
and the badly-contrived. He uses the ancient "barbarous" republics as 
his prime example of the latter type. As we have seen, Hume believes 
that it was in these republics that the rule of law, the division of
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powers, knowledge, science, the arts of government (and thus humanity), 
commerce etc, first appeared. Compared to their neighbouring absolute 
"barbarous" monarchies, these states were more stable and better able 
to protect the lives and property of their inhabitants. But when 
compared to modern European states, they seem little better than 
"barbarous" monarchies: "[T]he disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity, 
which must prevail [ in ancient republics ], are not easy for us to 
imagine in this age of the world" (Essays 407). "[T]heir wars were 
more bloody and destructive [than our own], their governments more 
factious and unsettled [than our own], cornerce and manufactures more 
feeble and languishing [than today], and the general police more loose 
and irregular [than in modern states]" (Essays 421). All those 
qualities a state must have in order to thrive and prosper first 
appeared in the ancient republics. But, as the above quote makes 
clear, they appeared very imperfectly. The ancient republics were 
"turbulent, factious, seditious, disorderly" (Essays 436). This 
explains why Hume labels these states "barbarous".
Hume brings together the various reasons for the bad shape of ancient 
republics in his description of ancient Athens. In the "tumultuous 
government" of this city-state "[i] [t]he whole collective body of the 
people voted in every law, [ii] without limitation of property, without 
any distinction of rank, [iii] without controul fron any magistracy or 
senate; and consequently without regard to order, justice, or prudence" 
(Essays 368-69). Let us investigate each defect in turn.
(i) According to Hume, "a people voting by their representatives, 
form[s] the best...DEMOCRACY" (Essays 18). Direct representation, as
was practised in the ancient republics, can only lead to chaos. For
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"[i]f the people debate, all is confusion", and the people, become "a 
mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motives" (Essays 
523).3
(ii) In any republic (or in any state with a constitution containing a 
republican element e.g Britain's limited monarchy) voting ought to be 
restricted to those who meet an appropriate qualification test. In 
this sense, but not in the sense of a nobility, republics require an 
aristocracy (the rule of the best). But in the ancient republics, 
where the people "were extremely fond of liberty" (Essays 408), all 
"freemen" believed that they were entitled "to every power and 
privilege of the commonwealth." Thus, they resisted any property 
qualification test for elections and public office. "[W]henever even 
the meanest and most beggarly were excluded from the legislature and 
from public offices", they threw the state into "perpetual discontents 
and seditions" (Essays 415). The lack of such a test, the lack of an 
aristocracy, Hume thinks, was "[o]ne general cause of the disorders, so 
frequent in all ancient governments" (Essays 415).
(iii) We have already mentioned that, according to Hume, where a con­
stitution incorporates the principle of the division of powers but does 
not have the appropriate "checks and controuls" among these powers, the 
only result can be "disorder...and the blackest crimes" (Essays 15-16; 
Essays 43). No such controls existed in the ancient republics, and 
thus the popular elements were able to turn these states into 
"tyrannical Democrac[ies]" (Essays 416).
As a result of these defects, ancient republics were plagued by two 
grave weaknesses.
(a) As we have seen, Hume thinks that the brutality of rulers causes 
rebellion among the people. But he also thinks that the disorderliness
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of a population fuels the brutality of a ruler (Essays 490). Thus, 
because of the seditious and turbulent nature of the people in ancient 
republics, rulers were forced to commit great "acts of violence"
(Essays 414). The moderating and humanising "arts of government" might 
have first emerged in the ancient republics. But they (like everything 
else) emerged very imperfectly. Thus, "[t]he maxims of ancient 
politics contain, in general, so little humanity and moderation"
(Essays 414).
(b) Hume is convinced that the people's "extreme love of liberty... 
must have banished every merchant and manufacturer" fron the ancient 
republics (Essays 419). As a result, (i) in the ancient republics, 
commerce and industry were "feeble and languishing" (Essays 421) and, 
thus, these states were unable to reap the economic, social, and 
political effects of commerce. (ii) As we mentioned in Chapter 2, Hume 
thinks that every state must have an independent magistracy to lead the 
people. Which group forms this body in a state depends upon its form 
of government. In a republic, this task must fall upon the shoulders 
of the commercial middle rank. But given that ancient republics 
"banished" all merchants, these states lacked the independent 
magistracy they ought to have had. The people were leader less and 
behaved like a rabble.
Hume thinks that the modern well-contrived republics of Europe are 
far superior to the "barbarous" ones of the past.
The antient Republics were somewhat ferocious, and 
torn [internally] by bloody factions...Modern Manners 
have corrected this Abuse; and all the Republics in 
Europe, without Exception, are so well governd, that 
one is at a Loss to which we should give the Prefer-
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ence (L II 306).
Thus, "[a]t present, there is not one republic in EUROPE, from one 
extremity of it to the other, that is not remarkable for justice, 
lenity, and stability" (Essays 416). These states incorporate the 
principle of indirect representation. They restrict voting to persons 
of the appropriate rank and economic status, and thus are "well- 
tempered Aristocracies" (Essays 416), in the sense that, in such 
states, the best people, the middle rank, form the political backbone
4of the nation. This rank leads society. Finally, the constitutions 
of the modern republics are properly balanced. Hume thinks that, like 
limited monarchies, republics can have great problems with the checks 
and controls designed to balance the various parts of the constitution. 
But, unlike limited monarchies, this problem is not inherent in a re­
publican constitution (Essays 46). If carefully constructed, republics 
can have well-balanced constitutions. Take, for example, the repub­
lican government of Venice. Its "stability and wisdom" spring fron the 
fact that "the forms and institutions, by which... [its] parts are 
regulated" place "a considerable check on the depravity of mankind." 
The Venitian constitution is free fron the influence of "the humours 
and education of particular men" and operates solely on the basis of "a 
system of laws...[which] regulate the administration of public 
affairs." Nothing is left to "chance" (Essays 24). Rather, everything 
depends upon impartial structures and "checks and controuls".
So, according to Hume, modern well-contrived republics, have all the 
advantages of limited monarchies. They foster commerce and industry, 
and contribute to the growth of luxury and agriculture. They improve 
the humanity of rulers and subjects, and promote the well-being of the 
common people. And, of course, they embody the rule of law. For, "a
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republic necessarily, by an infallible operation, gives rise to LAW"
(Essays 118). But, according to Hume, they have one great advantage 
over limited monarchies: They are not inherently unstable. If care­
fully constructed, they are capable of great stability.
All this does not mean that Hume sees the modern republics of Europe 
as flawless. For example, in constructing the constitution of his 
Perfect Commonwealth, he reflects upon the defects of the Dutch 
constitution (Essays 526). However, it is clear that, for Hume, of all 
forms of government that have existed so far these modern republics are 
best able to meet the political, social, and economic needs of a state 
in the modern world (with limited monarchies close behind).
"[T]he Republican Form of [Government] is by far the best" Hume 
announced in 1775. The ancient republics were seriously defective, 
"but they were still much preferable to the Monarchies or [Aristo­
cracies]" of the time "which seem to have been quite intolerable" (L II 
306). Modern republics are superior in every way to the ancient ones, 
but still they have their problems. These problems can, Hume thinks, 
be corrected, thus creating a well-contrived republic. A republic 
"modelled with masterly skill" (Essays 528), such as the Perfect 
Commonwealth, is the best example of the best form of government.
II
Our aim in this chapter is to show that, for Hume, Britain's transform­
ation into a Perfect Commonwealth will not be a radical one. And to 
establish this we can draw upon, not only what we have said so far in 
this chapter, but also upon what we have said so far in this thesis.
We should begin by making an important point, namely, that the
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British limited monarchy and Hume's Perfect Commonwealth are organised 
differently as systems of government. Without going into any detail, 
the British system of government (as we have already seen) involved 
three separate, though interdependent, elements, each element acting as 
a check or balance on the other two: A hereditary King, representing 
the monarchical part of the constitution, the Lords, also founded on a 
hereditary principle and representing the aristocratic part of the 
constitution, and the Commons which represented the constitution's 
popular element. Here, the franchise was restricted by a number of 
different qualifications depending on the type of electoral district, 
county or borough.^ Executive power was lodged in the King and 
legislative in the Parliament, though the King also plays a role in 
legislation. In contrast, the Perfect Commonwealth will consist of a 
balance between "two councils, a lesser and greater; or, in other 
words, a senate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON observes, would 
want wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would 
want honesty" (Essays 522-23). Senators are to be elected annually by 
the county representatives —  Hume's "the people" (Essays 523-24). 
Each representative will in turn be elected annually by those in his 
parish and county who meet the required property voting qualification
7(Essays 516). Executive power will be held by the senate and, while 
this body must debate every new law, it will have no power to enact 
law. It is the county representatives alone who will "possess the 
whole legislative power" (Essays 517). Finally, the nation's official 
opposition party (of interest), the "court of competitors", can propose 
legislation to the senate. If this is rejected it "may appeal to the 
people" (Essays 520).
Even on the basis of these brief corrments, it is clear that the
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introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain will give that 
nation a very different system of government fron the one that it 
currently possess. However, it is important to note that, for Hume, 
underlying these different systems are the same principles. For, as we 
saw in the previous section, he takes both limited monarchies and well- 
contrived republics to be forms of free government. Thus, both are 
founded on the principles of the rule of law and the division of 
powers. Of course, as we saw in the previous section, Hume thinks that 
in a well-contrived republic the latter principle is more perfectly 
established than in a limited monarchy. But this does not alter the 
fact that Hume founds the Perfect Commonwealth on political pillars 
which are identical to those of his Britain. Thus, while Britain and 
the Perfect Commonwealth have different systems of government, they 
have identical forms of government, in which case the establishment of 
the Perfect Commonwealth in Britain will leave the fundamental pillars 
of the British constitution untouched.
In addition to retaining these pillars of the British limited monar­
chy, Hume emphasises that the Perfect Commonwealth will retain another 
central feature of his nation's political system, what he considers to 
be "[t]he chief support of the BRITISH government", namely, parties of 
interest (though in a much improved form) (Essays 525).
All this means that, for Hume, the Perfect Commonwealth can be estab­
lished in Britain without upsetting that nation's political fundamen­
tals. Of course, a novel system of government will be introduced, and 
the principle of the division of powers will be better founded, as will 
the parties of interest. But, importantly, these political pillars 
will not be demolished, but will, more or less, remain intact.
Given this we can say that, as a form of government, the Perfect
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Commonwealth will not be completely foreign to the British public. 
Thus the public will not be shocked by the introduction of the Perfect 
Commonwealth into Britain. But this is not all. Since the British 
public is used to living under a free government, since it is accus­
tomed to the way in which this form of government works, and since the 
Perfect Commonwealth is a form of free government, it follows that the 
public already has many of the fundamental political habitual patterns 
of behaviour and thought needed to function in the Perfect Common­
wealth. And, in the Perfect Commonwealth, it will be able to retain 
many of these habits that it acquired under the limited monarchy. The 
public will not have to be significantly re-educated in this area. Of 
course re-education will be necessary at the secondary level of system 
of government, and we shall return to this problem in Chapter 8. But 
here we should remember (from Chapter 4) that the Humean individual is 
open to new, better ideas and beliefs, new, better patterns of thought 
and behaviour, and is quite capable of embracing a new, better system 
of government.
As we have seen, Hume thinks that what is valued in a nation is 
determined by its form of government: Birth, titles etc in monarchies; 
industry, present wealth etc in republics; and both types of goods in 
limited monarchies, since they have constitutions with both a republic­
an and a monarchical element. Thus, for Hume, the transformation of 
Britain into a well-contrived republic will not require the people to 
alter in any radical way their views about what is valuable. For, the 
British (whose constitution contains a republican element) already 
value industry, present wealth etc and they can continue to do so in 
the Perfect Commonwealth, though they will have to give up the belief 
that birth, titles etc ought to be valued.
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Given Hume's view that in a republic the middle rank must form the 
nation's independent magistracy, it follows that in the Perfect Common­
wealth this state of affairs will exist. Now, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
Hume thinks that in his Britain (given its mixed constitution) both 
nobles and merchants are in fact in positions of authority (Essays 
207), though only the former ought to be. Thus, for Hume, Britain's 
move to a well-contrived republic will not require the introduction of 
any radical reforms in order for the middle rank to emerge as that 
nation's independent magistracy, for it is already in a position of 
authority. And the people will not have to undergo any violent change 
in their mental and behavioural habits in order to accept this group as 
their leaders, for they already do so.
According to Hume, Britain has a free government and is a commercial 
nation. We can therefore take it that, in his opinion, the natural 
rules of justice, which are rules of commerce, are more or less 
effectively enforced in Britain. I say "more or less" because, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, Hume thinks that, of all the nations of Europe, 
Britain has the severest trade barriers. Given this, and given that 
the rules of justice are rules of commerce, it follows that Hume must 
think that in Britain these rules are hindered. But it is important to 
note that he does not take this hindrance to be severe, for he thinks 
that Britain is a successful commercial nation. In fact, London is 
one of "[t]he three greatest trading towns now in Europe" (Essays 92). 
Thus we can say that, while Hume thinks that in Britain there are re­
strictions upon the rules of justice, these are not great, and the 
rules of justice are more or less allowed to run their full course.
Now, the Perfect Commonwealth is a form free government. Thus, like 
the British limited monarchy it is a form of government which encoura-
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ges the growth of commerce. Given Hume's disapproval of severe trade 
barriers, we can take it that no such barriers will exist in the 
Perfect Canmonwealth. In this state, the rules of justice will be more 
perfectly enforced than they are in Britain. In fact, I think that it 
is safe to say that in the Perfect Commonwealth the laws of nature will 
be perfectly realised.^
So, both the British limited monarchy and Hume's well-contrived
republican Perfect Canmonwealth are forms of free government, and,
therefore, turn their states into commercial nations by allowing the
natural rules of justice to flourish (though more so in the Perfect
Commonwealth.) This is important, for it means that, for Hume, the
introduction of the Perfect Canmonwealth into Britain will require
neither the existing principles of justice, nor the habits of the
public underlying these principles, to be upset in any significant way.
True, as we said, Hume must think that the principles of justice will
be more effectively enforced in the Perfect Canmonwealth than they are
now in Britain. But, as we also said, he does not see these rules as
hindered to any great degree in Britain. The natural rules of justice
are allowed to flourish in Britain almost as effectively as they will
be in the Perfect Canmonwealth. If this is correct, then it follows
that, for Hume, the introduction of the Perfect Canmonwealth into
Britain will not require that nation to undergo any sort of radical
transformation in the area of justice (and the habits supporting
justice). The introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain
will leave the existing rules and habits of justice more or less
untouched, and this, no doubt, will make it easier for Britain to be
9transformed into a well-contrived republic.
In the previous chapter we saw that nothing Hume has to say about
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justice precludes us fron labelling him a conservative/radical 
reformer. We now discover that nothing Hume has to say about justice 
prevents us from taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously in 
the case of Britain. For, if what we have said so far is correct, 
then, according to Hume, Britain's conversion into the Perfect Common­
wealth will not require the principles of justice (or the habits of 
justice) to be upset in any radical way.
Since both the Perfect Commonwealth and Britain are commercial na­
tions we can take it that, for Hume, the British people will not have 
to significantly alter the habits and practices they have developed in 
the realms of commerce, industry, and manufacturing once the Perfect 
Commonwealth is established (just as they will not have to radically 
alter their fundamental habitual political beliefs and practices). In 
fact, given that, for Hume, political causes (i.e forms of government) 
have social and economic effects, and given that Britain's limited 
monarchy and the Perfect Commonwealth are the same political cause, it 
seems that, in his view, the social and economic institutions, practi­
ces, and beliefs that will exist in the Perfect Commonwealth will 
closely resemble those of modern Britain. For Hume, Britain and the 
Perfect Commonwealth are close, not only politically, but also socially 
and economically. Thus, once again we can say that Hume ensures that 
Britain's adoption of his well-contrived republican constitution can be 
achieved without radically upsetting the established order.
Of course, the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain 
will require the public to alter its object of allegiance (just as it 
will require the public to alter its political habits at the level of 
system of government, though not at the fundamental level of form of 
government). This is an important problem, and it (like the latter
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problem) will be dealt with in the Chapter 8. But leaving this problem 
aside for now, if all that we have said so far is correct, then it 
seems that, for Hume, the establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth in 
Britain will not call for any radical economic, social, or political 
discontinuity with that nation's past. It will not call for the intro­
duction of a radically new situation or order in that country. Hume 
ensures that under the well-contrived republican constitution of the 
Perfect Commonwealth the British will be able to retain many of the 
economic, social, and political principles they are used to, along with 
the beliefs, practices, and institutions that these principles support. 
Of course, novelties will be introduced, but at the same time much of 
what is established will be kept (or kept in a much improved form). 
Thus, for Hume, the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into 
Britain will not be a radical reform but a conservative/radical one.
Ill
We have already seen that, according to Hume, reformers must take human 
nature seriously and must never introduce innovations which are 
"violent" in the sense that they violate the course of nature (Essays 
260). Thus, it is important for us to show, not only that, as a 
reform, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is (in the case of Britain) a 
conservative/radical reform, but also that it is consistent with the 
requirements of nature.
(a) Hume thinks that of all the plans of government that have been 
presented to the world since Plato's Republic, Harrington's Oceana is 
"the only valuable model" (Essays 514). This, however, does not mean
that Hume finds the constitutional arrangements of Oceana flawless. He
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finds three "chief defects" with these arrangements. Of these, only
one is important for us, namely, that "[Oceana's] Agrarian [Law] is
impracticable" (Essays 515). Now, according to Harrington, the balance
of power in a state depends upon the balance of property. Thus, the
Agrarian Law, which deals with property, is one of the "Fundamentall
Lawes of Oceana". Without going into any detail, the main aim of the
Agrarian Law is to limit property: No one in the Commonwealth will be
allowed to have an income which exceeds two thousand pounds a year. In
this way Harrington hopes to prevent his Commonwealth from sliding into 
10monarchy. Now, as we said, Hume finds the Agrarian Law "impractic­
able". Why? Because "[m]en will soon learn the art, which was 
practised in ancient ROME, of concealing their possessions under other 
people's name; till at last, the abuse will become so common, that they 
will throw off even the appearance of restraint" (Essays 515). We have 
already seen Hume's view that "avidity", the desire for goods, is 
rooted in human nature. It is "insatiable, perpetual [and]...
universal" (T 492). Thus, any attempt to uproot this quality of human
11nature (as Harrington seeks to) is bound to fail. The fact that 
Hume's condemnation of the Agrarian Law can be found in "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth" is a clear indication that the Perfect Common­
wealth will respect man's natural avidity. This idea is consistent 
with the view expressed a number of times that in Hume's well- 
contrived republic the rules of justice that have been provided by wise 
nature will be fully realised and allowed to run their full course 
without hindrance. This respect for the natural rules of justice is 
respect for what has been provided by wise nature.
(b) Commerce is founded on the rules of justice. Thus, where these 
rules flourish, so does commerce. Given that these rules will flourish
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in the Perfect Commonwealth it follows that this state will be a 
commercial nation. And, importantly, this characteristic of Hume's 
state is in harmony with the requirements of nature, for commerce, Hume 
thinks, has been ordained by nature (T 514; Essays 324; Essays 329).
(c) Wise nature demands commerce. Thus, we can say that the effects 
of commerce are in harmony with the requirements of nature. One such 
effect, as we have seen, is free government. Now the Perfect Common­
wealth is a type of free government. Thus, politically, the Perfect 
Commonwealth does not violate the natural course of things. And since 
political causes have economic and social effects, and since the 
Perfect Commonwealth is a "natural" political cause, it follows that, 
for Hume, its economic and social effects are also "natural".
(d) As we saw in Chapter 2, Hume approves of "equality" of property in 
the sense that "[e]very person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits 
of his labour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and many of 
the conveniences of life. No one can doubt, but such an equality is 
most suitable to human nature" (Essays 265; my emphasis). In the 
Perfect Commonwealth, where, we can safely assume, the natural rules of 
justice will be perfectly realised and industry, commerce, and luxury 
will flourish, "equality" in Hume's sense will be fully respected, and, 
therefore, so will this aspect of human nature.
(e) Hume refuses to exclude religion from his state (Essays 520). This 
is very odd given (a) Hume's fear (noted in Chapter 1) of the tendency 
of religion to go superstitious or enthusiastic, and therefore cause 
great socio-political disharmony, and (b) Hume's belief that enthusiasm 
might be the cause of the downfall of the Perfect Commonwealth (Essays 
529). (And here we should recall Hume's view that no state is immortal 
(Essays 51), not even the Perfect Commonwealth (Essays 528-29)). Why,
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then, does Hume not exclude religion from his state? Because religious 
belief is "universal in human nature" (Essays 61) and is "intractable"
(Essays 40): "[A]11 mankind have a strong propensity to religion"
(Essays 199 fn. 3). Thus, to excluded religion fron the Perfect 
Commonwealth would be "violent".
(f) Given Hume's fear and hatred of political parties (Essays 55), it 
is surprising to find political parties in the Perfect Commonwealth 
(Essays 525). This is not only because it is impossible and impractic­
able to remove such parties fron free governments (Essays 493), but 
also because factions "naturally propagate themselves" among humans 
(Essays 55; my emphasis), that is, factionalsim is natural to man. 
Thus, as in the case of religion, to exclude factions fron the Perfect 
Commonwealth would violate the requirements of nature.
(g) The Perfect Commonwealth contains "rank[sj" (Essays 522). This is 
important for us given that Hume thinks that ranks "arise necessarily, 
because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human 
nature" (T 402). Rank is natural to society. The fact that the 
society of the Perfect Commonwealth is divided into ranks is another 
indication that it respects the demands of nature.
(h) We already know fron Chapter 2 Hume's view that it is "violent, 
and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things" (Essays 
259; my emphasis) for a government to use its people in order that they 
may contribute to the "greatness of the state", that is, in order that 
they may fulfil the government's colonial and military ambitions. Such 
a thing is likely to happen when a state lacks industry and commerce 
and, as a result, "superfluous hands" are directed into the nation's 
fleets and armies (Essays 256-57). In the Perfect Commonwealth, where
commerce and manufacturing are strong and thus able to absorb all
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"superfluous hands", such an "unnatural" practice will never be 
permitted. In fact, the Perfect Commonwealth will have "a fundamental 
law against conquests" (Essays 529).
We could expand this list of examples indicating the harmony between 
the Perfect Commonwealth and the dictates of nature, but there is no 
need. Enough has been said to show that the Perfect Commonwealth is 
not a "violent" reform. If this is correct, then in this subsection, 
we have made an important contribution to our aim (as we did in the 
previous subsection and as we shall in the next one). For, according 
to Hume, reforms must be in harmony with "the common bent of mankind" 
(Essays 260). Thus, if we could not show that "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" is a natural reform, then we would be in trouble. But, 
as the above examples make clear, economically, socially, and 
politically the Perfect Commonwealth is such a reform. It is a reform 
which takes the course of nature (including human nature) seriously.
VI
Hume condemns "any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may form a 
plan in his closet" (Essays 52). Is "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
such a plan? If it is, then, clearly, we cannot take it seriously. 
But it is not. As we shall see now, Hume's well-contrived republic is 
the product of reflection upon experience, that is, experimental 
reasoning.
(a) As mentioned a number of times, in constructing his Perfect 
Commonwealth, Hume takes into account the existing Dutch constitution. 
However he makes "alterations" to this constitution, "alterations... 
[which] seem all evidently for the better (Essays 526). In other
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words, in designing his preferred form of government, Hume reflects 
upon his "experience" of the Dutch constitution. And here we should 
note that this design is also the result of Hume's reflection upon his 
vast knowledge (and, in this sense, "experience") of the ancient 
republics (Essays 527-28).
(b) Hume the anatomist knows that religion is a deep human instinct. 
Thus, religion must exist in the Perfect Commonwealth. However, Hume 
also knows about the dangers of religion. He knows the destructive 
consequences of superstition and enthusiasm. Reflecting on all this, 
on man's religious instinct and on the adverse effects of this 
instinct, in the Perfect Commonwealth Hume decides to place religion 
under the complete control of the state (Essays 520; Essays 525). 
While reformers must never ignore human nature, they can, and must, 
reflect on this nature and "give it all the improvements of which it is 
susceptible" (Essays 260). State control of man's natural passion for 
religion is such an improvement.
(c) The Perfect Commonwealth must contain parties, for (among other 
things) people naturally divide themselves into parties. However, 
party division can lead to terrible conflict. Thus, as in the case of 
religion, this natural characteristic of man can, and must, be 
improved. In the Perfect Commonwealth factionalism will be organised 
in such a way that there will exist only parties of interest (which, 
according to Hume, are "the most reasonable, and the most excusable" 
parties (Essays 59)). As a result, factionalism in the Perfect Common­
wealth will do "all the good without any of the harm" (Essays 525). 
Thus, after reflecting upon his "experience" of factionalism, Hume 
ensures that the parties in the Perfect Commonwealth will be of the 
beneficial and salutary type.
CHAPTER 6 - 2 1 5
(d) According to Hume, human nature is such that, when people debate in 
"numerous assemblies", they "fall into disorder" and become a "mere 
mob" (Essays 523). Given the principle of sympathetic perception, 
"[w]hen an absurdity strikes a member [of a large assembly], he conveys 
it to his neighbour, and so on, till the whole be infected" (Essays 
523). Clearly, this adverse consequence of sympathy must not be 
allowed to find expression in the Perfect Ccmmonwealth. This is 
achieved by dividing the Commonwealth into counties, each with only 100 
representatives. In other words, in the Perfect Commonwealth, discus­
sion and debate will take place in small assemblies. As a result, the 
people "may debate with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be 
prevented" (Essays 523). For, when people debate in small bodies, 
"reason can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being 
removed, good sense will always get the better of bad among a number of 
people" (Essays 523). As Hume says elsewhere: "[W]hen dispersed in 
small bodies...[people] are more susceptible both of reason and order; 
the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broken; 
and the public interest may be pursued with sane method and constancy" 
(Essays 36). Thus, the division of the Perfect Conmonwealth into 
counties is the result of experience of, and reflection upon, human 
nature.
As we said, Hume condemns plans of government which spring from 
abstract theorising. Clearly, the Perfect Commonwealth is not such a 
plan.
VII
Hume opens "Idea of a Perfect Conmonwealth" with the following para-
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graph:
It is not with forms of government, as with other ar­
tificial contrivances; where an old engine may be re­
jected, if we can discover another more accurate and 
commodious, or where trials may safely be made, even 
though the success be doubtful. An established gov­
ernment has an infinite advantage, by that very cir­
cumstance of its being established; the bulk of man­
kind being governed by authority, not reason, and 
attributing authority to any thing that has not the 
recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, 
in this affair, or try experiments merely upon the 
credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can 
never be part of a wise magistrate, who will bear 
a reverence to what carries the mark of age; and 
though he may attempt some improvements for the pub­
lic good, yet he will adjust his innovations, as 
much as possible, to the ancient fabric, and pre­
serve entire the chief pillars and supports of the 
constitution (Essays 512-13).
12Whelan describes this opening paragraph as a "disclaimer". In other 
words, according to Whelan, Hume opens "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
by telling us that the recommendations of this essay should not be 
taken seriously. But this is an odd thing to say. For why would Hume 
want to disclaim a constitutional arrangement whose practicability he 
defends (Essays 526)? And why would Hume begin his essay with a dis­
claimer, and then in the third paragraph tell us that he is keeping 
this essay short so as not to offend the public (Essays 514)? Why, in
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other words, would Hume renounce an essay he wrote for the public? And 
if he renounced it, why would he then be careful not to offend that 
same public?
The fact that Hume defends the practicability of "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" and has the public in mind when writing this essay is a 
clear indication that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" does not open 
with a disclaimer. Rather, it opens with the announcement that the 
reformist recommendations which follow are not radical. These recom­
mendations do not discard the existing British form of government like 
an "old engine". For Britain and the Perfect Commonwealth have the 
same form of government, free government. They do not seek to take the 
British public in any radical way beyond what it knows. For the Perfect 
Commonwealth will retain many of the economic, social, and political 
elements of the existing British limited monarchy and, therefore, will 
have the "marks of age". Thus, these recommendations do respect "as 
much as possible, the ancient fabric" (my emphasis), but where such 
respect is not possible "innovations" are introduced, "innovations" 
which are "[on] the side of reason, liberty, and justice" as all 
"innovations" should be (Essays 477). "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
does not demolish "the chief pillars and supports" of the existing 
British constitution, for the Perfect Commonwealth and the British 
polity share the same pillars and supports (the rule of law, the 
division of powers, parties of interest, the natural rules of justice). 
The recommendations in this essay are not "experiments" based on "sup­
posed arguments", but "innovations" founded on (i) the requirements of 
wise nature and (b) Hume's reflection on his "experience" of the 
ancient republics and a number of existing constitutions, especially 
the Dutch. In "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" Hume is not "indulging
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1 3in abstract republicanism", as Whelan claims he is. Rather, the 
Perfect Commonwealth is the result of experimental reasoning, a method 
of reasoning which is consistent with conservative/radical reformism. 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is not a radical reform (in the case 
of Britain). It is a conservative/radical reform put forward by a 
conservative/radical reformer.
CHAPTER 7
So far in this thesis we have dealt with only one objection against 
taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously, namely, that Hume is 
restricted to conservative'reformism (given the guide of life he recom­
mends, his conception of man, and the role he assigns to habit in the 
cohesion of society), while his Perfect Commonwealth is a radical 
reform. We have seen that this objection fails. But scholars have put 
forward other objections designed to show that Hume did not write "Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth" with serious intent. We shall investigate 
these objections in this chapter, and see that they too fail.
I
A.
Letwin finds it impossible to take "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
seriously because, she thinks, that in The History of England Hume
expressly tells us that we ought not to do so: "The idea__of a perfect
and immortal conmonwealth will always be found as chimerical as that of 
a perfect and immortal man" (H 6 153). Now, if Hume thinks that the 
notion of a perfect commonwealth is "chimerical", then clearly he must 
have written his own essay on this subject as a sort of amusement and, 
thus, it ought to be treated as such.
There are two problems with Letwin's interpretation of the passage 
from The History of England quoted above. First, in this passage Hume 
labels as "chimerical" the notion of a perfect and immortal common­
wealth, and not just the notion of a perfect commonwealth (as Letwin 
takes him to be doing). In other words, Hume is telling us that a form 
of government which claims to be both perfect and immortal ought to be
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2dismissed as "chimerical". But this in no way undermines "Idea of a
Perfect Commonwealth", for while the form of government that Hume 
constructs in this essay is perfect, it is not immortal. Hume knows 
that "every government must cane to a period, and that death is un­
avoidable to the political as well as to the animal body" (Essays 51), 
and this is true of the Perfect Commonwealth itself (Essays 528-29). 
It is commonwealths which claim to be both perfect and immortal which 
ought to be dismissed as "chimerical", not commonwealths which claim
3only to be perfect.
But even if we accept Letwin's interpretation of the passage from 
The History of England quoted above and understand this passage as 
referring to perfect commonwealths alone (in contrast to commonwealths 
which are both perfect and immortal), Letwin is still in trouble. For 
in this passage Hume neither tells us that he himself finds the notion 
of a perfect commonwealth as "chimerical" nor that we should do so (as 
Letwin clearly thinks he does). He tells us only that such a notion 
"will...be found...chimerical" (my emphasis). But who will find it 
"chimerical"? Hume gives us his answer in "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" where he tells us, as already mentioned, that "the public..will 
be apt to regard ...disquisitions [about perfect commonwealths] both as 
useless and chimerical", which is why he keeps his own "disquisition" 
on this subject short (Essays 514). However, "the wise and learned" 
(one of whom is Hume) know better than this. They know that "one form 
of government must be allowed more perfect than another" and are aware 
that "[i]n all cases, it must be advantageous to know what is most 
perfect in the kind" in order that the perfect model might one day 
become a reality (Essays 513). A large part of the public "will" find
talk about the perfect form of government "chimerical". It is the task
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of "the wise and learned", not only to design the perfect commonwealth, 
but, once they have done so, to get the suspicious public to embrace 
it.
B.
Duncan Forbes does not directly undermine the seriousness of "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth". In fact, he thinks (correctly) that, for Hume, 
republicanism is the best form of government. But by arguing that, for 
Hume, "[t]he best system of government in pure theory is the republic­
an", and that for Hume, republicanism "was not practical politics in
4Britain" but instead "a purely academic subject of speculation" , he 
does, indirectly, classify "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" as a specu­
lative exercise, thus depriving its recommendations of any practical 
significance, and in turn undermining its seriousness. Given this 
consequence of Forbes' position, we should investigate why he thinks 
that, for Hume, republicanism is impracticable in the case of Britain. 
He has two arguments.
(a) Firstly, Forbes appeals to the conclusion of "Of the First 
Principles of Government": "Let us cherish and improve our ancient 
government as much as possible, without encouraging a passion for such
5dangerous novelties" (Essays 36). But what does Hume mean by "such 
dangerous novelties"? The context makes it clear that he means the 
attempt to establish a republican form of government in Britain without 
the leadership of the nation's political and social chiefs. For Hume 
describes the introduction of a republican system of government in 
Britain as "dangerous" only after he tells us that this "seems not to 
be the aim of any party amongst us" (Essays 36). In other words, if
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Britain is to adopt a new system of government, then what is required 
(at the very least) is the direction and command of existing leaders. 
Without such direction only chaos can follow. In the next chapter we 
shall see that Hume presents us with two ways in which the Perfect 
Commonwealth might be established in Britain. We shall see that, in 
both cases, this establishment cannot be achieved without the leader­
ship of social and political chiefs.
With this in mind, we can return to Essays 36 (quoted above) and take 
Hume's message to be the following: When presented with a choice 
between implementing a new system of government without the support of 
existing leaders, on the one hand, and improving the existing, ancient 
constitution, on the other, the British should take the latter course, 
for the former one would be disastrous. Without the guidance of 
existing leaders, any attempt to introduce a new system of government 
in Britain must fail. If this is correct, then, Hume says nothing at 
Essays 36 to preclude the possibility of the establishment in Britain 
of a well-contrived republic (such as that one outlined in "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth) once this has became the aim of the nation's 
chiefs. We shall return to this in the next chapter.
(b) Secondly, Forbes appeals to a letter Hume wrote to his nephew in 
1775, and derives from this letter two arguments against the 
practicability of republicanism in Britain for Hume. We had the 
opportunity to quote parts of this letter in the previous chapter. 
Here we must requote these parts along with the rest of the relevant 
passage from the letter in question.
I cannot but agree with Mr Miller, that the Repub­
lican Form of [Government] is by far the best. The 
antient Republics were somewhat ferocious, and torn
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[internally] by bloody Factions; but they were 
still much preferable to the Monarchies or [Aris­
tocracies] which seem to have been quite intolerable.
Modern Manners have corrected this Abuse; and all 
the Republics in Europe, without Exception, are so 
well governd, that one is at a Loss to which we 
should give the Preference. But what is this gener­
al Subject of Speculation to our Purpose? For be­
sides, that an establishd Government [cannot] with­
out the most criminal Imputation, be disjointed 
from any Speculation; [Republicanism] is only 
fitted for a small State: And any Attempt towards 
it can in our [Country], produce only Anarchy, 
which is the immediate Forerunner of Despotism.
[Will he] tell us, what is that Form of a Republic 
which we must aspire to? Or will [the Constitu­
tion be afterwards decided by the Sword? (L II 
306).6
As I said, Forbes finds two arguments in this letter for the view that, 
for Hume, a British republic is impracticable, and thus, indirectly, 
two arguments against taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
seriously:
(i) We may state Forbes' first argument as follows. While Hume 
endorses republicanism in his letter to his nephew, he does so only for 
small states. But Britain is a large state. Therefore, Forbes 
concludes that, for Hume, Britain is not fit for a republican form of 
government.7
In response to Forbes we should begin by pointing out that in "Idea
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of a Perfect Commonwealth" Hume attacks the "common opinion" that 
republicanism is fit only for "a city or small territory". This form 
of government, he thinks, can clearly be implemented in "[a] large 
state, such as FRANCE or GREAT BRITAIN" (Essays 527) (if its is skil­
fully modelled (Essays 528)). Forbes, of course, is aware of this viewg
put forward by Hume. Yet he clearly gives priority to the letter 
passage over the passage from "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". But 
his argument will work only if this priority is justified. Is it? I 
don't think so. Let me explain why.
Hume never stopped revising his Essays. The final revision of this
9work was in 1777, shortly before his death. Now, if Hume was con­
vinced that only small states were capable of republicanism, surely he 
would have altered the relevant passage in "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth". But he never did. Since this essay first appeared in 1752 
Hume modified and revised it a number of times. ^  But he left
untouched the idea expressed there that large states are fit for
republicanism. Thus we should take this view as Hume's true one and 
treat the 1775 view expressed in the above quoted letter as a short­
lived one. Clearly, it was an opinion he held, for otherwise he would
not have written what he did to his nephew. But equally clearly, it
was an opinion he gave up, for otherwise he would have made the
11necessary modifications in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". If this 
argument is correct, then Hume's opinion in his letter to his nephew 
that only small territories are fit for a republican form of government 
cannot be used to support the claim that for Hume "republicanism is a 
purely academic subject of speculation in Britain" and, thus, does 
nothing to undermine the seriousness of "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" .
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(ii) The second argument Forbes derives fron this letter against the
practicability, for Hume, of republicanism in Britain is this: The
establishment of a republic in Britain would produce only "Anarchy"
12which in turn must lead to "Despotism". But this is not the point
that Hume is making in his letter to his nephew. As Stewart has
recently shown, appealing to the sentence immediately following that in
which the claims about "Anarchy" and "Despotism" appear (and quoted
above), Hume can, not unintelligibly, be understood as telling his
nephew that before the British make any move towards republicanism they
13must know the type of the republic to be instituted. As we have 
seen, Hume distinguishes between well-contrived and badly-contrived 
republics. The latter do yield pernicious consequences, while the 
former do not. The British public must be very careful that the 
republican form of government they embrace is wisely constituted (such 
as the one advocated in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth") otherwise 
they will plunge the country into anarchy and despotism. The idea that 
Britain would be thrown into anarchy if it were to acquire a defective 
republican government is expressed by Hume at Essays 52. We shall deal 
with this passage in a moment.
C.
According to David Miller anyone reading "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" is forced to "wonder how seriously Hume's 'perfect common-
14wealth' was meant to be taken." He thinks this, not only because he
takes Hume to be a conservative reformer and his Perfect Cornnonwealth a
15radical reform, but also because of the "ambiguity" caused by a 
number of remarks made by Hume which, in one way or another, Miller
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thinks, cast doubt over any talk of his desiring to put into practice
the recommendations outlined in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". Let
us examine these comments which Miller thinks cause "ambiguity".
First, Miller, like Letwin, points to the remark Hume makes in The
History of England that "the idea...of a perfect and immortal common-
16wealth" is "chimerical". But, this comment, as we saw, does nothing
to weaken the seriousness of "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth".
Second, like Forbes, Miller appeals to Hume's 1775 letter to his
nephew, and derives from this letter the same two arguments that Forbes
does, namely that (a) republicanism is not suited to large states and
(b) the establishment of a republic in Britain would lead to anarchy
17followed by despotism. But as we saw when dealing with Forbes, 
neither (a) nor (b) cause us to question the seriousness of "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth".
Here we should note that Miller appeals to Hume's words that, "I 
should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in this 
Island" (Essays 52), in order to support his claim that, for Hume, the 
establishment of a republic in Britain would have chaotic consequences. 
For Hume makes it clear in the essay from which the above quote canes 
that if a republican form of government were to be established in 
Britain, then there would be nothing but "many convulsions, and civil 
wars" (Essays 53). But when we examine this passage in context we find 
that all Hume is doing here is arguing against the introduction into 
Britain of a badly-contrived republic.
This passage occurs in Hume's essay "Whether the British Government 
inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic?". Now, we know 
that Hume thinks that the British constitution is inherently unstable, 
with the monarchical and republican elements locked in combat. We also
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know that he does not believe in the immortality of any form of govern­
ment. Given these two views, Hume asks at the end of this essay 
"whether it it be more desirable for the BRITISH constitution to 
terminate in a popular government, or in absolute monarchy?" (Essays 
51-52). He chooses the latter as more desirable. Why? Because if the 
constitution were to be swallowed by the republican element, then it 
would be led by the Commons "according to its present constitution"
(Essays 52). But, as we have already seen, Hume thinks that the 
present Commons is defective. Thus, if the current Commons were to
dominate the present constitution, then Britain would be left with a 
badly-contrived republic. It is the introduction of such a republic 
which would plunge the British nation into civil war, and not the 
introduction of a well-contrived republic, one like that outlined in 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth".
Third, Miller points to a footnote in Hume's essay "Of the Rise and
18Progress of the Arts and Sciences". Here, Hume briefly touches upon 
the Chinese government, a government with "happiness, riches, and good 
police", but weak militarily, and tells us that "[pjerhaps, a pure 
monarchy of this kind, were it fitted for defence against foreign
enemies, would be the best of all governments, as having both the 
tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of 
popular assemblies" (Essays 122 fn. 13). This is a curious position 
for Hume to take, given his view of pure monarchies examined in the 
previous chapter. True, such monarchies have enough strengths for Hume
to tolerate them and to attack those who disparagingly label them
' tyrannies' . But at the same time they have too many weaknesses to be
endorsed as the best form of government. How, then, are we to deal 
with this odd passage?
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We should recall that Hume is a mitigated sceptic, and as such, he 
condemns dogmatism. We must never cling blindly to our beliefs and 
never be prejudiced against the views of our opponents. Thus, in
expressing the above view with respect to pure monarchies, we can take 
Hume as being a consistent mitigated sceptic. He has a clear prefer­
ence for skilfully modelled republics above all other forms of 
government (as we saw in the previous chapter), but as a mitigated 
sceptic, he must not embrace this position dogmatically. He must 
always entertain the possibility that he is wrong, and, therefore, toy 
with the idea that pure monarchy is "perhaps.. .the best of all 
governments" (my emphasis).
The fourth of Hume's comments which Miller thinks must make us wonder
about the seriousness with which Hume wrote "Idea of a Perfect Common-
19wealth" appears in a letter Hume to the Abbe le Blanc. Here, Hume 
tells the Abbe that in The History of England he "discovers the 
Consequences of puritanical and republican Pretensions. You wou'd have 
remark'd in my Writings, that my principles are, all along, tolerably 
monarchical, and that I abhor, that low Practice, so prevalent in 
England, of speaking with Malignity of France" (LI 194). But I don't 
think that this passage causes any "ambiguity" of the type Miller 
thinks it does. We know that, unlike his contemporaries, Hume
tolerates France's form of government. In fact, he thinks that
absolute "civilized" monarchy (or pure monarchy) has a number of 
special virtues. And while he does not rank such monarchies above 
well-contrived republics, he certainly ranks them higher than badly- 
contrived ones. And it seems to me that in the above passage this is 
exactly the point that Hume is primarily making, that is, that 
"civilized" monarchies are better than badly-contrived republics. This
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canes out when we notice that Hume prefaces his criticism of. those who 
speak ill of France's pure monarchy with his condemnation of "the 
Consequences of puritanical and Republican Pretensions." Here, I 
think, Hume is referring to the Cannons (the republican arm of the 
Constitution) which Charles had to deal with, a Cannons whose "leaders 
...had secretly embraced the rigid tenants" of the enthusiastic 
Puritans (H 5 159) and which brought on Britain's seventeenth century 
crisis. Republicanism and enthusiasm is a dangerous recipe, a form of 
badly-contrived republicanism, and, thus, clearly inferior to a 
"civilized" monarchy. This is the point that Hume is making in his 
letter to Le Blanc. If this is correct, then the only conclusion we 
can draw from this letter about Hume's attitude towards republicanism, 
is that Hume prefers absolute "civilized" monarchies (such as that of 
France) to bad republicanism. But this is something we already know. 
And this preference does nothing to undermine the seriousness of "Idea 
of a Perfect Coirmonwealth".
The final of Hume's observations which, Miller thinks, causes
confusion, is Hume's claim that it is no "exaggeration" to say that
after the 1688 Revolution "we, in this island, have ever since enjoyed,
if not the best system of government, at least the most entire system
20of liberty, that ever was known amongst mankind" (H 6 531). It is 
strange that Miller should think that this passage causes confusion, 
strange because Forbes, I think, has dealt with and explained this 
passage quite adequately. Forbes finds evidence in Hume's writings for 
a distinction between a nation's "legal constitution" i.e the rule of 
law, on the one hand, and its "political constitution" i.e the form of 
government, on the other, and then draws our attention to Hume' s view 
that Britain enjoys "the best civil [legal] constitution where every
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21man is restrained by the most rigid laws" (Essays 31). Now, the 
above quote from The History of England seems to be just a reiteration 
of the distinction between a nation's legal and a political constitu­
tion, and of the view that Britain enjoys the best legal constitution, 
or "most entire system of liberty" i.e the complete absence of 
arbitrary coercion i.e the rigid rule of law. But The History of
England quote above does not say that Britain also enjoys the best 
political constitution. The political constitution of Britain, her 
form of free government, is "good" and "advantageous" (a view we met in 
Chapters 2 and 6), but it is neither as good, nor as advantageous, as 
well-contrived republicanism.
In the end, Miller seems to admit that Hume has a preference for a
22republican form of government over others, but adds that this pre-
23ference is only "theoretical". True, it would be best to establish a
republican form of government in a nation, but only if certain "ideal
circumstances" were to prevail in that nation such as "a suitable
population and a chance to devise a government from scratch." But in
real life no such circumstances exist. "Instead there would be a
population of a given size, at a particular stage of economic develop-
24ment, with inherited dispositions and loyalties, and so forth." 
Thus, Miller is convinced that the establishment of a republican form 
of government in Britain is out of the question for Hume. Miller 
concludes by telling us that since for Hume limited monarchy and 
republicanism differ "so little in their merits" and that there is very 
little to choose between them, Hume's message is the conservative one 
that the British should uphold their existing form of government rather 
than strive to establish a republican form of government in their coun­
try, a form of government which is not in any significant way superior
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25to limited monarchy. Hume's preference for republicanism is specula­
tive, and is not meant to have a practical impact on Britain.
But, on all these points, Miller is wrong:
(a) It is true that the British public will have its inherited and 
well-established economic, social and political loyalties and disposi­
tions. But, as we have seen, these loyalties will not cause problems 
for the erection of the Perfect Commonwealth in Britain (though we have 
not yet dealt with the problem of how the British public will change 
its object and habits of allegiance. This will be one of our tasks in 
the next chapter);
(b) As we have seen, for Hume, republics and limited monarchies are 
forms of government which allow the natural rules of justice to thrive. 
Thus, both have powerful commercial and manufacturing sectors. We can 
say, therefore, that, in Hume's view, both are more or less on a par 
economically. If this is correct, then Miller is wrong in thinking 
that, for Hume, Britain's stage of economic development is an obstacle 
to her acquiring a (well-contrived) republican constitution;
(c) Miller is wrong to suggest that, for Hume, the establishment of the 
Perfect Commonwealth in Britain requires the complete removal of that 
nation's economic, social, and political principles and institutions, 
and the need to start de novo or "from scratch" (as Miller puts it). 
For Hume, limited monarchies and well-contrived republics are so 
similar that many of the principles and overlying beliefs, practices, 
and institutions that exist in a limited monarchy can be retained as it 
is transformed into a well-contrived republic.
(d) While limited monarchy and (well-contrived) republicanism share 
many of the same strengths, the former, unlike the latter, has one 
great disadvantage: It is inherently unstable, which clearly makes it
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inferior to well-contrived republicanism. In other words, Miller is 
wrong in holding that, for Hume, limited monarchies and well-contrived 
republics differ little in their merits.
(e) Republicanism is not merely theoretical or speculative for Hume. 
Hume wrote to influence the public and this (as we have seen) is true 
even of "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". He wanted this essay to have 
a practical impact on the world outside the study, which is why he 
defends its practicability (Essays 526).
(f) Miller's idea that, in order for a state to acquire a republican 
constitution, it requires a suitable population size, is a clear 
indication that he (like others before him) believes that, for Hume, 
only a small state can be owner of a republican form of government. 
But as we have seen this idea is mistaken.
D.
Like Forbes, neither Livingston nor Phillipson tells us directly that 
we ought not to take "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously. But 
by arguing that, for Hume, the best form of government is an absolute 
"civilized" monarchy, both can be taken as denying that Hume wrote 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" in order to make a practical impact on 
the public.
Phillipson attributes to Hume a preference for absolute "civilized" 
monarchy over all other forms of government on the ground that only it 
provides a nation with stability. Noting that, according to Hume, man 
needs habits in order to function, Phillipson argues that, for Hume, a 
nation's form of government must be such that it allows people to 
acquire stable socio-political habits. It must be a form of government
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which incorporates the rule of law, where power is not divided, and
where succession is hereditary. Only a form of government which
incorporates these three elements is able to provide people with the
environment they need to acquire fixed, confirmed, and orderly 
26habits. And which form of government embraces these three elements?
27Absolute "civilized" monarchy. Further, this form of government has
the added advantage of being free from factions, and, as we know, Hume
28detests factions (Essays 55). For these reasons, then, Phillipson 
concludes that absolute "civilized" monarchy is Hume's preferred form 
of government. I disagree.
True, as we saw in the previous chapter, in "civilized" monarchies 
all are equally restrained by the law, with one exception: The monarch. 
And, as we saw, Hume thinks that this can have disastrous consequences 
if the wrong type of character comes to the throne. This fact about 
absolute "civilized" monarchy means that the undivided absolute power 
of the monarch can also give rise to pernicious results. This came out 
in the previous chapter. On the other hand, a republican constitution, 
where all parts are perfectly balanced, where the wise middle rank 
holds political power, and where all, without exception, are equally 
restrained by law, ensures great stability and order (and the social 
and economic benefits which spring fron order).
What of Phillipson's claim that, given Hume's hatred of factions, the 
fact that absolute "civilized" monarchies are free fron factions, is 
more evidence that Hume has a supreme preference for this form of 
government? It is also wrong. For, as we saw in Chapter 6, Hume makes 
it clear that factions can arise in absolute "civilized" monarchies, 
though they do so with greater difficulty than under any other form of 
government (especially free governments). Thus, Phillipson cannot
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argue that Hume has a supreme preference for absolute "civilized" 
monarchies on the ground that they are completely free form factions. 
For they are not.
However, in light of what has just been said, Phillipson might want 
to modify his argument. He might want to say that, given Hume's 
intense fear of factions, and given that factions grow with most dif­
ficulty in an absolute "civilized" monarchy, such a form of government 
is still superior to all other forms, especially free governments, 
where factions grow best. But this modified argument will not work 
either. For, firstly, it ignores the many other advantages that free 
governments (especially well-contrived republics) have over "civilized" 
monarchies, and, secondly, it ignores the fact that, according to Hume, 
in a well-contrived republic the adverse consequences of factionalism 
can and will be eliminated. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
Perfect Commonwealth will have factions, but these factions will be 
factions of interest and will not be allowed to create havoc. The 
factions in the Perfect Commonwealth will produce "all the good without 
any of the harm" (Essays 525). This surely negates any advantage that 
"civilized" monarchies have over well-contrived republics in the area 
of factionalism. And since, for Hume, well-contrived republics have 
all the strengths of "civilized" monarchies (and much more), but none 
of their weaknesses, it means that in Hume's mind well-contrived 
republics are to be preferred to absolute "civilized" monarchies.
Thus, Phillipson fails to show that, for Hume, the best form of
29government is an absolute "civilized" monarchy. Does Livingston do 
any better? No.
Livingston declares that, while Hume is "sympathetic with republican 
ideals", he "always viewed absolute ["civilized"] monarchy as being, if
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not the ideal form of government, at least the best working arrangement
30for the modern age." Livingston gives us two reasons for this view.
First, like Phillipson, he points to what, for Hume, is the "major
defect" of republics, namely, that they provide the perfect breeding
31ground for violent factionalism. But, as we know, Hume thinks that 
this defect can be remedied in a properly designed republic. Living­
ston (like Phillipson) ignores this. Second, Livingston points to
Hume's claim that "I should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than
32a republic in this island" (Essays 52). But, as we have seen, in 
this passage, Hume is expressing a preference for an absolute monarchy 
over a British republic headed by the Commons "according to its present 
[defective] constitution" (Essays 52), that is a badly-contrived 
republic. Thus, while this passage can be used to show that Hume ranks 
"civilized" monarchies above badly-contrived republics, it certainly 
cannot be used to show that Hume thinks of "civilized" monarchies as 
superior to well-contrived republics.
Finally, the claim that, for Hume, absolute "civilized" monarchy is 
the best form of government "for the modern age" is wrong. The modern 
age requires a form of government which ensures the freedom of the 
people from arbitrary coercion, and which fosters a luxurious 
commercial society. An absolute "civilized" monarchy cannot fulfil 
these ends. Only a well-contrived republic can, with the other type of 
free government, limited monarchy, following close behind.
E.
Annette Baier gives us three reasons why we ought not to take "Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously. First, pointing to Essays 52 she
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claims that Hume was not "sure that it [i.e the Perfect Commonwealth]
33could be tried in Britain." But as we have seen Essays 52 does 
nothing to exclude the possibility of erecting a well-contrived British 
republic. Second, Baier sees "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" as 
"utopian in its non-provision for any transition to it [i.e the Perfect 
Commonwealth] from any actual constitution." But Baier is wrong. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, one possible way in which Hume thinks 
the Perfect Commonwealth might be established is by "bringting] any 
real constitution or form of government as near as possible [to the 
perfect constitution], by such gentle alterations and innovations as 
may not give too great disturbance to society" (Essays 513-14). Thus 
Hume does provide for the possibility that the Perfect Commonwealth 
might emerge fron an actually existing constitution, though he does not 
give us a detailed account of how an existing constitution can be 
transformed into the well-contrived perfect constitution outlined in 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". We shall return to this topic in the 
next chapter and examine it in some detail.
Finally, Baier declares that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" "fails
35his [i.e Hume's] test of experiment." But, again, Baier is wrong. 
For Hume has the Dutch republic as a working and successful "experi­
ment". To requote: "That the foregoing plan of government [i.e the
plan of the Perfect Commonwealth] is practicable, no one can doubt, who 
considers the resemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the 
United Provinces, a wise and renowned government" (Essays 526).
II
A number of times in this chapter we have come across the idea that,
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for Hume, republicanism is merely a subject of speculation. We have 
examined the reasons why scholars have held this view, and seen that 
they fail. This is important for us. For if republicanism is a mere 
subject of speculation for Hume, then the (well-contrived) republican 
state that Hume builds in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" can be 
nothing more than a piece of speculation. But here we should note that 
Hume himself seems to suggest that "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is 
nothing but a speculative exercise. For he writes in this essay: "All 
I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject [i.e the 
subject of the Perfect Commonwealth] of speculation" (Essays 514; my 
emphasis). But it cannot be that, for Hume, "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" is a mere speculative exercise. For we already know that 
Hume the reformer wrote "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" for the public 
and even defends its practicability. What, then, can be going on the 
above quote? It is hard to say, but I think that the best answer is 
that here Hume is simply using a clever tactic in order to achieve his 
own end. Hume wanted his works (including "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth") to reach and to influence the public. But, as we have seen, 
the public is, according to Hume, hostile towards works about perfect 
commonwealths. They find them "useless and chimerical" (Essays 514). 
Given the public's attitude to the subject of perfect states, and given 
Hume's reformist intentions, what better way to get the public to read 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" than to call it a piece of "specula­
tion"? Doing so will surely make the suspicious public less hostile 
towards it, less afraid and reluctant to read it.
While for the public the subject of a perfect commonwealth is "use­
less and chimerical", "the wise and learned" know better. They know 
that "[this] subject is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit
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of man can possibly devise", for they know that "one form of government 
must be allowed more perfect than another" and that it is important "to 
know what is [the] most perfect [form of government]" given that "in 
sane future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the 
theory to practice" (Essays 513). But before such a reduction can take 
place the question of the nature of the best constitution must be 
"fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned" (Essays 513). 
The "wise and learned" must sit down together and construct the best 
form of government. Hume's "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" can be 
seen as a contribution to this debate. However, it is more than this, 
for, in all humility, Hume thinks that the the form of government he 
constructs in this essay is one "to which I cannot, in theory, discover 
any considerable objection" (Essays 516). Further, he is convinced 
that his Perfect Commonwealth "is practicable" (Essays 526). Thus, we 
can say that, for Hume, not only is there no "considerable objection" 
in theory to his Perfect Commonwealth, but also there is no "consider­
able objection" in practice either. In the next and final chapter we 
shall investigate how Hume thinks the "theory" with which he presents 
us in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" might be reduced to practice; 
how, that is, the Perfect Commonwealth might come into being.
CHAPTER 8
I
Hume presents us with three possible ways in which the Perfect Common­
wealth might be established:
(a) "by a dissolution of scxne old government" (Essays 513);
(b) "by the combination of men to form a new one [i.e gov­
ernment], in some distant part of the world"(Essays 513);
(c) or, finally, by reforming "any real constitution or form of
government__by such gentle alterations and innovations as
may not give too great disturbance to society"(Essays 513- 
14).
In this section we shall investigate all three possibilities, beginning
1(for reasons of convenience) with the final one.
A.
Given that in this thesis we are concerned with the establishment of 
the Perfect Commonwealth in Britain only, the first question that 
arises in connection with this possibility is who will have the task of 
introducing the reforms necessary to perfect the present British 
constitution and thereby transform Britain into the Perfect Common­
wealth. Hume does not say, but we can derive an answer to this 
question from what he says elsewhere. We have already noted Hume's 
approval of those "leading members" of the Commons during the reign of 
James I, "men of an independent genius and large views", who "began to 
regulate their opinions, more by the future consequences which they 
foresaw, than by the former precedents which were set before them; and 
they less aspired at maintaining the ancient constitution, than at
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establishing a new one, and a freer, and a better" (H 5 42). It is 
reformist and progressive politicians such as these, I think, that Hume 
is counting on to perform the reforms necessary to perfect the existing 
British constitution and erect the Perfect Commonwealth in Britain, 
"wise politician!s]" who are "the most beneficial character!s] in 
nature, if accompanied with authority...and not altogether useless, 
even if deprived of it" (Essays 647), in contrast to "vulgar 
politicians" who are "hasty" and "dangerous" (H 6 322).^
We can assume that these wise politicians will have read the works of 
Hume the metaphysician and Hume the moralist. Thus, they will know a 
number of important things. They will know that people do in fact 
abandon their customs, that people do not rot in what they have 
inherited but, as we saw in Chapter 4, turn away fron their habitual 
patterns of behaviour and belief. They will know, in other words, that 
people have what I called a "progressive tendency". Knowing this, 
these politicians will know that it is not futile to embark upon the 
task of introducing the progressive recommendations outlined in "Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth". However, at the same time these poli­
ticians "of independent genius and and large views" will know that 
people are also owners of a strong "conservative tendency", that they 
have an "affection" for the established, a dislike or fear (at first, 
at least) for the new and novel, and that "too sudden and violent a 
change is unpleasant" to people (T 453; T 466). Knowing this, and 
knowing that every reformer must take human nature seriously, they will 
not ignore man's "conservative tendency". Thus, as they strive to 
introduce the Perfect Commonwealth, they will be careful not to create 
"too great disturbance to society" (Essays 514). They will introduce
reforms slowly and gently so as not to scare and disrupt the public.
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In short, then, the progressive politicians who are to introduce the 
Perfect Constitution in the manner under consideration know that humans 
are susceptible to progressive reform, which is why they embark on 
their reformist task in the first place. But they also know that 
humans are owners of a conservative tendency, and, therefore, they will 
introduce their reforms accordingly.
But perhaps all this talk of introducing the reforms in question in a 
gentle and careful manner is unnecessary. For it seems that these 
reforms will have the support of the public. Let me explain. 
According to Hume "it is in every respect better to guide [people]... 
like rational creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute beasts"
(Essays 604-05). And elsewhere Hume condemns reforms which are
3introduced in an "imperious" manner (Essays 477). The idea seems to 
be that if society is to be reformed, then these reforms must not be 
imposed from above in sane tyrannical or "imperious" manner as if 
people were "brute beasts", but must be introduced after consulting the 
public. For only in this way can the public be guided in a rational 
manner, as it ought to be. Thus reforms must have public support 
before they are put into practice. Now, having read Hume, the wise 
politicians will know all this, and thus will make every effort to 
ensure that the public knows of their plan to reform the present 
constitution in accordance with the recommendations outlined in "Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth". And there is every reason to believe that 
the public will (sooner or later) accept this plan. For, while the 
current British constitution is good and advantageous (and, therefore, 
we can assume, is popular among the public), it is inherently unstable. 
The constitution of the Perfect Commonwealth has all the economic, 
social, and political advantages of the British one, but without the
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serious disadvantage of inherent instability.
Now, as we saw in Chapter 4, Hume is convinced that people are wil­
ling to abandon an established constitution and embrace a new one if 
the latter has "a evident tendency to the public good" (T 561). Both 
the British constitution and the constitution of the Perfect Common­
wealth serve the public good, but the latter does so more perfectly. 
Thus, we can assume that the British public will support the introduc­
tion of the Perfect Commonwealth. Of course, this support will not 
come immediately, given the affection that the public has for the 
established, and the fact that the British constitution is a good 
constitution, in spite of its instability. Thus, the wise politicians 
will have to work hard in order to win public support for their 
reformist task. They will point out the advantages of the new 
constitution over the existing one and, keeping in mind the public's 
conservative streak, will make sure that the public understands that 
the new constitution is not a radical reform. Once these points have 
been made to, and understood by, the public, then it seems safe to say 
that the public will (sooner or later) follow the reformist 
politicians. And note: only when the politicians have this support 
will they embark on their reformist task, given their desire to avoid 
acting in an "imperious" manner and to guide the public like "rational 
creatures". But if this is so, if the reformers will be backed by the 
public, then surely there is no need for them to be gentle and careful 
in introducing their reforms.
Unless I have misinterpreted Hume, I think that it is clear that the 
wise politicians will have to seek public support before embarking upon 
their reforms, and, eventually, will gain such support. But this does 
not mean that these politicians should be reckless in the manner in
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which they introduce their reforms. Reforms supported by the public 
are still able to scare that same public. Just because a reform is 
supported by the public it does not make it less alien, less difficult 
to embrace, and less likely to disrupt society. True, for Hume, the 
Perfect Commonwealth is not a radical reform, but a conservative/ 
radical one. The Perfect Commonwealth shares many of the economic, 
social, and political elements of the existing British limited mon­
archy. But still, its introduction will bring with it novelties, and 
these, Hume knows, must be introduced carefully, in spite of any sup­
port the introduction of the Commonwealth might have among the public.
But there is a further reason why Hume wants reforms to be introduced 
carefully and slowly, namely, the problem of allegiance. The introduc­
tion of the Perfect Commonwealth (into Britain) will require the public 
to alter its object of allegiance. The public will have to develop new 
habits of allegiance. We raised this problem in Chapter 5, but left it 
hanging. There we saw that, for Hume, habits of allegiance are im­
portant. They contribute to the cohesion of society. Thus, to tamper 
with these habits is dangerous. But not always. As we saw in Chapter 
5, Hume thinks that where the government in power is pernicious and 
does not serve the public good, allegiance to this government (and the 
habits underlying this allegiance) will be weak. In this case the 
existing pernicious government can be removed and a new, better one can 
be erected without having to worry about upsetting the existing habits 
of allegiance. For the habits of allegiance to an existing pernicious 
government are weak. But (and here is our problem), what if the ex­
isting government is not pernicious? This is the situation that exists 
in the present case. Despite its inherent instability, Hume thinks 
that the existing British limited monarchy does serve the public good
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(e.g Essays 508). Thus, we can assume that, in his view, the public 
has a strong sense of allegiance towards it. If this is so, then the 
redirection of this allegiance to a new object (i.e the Perfect Corrmon- 
wealth) becomes a problem. Will not this redirection upset the strong 
habits of allegiance to the existing good government and thus introduce 
social disharmony? How can Hume deal with this probIon?
He would begin by noting that the reformist politicians will know 
that they must "guide" people "like rational creatures" and not "lead 
or drive them, like brute beasts" (Essays 604-05). Thus, before 
embarking upon their reforms these politicians will seek public sup­
port and will not begin their reformist task until they have this 
support. And, as we said, sooner or later they will receive it, given 
that the new constitution will lack the instability of the current one 
and serve better the public good. In view of such support it seems 
that the public can and will drop the old habits of allegiance and 
develop new ones without massive complications. If the public supports 
the erection of the new constitution, then clearly the new habits of 
allegiance will develop (and the old ones die) a lot easier than if 
this erection had no public support. And, given public support, this 
change in the object and habits of allegiance can be achieved without 
plunging society into anarchy.
Unfortunately, however, things are not so simple for Hume. For even 
though the public will recognise the greater utility of the new con­
stitution and even support its erection (a necessary requirement if the 
politicians are to guide the people in a rational manner), still we can 
assume that it will be difficult for that same public to abandon its 
existing habits of allegiance. For, in spite of its disadvantage, the 
British limited monarchy does serve the public good, and does so quite
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well. Thus, we can assume that the public's allegiance to the existing 
limited monarchy is quite strong, as are the habits underlying this 
allegiance. If this is correct, then Hume is faced with a situation 
where the British public supports the establishment of the Perfect 
Commonwealth, but at the same time retains strong feelings of allegi­
ance to the existing limited monarchy. And this situation could easily 
lead to great social disruption if not handled carefully. But here 
Hume would point out that the progressive politicians whose task it is 
to introduce the Perfect Commonwealth will have several important tools 
at their disposal to help them redirect the political allegiance of the 
public and assist them in developing new habits of allegiance among the 
people.
As we have seen, for Hume, education is a kind of custom (T 116- 
17). As we have also seen, Hume thinks that politicians have the task 
of educating the public in the area of "general virtue and good 
morals", including, of course, the virtue of allegiance. Such educa­
tion is "the effect of wise laws and institutions" (Essays 55). Now, 
we here are discussing the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth 
into Britain as a result of that nation's wise politicians slowly and 
carefully altering the laws and institutions of the existing British 
polity until they are in harmony with the recommendations outlined in 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". Keeping this in mind, and keeping 
also in mind (a) the educative task of the politicians and (b) the way 
in which they achieve this education, (i.e by means of wise laws and 
institutions), we can say that as existing laws and institutions are 
slowly improved (by the wise politicians), and as the public is repeat­
edly exposed to these slowly emerging better laws and institutions, 
this same public will slowly begin to acquire new habits of allegiance.
CHAPTER 8 - 246
According to Hume, habit is a "powerful means of reforming, the mind, 
and implanting in it good dispositions and inclinations" (Essays 170). 
For us here, the "good dispositions and inclinations" in question are 
those new habits of allegiance necessary to support the new object of 
allegiance. These new habits will be introduced slowly as existing 
laws and institutions are slowly perfected. In this cautious and care­
ful way, then, by the time the existing laws and institutions have been 
fully replaced by the new, better, ones, the public will have abandoned 
its old habits of allegiance and acquired the new, necessary ones. And 
all this can be done without plunging society into the state of nature.
Here we should note a second tool that the politicians have at their 
disposal to help them instil new habits of allegiance: The "middle
rank of men". As we saw in Chapter 2, Hume thinks that this rank 
already holds a position of authority in Britain, together with the 
"gentry" (Essays 207). Now, as Britain's existing laws and institu­
tions are slowly reformed, as the the existing British constitution 
slowly begins to be replaced by the constitution of the Perfect Common­
wealth, as Britain slowly begins to move towards well-contrived repub­
licanism, the middle rank will slowly begin to emerge as the only group 
that the public regards as its independent leaders, that is, as the 
group that the public imitates. Being made up of men of commerce, this 
rank will, no doubt, support the efforts of the reformist politicians 
to introduce that form of government which best supports commerce, and 
in doing so it will, by means of the power of "imitation", carry the 
rest of the public with it. Thus, by imitating its leaders (the middle 
rank), the public will develop the new habits of allegiance necessary
4to support the new government.
Finally, "time" will ensure that the necessary habits of allegiance
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become well-founded. For,
Time__accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful
or native princes, that family, which, at first, they 
considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors...[In 
time the people] willingly consent, because they
think, that, fron long possession, [the prince]__has
acquired a title, independent of their choice or 
inclination" (Essays 474-75).
Of course, there are no "princes" here who are "usurpers or foreign 
conquerors" and the public does not have a bitterly hostile "inclina­
tion" to the erection of the Perfect Commonwealth. In fact, it will 
support such an erection. But still, allegiance to the old limited 
monarchy (a good and advantageous form of government) will be strong. 
Time will take care of this. And given (i) the education by the poli­
ticians, (ii) the leadership of the middle rank, (iii) the fact that 
there are no hostile inclinations on the part of the public to the 
establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth, and (iv) the greater utility 
of the new constitution, the time taken for the new habits of alle­
giance to develop and the old ones to wither away, will be considerably 
less than if these factors where absent.
And with this we arrive at what is for us a very important conclu­
sion, namely, that Hume's theory of allegiance does not prevent us fron 
taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously. In Chapter 5 we saw 
that this theory (like his theory of justice) does not restrict Hume to 
conservative reformism and does not prevent us from labelling him a 
conservative/radical reformer. We now discover that this theory 
(again like his theory of justice, as we saw in Chapter 6) is 
not an obstacle to taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously
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(in the case of Britain). The British can change their habits of 
allegiance and make the Perfect Commonwealth the object of their 
allegiance without plunging the nation into the state of nature.
I do not want to suggest that, for Hume, the erection of the Perfect 
Commonwealth in the manner under consideration will be an easy task. 
It will not be. But nor will it be impossible. And I have already 
revealed a number of factors which will make the politicians' task of 
erecting the Perfect Commonwealth easier. Before going on I want to 
reveal one more such factor: The fact that (as we saw in Chapter 6)
the Perfect Commonwealth is in harmony with the natural course of 
things . This is important, for, according to Hume, "the less natural 
any set of principles are...the more difficulty will a legislator meet 
with in raising and cultivating them" (Essays 260). Thus, we can say 
that, for Hume, the "naturalness" of the Perfect Commonwealth (in 
conjunction with the other factors unveiled above) will make its 
establishment less of a chore for the reformist politicians and more 
likely that their task will succeed.
A serious problem arises once the Perfect Commonwealth is erected. 
We have already discussed the importance of habit for Hume. While he 
does not think that people rot in their habitual practices and beliefs, 
he does think that people have a deep affection for their habits and 
that these habits (economic, social, and political) are responsible for 
holding society together. Now political causes have social and 
economic effects and limited monarchies and well-contrived republics, 
both being types of free government, will have social and economic 
effects which are close in significant ways. Thus, as we noted in 
Chapter 6, the introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into Britain 
will not severely disrupt the public's social and economic habits; it
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will not require the public to drastically alter its established social 
and economic patterns of behaviour and thought. But what about the 
public's political patterns of behaviour and thought? Is it not the 
case that this set of patterns will have to be altered in important 
ways? True, limited monarchies and well-contrived republics belong to 
the same form of government and so, politically, share the same 
"nature" or "fabric" or "fundamental pillars". This means, not only 
that the public will recognise the Perfect Commonwealth (as a form of 
government) and will not find it completely foreign and alien, thus 
making its introduction and reception less difficult, but also that the 
public, which is used to living under a free government, will already 
have those fundamental political habits of thought and behaviour which 
are needed in order to function properly under a free government. But 
still, as we saw in Chapter 6, the Perfect Conrmonwealth and the British 
limited monarchy operate, and are organised, differently as systems of 
free government. The British public might have those habits necessary 
for it to operate well under a free government, but it lacks the habits 
needed to operate under a certain type of free government, namely, a 
well-contrived republic. How will the wise politicians introduce these 
new habits?
Hume distinguishes between "moral causes" and "physical causes". 
Under the latter heading he places "qualities of air and climate"; 
under the former "the nature of the government, the revolutions of 
public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the 
situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like 
circumstances." Hume thinks that "moral causes" (but not "physical 
causes") "are fitted to work on the mind as motives and reasons, and 
which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us" (Essays 198).
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In other words, "moral causes" create habitual regularities. Now, "the 
nature of government", Hume thinks, is a "moral cause" and, thus, the 
type of government ruling over a nation will instill in its subjects 
certain habitual practices and beliefs, including habitual political 
practices and beliefs. If this is correct, then it seems that, with 
the establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth, the people will begin to 
acquire the political habits necessary to operate under that system of 
government. Habit is the result of repeated experience. Thus, by 
repeatedly experiencing the new constitution (a "moral cause") people 
will develop new political habits, habits which are consistent with the 
political organization of the Perfect Commonwealth (well-contrived 
republicanism) and which are necessary for the maintenance and proper 
functioning of the Perfect Corrmonwealth. For Hume, as we have said, 
habit reforms the mind, introducing in it "good dispositions and 
inclinations" (Essays 170). For us here, the "good dispositions and 
inclinations" are those which are consistent with well-contrived 
republicanism. These "good dispositions and inclinations" will be 
introduced into the public realm by means of repeated experience of the 
state's new constitutional arrangements. It is repeated experience of 
this sort which will render these dispositions and inclinations 
habitual to the people and as a result transform them into good members 
of the Perfect Commonwealth, people who can function well (politically) 
under their new well-contrived republican system of government.
B.
As we have already noted, Hume is convinced that no form of government 
is immortal (Essays 51? Essays 528-29). Thus, a second way he thinks
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the Perfect Commonwealth might be established is by the "dissolution" 
of the existing government (Essays 513). Since we in this thesis are 
focusing on the establishment of the Perfect Ccmmonwealth in Britain, 
the question for us is, How, according to Hume, might the current 
British government be dissolved? We have already seen that, according 
to Hume, the British constitution is unstable and might collapse as a 
result of either its Monarchical or its defective and self-interested 
Republican element gaining complete ascendency thus transforming 
Britain into either an absolute monarchy or a (badly-contrived) 
republic. We have also seen his view that the standing army might be 
the cause of the constitution's destruction, turning Britain into a 
military despotism. Finally we should note Hume's view that if the 
practice of public credit is not halted, then the constitution will 
perish. For the rise of the debt can only lead to the rise of the 
stockholders who will destroy the "middle power" between the king and 
the people and, as a result, "a grievous despotism must infallibly 
prevail" in Britain (Essays 358). "It must, indeed, be one of these 
two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public 
credit will destroy the nation" (Essays 360-61). The next question is 
how the Perfect Commonwealth will arise out of any of these "deaths" of 
the current British constitution. Hume does not say, but it seems that 
the only answer to this question can be, Revolution.
Now, Hume must think that if any of these "deaths" of the British 
constitution were to eventuate, Britain would be left with a form of 
government significantly inferior to its present free limited monarchy. 
For, as we have seen, he sees neither absolute monarchy, nor despotism, 
as serving the public good as well as limited monarchy. Thus, on the 
basis of what was said in Chapters 4 and 5, it seems clear that, if the
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current British constitution were to dissolve in one of the above- 
mentioned ways, then the British public would seek to overthrow the new 
pernicious government and return to the one it knew and loved, for it 
served the public good better. However, Hume thinks that, on its own, 
the public would be unable to achieve such a task. For, "the insurrec­
tions of the populace, when not raised and supported by persons of 
higher quality, are the least to be dreaded" (H 2 293), "dreaded", that 
is, by the existing rulers who are the object of the public's outrage 
and discontent. Thus, if the public is to succeed in returning to 
limited monarchy by overthrowing the existing pernicious form of 
government, then it must be led by people of "higher quality", that is, 
by those people regarded by the public as their natural leaders.
But will these leaders agree to take the public back to the form of 
government it knew? There is always the possibility that the "men of 
quality" will instead decide to steer their followers to the well- 
contrived republic of the Perfect Commonwealth. In such a case the 
leaders, having read Hume and therefore wanting to guide the people 
like "rational creatures" rather than force them ahead like "beasts", 
will make their plan known to the public, pointing out the advantages 
of the Perfect Commonwealth over the British limited monarchy, its 
greater public utility, and making clear to the people the political 
similarities between these two types of government and their almost 
indistinguishable economic and social effects i.e showing the people 
the conservative/radical nature of the Perfect Commonwealth. There is 
no guarantee that the people will be convinced by all this, in which 
case the leaders will have to guide them back to limited monarchy. But 
given the power of imitation and the place that the leaders hold in the 
eyes of the people, and given the nature of the Perfect Commonwealth,
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its closeness to, and greater public utility than, limited monarchy, it 
is likely that the people will agree to be led to well-contrived 
republicanism. In this way, then, through revolution, the Perfect 
Commonwealth will arise.
The people, who are used to living under a free government, will find 
the new government familiar. They will recognise its "pillars". They 
will be able to retain their habitual economic and social practices and 
beliefs and those political habits necessary to operate under a free 
government. However, as in the possible introduction of the Perfect 
Commonwealth by means of the reformation of the current constitution by 
progressive politicians, in this current case too the people will lack 
both the necessary habits of allegiance and the political habits neces­
sary to function under a well-contrived republic. The latter habits, 
we can assume, will be introduced in the same way as they were in A 
above. But what about the new habits of allegiance? Here we do not 
face the same problems that we faced in possibility A above. For here, 
the public is turning its back on a pernicious form of government, a 
government which does not serve the public good, and therefore, does 
not command the allegiance of the public. Thus, on the basis of what 
was said in Chapters 4 and 5, we can say that the public's habits of 
allegiance to the existing government will be weak, if not 
non-existent. Thus, it will be easy for the public to develop new 
habits of allegiance to the new form of government. And these habits 
will develop in the same way as in case A above (though with none of 
the difficulties experienced in that case), by means of education by 
the politicians (through repeated experience of new and better laws and 
institutions) and by means of imitating the leaders of society.
CHAPTER 8 - 234
C.
There is one final way in which Hume thinks that the Perfect Common­
wealth might come into being, namely, by establishing a settlement in a 
new, distant, land.5 Of course, in this thesis, we are concerned 
solely with the establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth in Britain. 
Thus, this possible way in which the Perfect Commonwealth might come 
into being is not important for us. However, a brief investigation is 
still necessary in order to complete our discussion on this subject.
Why does Hume leave roan for the establishment of the Perfect Common­
wealth as a settlement in a "distant" land? Probably because he feels 
that there is a possibility that the Perfect Commonwealth might never 
be established in Britain. In this case, those who have read "Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth" and found it attractive, will have to leave 
Britain in order to realise their dream of living in the Perfect 
Commonwealth. Will this Caimonwealth be a colony ruled from London? 
No. For, firstly, Hume thinks that free governments (including, of 
course, the British limited monarchy) make bad colonial rulers: 
"Compare the Pais conquis of FRANCE with IRELAND, and you will be 
convinced of this truth...CORSICA [ruled by the republic of Genoa till 
1768] is an obvious instance to the same purpose" (Essays 21). Thus, 
the Perfect Conmonwealth ruled as a colony would be anything but 
perfect. Second, Hume thinks that it is impossible for a nation 
(regardless of its form of government) to maintain a colony with a free 
form of government. Thus, if Britain wants to hold on to America she 
must "annul all the Charters; abolish every democratical power in every 
Colony; repeal the Habeas Corpus Act with regard to them; invest every 
Governor with full discretionary or arbitrary Power; confiscate the
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Estates of all the chief Planters; and hang three fourths of their 
Clergy" (L II 300-01). Clearly, then, a colony with a republican 
constitution ruled from London is out of the question. Thus, if the 
Perfect Commonwealth is to be established by means of a "combination of 
men" settling "in some distant part of the world" the settlement must 
be independent of the mother country. But here we should note Hume's 
view that such independence is difficult to achieve:
A company of men, who should leave their native 
country, in order to people sane uninhabited region, 
might dream of recovering their native freedom; but 
they would soon find, that their prince still laid 
claim to them, and called them his subjects, even in 
their new settlement. And in this he would but act 
conformably to the common ideas of mankind (Essays 
476).
The inhabitants of the new settlement will find it difficult to assert 
their independence. Unfortunately, Hume does not tell us how they will 
succeed in asserting their independence.
What can we say about the subjects of this independent settlement? 
Not much, but three things can be said with certainty:
(i) They are people who are unhappy with the British political system 
and unhappy that the Perfect Commonwealth will never be established in 
that country (for otherwise they would never have left Britain);
(ii) They are people who have all the mental and behavioural character­
istics and qualities of eighteenth century Britons. For according to 
Hume, "[t]he same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to 
them all over the whole globe...The SPANISH, ENGLISH, FRENCH and DUTCH 
colonies are all distinguishable even between the tropics" (Essays
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205). Of course, we here are dealing with an independent settlement, 
not a colony. But we can assume, in this case, that what is true of 
colonies is also true of independent settlements.
(iii) No doubt, the settlers will have familiarised themselves with 
the nature of the Perfect Commonwealth before going off to join it as 
an independent settlement "in some distant land". Thus, these settlers 
will know what to expect, namely, a settlement which is not radically 
different (economically, socially, politically) from the nation they 
are leaving. Thus, in leaving Britain to join the new well-contrived 
republican settlement, these people will be able to keep many of the 
economic, social, and political habits they acquired while living under 
the British limited monarchy. They will not have to reform themselves, 
or be reformed, in any radical manner. And, they will know all this. 
Given the significant similarities between limited monarchies and 
(well-contrived) republics, the economic, social, and political 
character of the new independent settlement will be familiar to the new 
inhabitants. And this of course will make it easier for them to 
embrace their new heme. They will recognise the new settlement and not 
see it as something alien. They will feel comfortable, and be able to 
function well, within its boundaries.
These new settlers will have leaders. Who will these leaders be? 
Probably men who in Britain were members of the "governing part of the 
nation", that is, men who are naturally imitated by the public. Like 
the people they are governing, they too will be dissatisfied with the 
the British political system and unhappy that the Perfect Commonwealth 
will not be established in their country. But these men will not only 
be the independent settlement's leaders. They will also be its 
founders and like all "founders of states" their job will be to
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"transmit a system of [constitutional] laws and institutions to secure 
the peace, happiness, and liberty of future generations" (Essays 54). 
They will find the necessary constitutional laws and institutions in 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth".
According to Rousseau, "[o]ne who who dares to undertake the founding 
of a people, should feel that he is capable of changing human nature." 
But Hume would disagree, for as we have seen he thinks that human 
nature cannot and should not be changed. Rather, "the common bent of 
mankind" ought to be respected and given "all the improvements of which 
it is susceptible" (Essays 260). And if what we said in Chapter 6 is 
correct, then, according to Hume, the "founders" will establish a state 
(i.e the Perfect Commonwealth) which is in harmony with the course of 
nature.^
These leaders and founders of the Perfect Commonwealth will also have 
the task of instilling in their subjects (i) the political habits 
necessary to operate well under a well-contrived republic, and (ii) the 
necessary habits of allegiance. (i) will be achieved in the same way 
as in possibilities A and B above. As for (ii), it is clear that, as 
in B above, here too the problems met by the reformist politicians in 
possibility A, will be absent. For, we can assume that the settlers 
left a government to which they were not intimately attached. Thus, 
their habits of allegiance to the old government will be weak. As a 
result, the new habits of allegiance will develop easily and quickly. 
These habits will be instilled in the same way as in B above.
There is one final issue that must be tackled here. We are dealing 
with the establishment of the Perfect Commonwealth as an independent 
settlement "in some distant land". No doubt, this distant land will be 
inhabited by indigenous persons or natives. Will these natives form
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part of the new settlement? One possible way in which they might do so 
is as slaves. But, for Hume, slavery is unacceptable. It is "cruel 
and oppressive" and therefore harmful to the enslaved (Essays 383). 
But at the same time it is also harmful to the enslaver, who ends up 
with "little humanity" (Essays 383) and with all the nasty qualities of 
a "petty tyrant" (Essays 384). Where a society practices slavery, 
those "of condition", that is, those of superior social rank, "are only 
qualified to be, themselves, slaves and tyrants; and in every future 
intercourse, either with their inferiors or their superiors, are apt to 
forget the natural equality of mankind" (Essays 185). And here we 
should recall the important socio-political role that Hume assigns to 
men of superior rank. He seems to think that the institution of 
slavery corrupts this role. Further, Hume is convinced that slavery 
has an adverse effect upon the "populousness" of a nation. Hume 
accepts the established idea of the time that "wherever there are most 
happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be
g
most people" (Essays 382). Since slavery does harm to the size of a 
nation's population (Essays 386-89), it follows that this practice 
detracts from a nation's virtue, happiness, and institutional wisdom: 
"[Sjlavery is in general disadvantageous both to the happiness and 
populousness of mankind" (Essays 396). For all these reasons, then, 
"[t]he remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN 
colonies, and among seme EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a 
desire of rendering it more universal" (Essays 383). We can say, 
therefore, that the Perfect Commonwealth as an independent settlement, 
will not include indigenous persons, or any other persons for that 
matter, as slaves.
But there is a second way in which indigenous persons might form part
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of the Perfect Commonwealth, namely, as members of this state on the 
same footing as those fron the mother country. But it is unlikely that 
Hume would find such an idea acceptable. For according to Hume "so­
ciety.. .supposes a degree of equality" among its members, an equality 
of "body and mind" which will allow these members to participate in the 
rules of justice (E II 190). However, Hume thinks that non-whites are 
"naturally inferior to the whites" in the arts and the sciences i.e 
they have inferior minds (Essays 208 fn. 10; Essays 629 note i). Given 
the intellectual "inferiority" of non-whites, and their consequent in­
ability to participate in the fundamental rules of society, it follows 
that, for Hume, indigenous persons will not form part of the Perfect 
Commonwealth as members. Importantly, however, neither will they form 
part of the Commonwealth as slaves, in spite of their (supposed) in­
feriority. They will be left alone, outside the "walls" of the Perfect
9Commonwealth.
II
In this thesis we have limited ourselves to showing that Hume's Perfect 
Commonwealth ought to be taken seriously in the case of Britain. I 
think we have achieved this task. But did Hume himself intend such a 
limitation? Did Hume write this essay with only the British public in 
mind? I want to end this chapter, and therefore this thesis, by 
investigating this question, and by revealing what we might call 
"Hume's Dream".
Does Hume see the recommendations outlined in "Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth" as applying exclusively to Britain? No. There can be no 
doubt about this. For he tells us that the Perfect Commonwealth might
CHAPTER 8 - 260
be erected either "by a dissolution of some old government", or by
reforming "any real constitution or form of government" (Essays 513; my
emphases). Thus, he makes room for the possibility that "the country,
proposed to be erected into a commonwealth... [might] be of more narrow
extent__[or] of greater extent" than Britain (Essays 516). Clearly,
then, Hume does not confine the erection of the Perfect Commonwealth to
Britain alone. However, given that he is a conservative/radical
reformer, we can take it that he does confine this erection to that
handful of European nations of his time which (according to him) are
10ruled by free governments. For, like Britain, only such nations will 
already have in place the structures necessary to implement the recom­
mendations outlined in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" in a conserva­
tive/radical manner. Hume is a conservative/radical reformer. There­
fore, we can assume that he does not want to see his recommendations 
embraced by a nation which would have to undergo radical and wholesale 
reform in order to put these into practice. Does this mean that, for 
Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is to have no influence at all 
on those states of Europe which are under the control of absolute 
rulers? Given that Hume is not a radical reformer, does it follow that 
he does not want "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" to have a practical 
impact on what we might call "Monarchical Europe"? Yes and No. Let me 
explain.
According to Hume, "EUROPE [today] is shared out mostly into great 
monarchies; and such parts of it as are divided into small territories, 
are commonly governed by absolute princes, who ruin their people by a 
mimicry of the greater monarchs" (Essays 402).^1 Clearly, no attempt 
should be made to erect the Perfect Commonwealth in these states. For
the transformation of a state fron absolutism to well-contrived
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republicanism is too radical. It would require massive reorganisation 
at all levels. But there is no room for such reorganisation in Hume's 
thought. Thus, we can take it that Hume did not write "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth" with an eye on Monarchical Europe. However, this 
is not the end of the story. For there is always the possibility that, 
sometime in the future, the states of Monarchical Europe will find 
themselves in a position to erect the Perfect Commonwealth. This may 
happen in one of two ways.
(i) We have already noted Hume's view that, after witnessing the 
prosperity of neighbouring republics and emulating these republics, 
"barbarous" monarchies transformed themselves into "civilised" 
monarchies. We have also noted Hume's view that the modern well- 
contrived republics of Europe are superior to and more advantageous 
than their neighbouring absolute monarchies. Given this, and given the 
power of emulation, there is always the possibility that Europe's 
absolute monarchies will move closer and closer to free government (or 
even to well-contrived republicanism). Once this happens, then clearly 
these states will be in a position to adopt Hume's constitutional 
arrangements in a conservative/radical fashion.
(ii) For Hume, economic, social, and political elements are inter­
twined as causes and effects. Thus, cormerce gives rise to industry 
and luxury, improves the conditions of the poor and creates in a state 
"the middling rank" who seek the establishment of free government. 
Free government in turn strengthens the position of the middle rank, 
enforces justice effectively, ensures the prosperity of the people and 
promises strong commercial and manufacturing sectors. Now, as we saw 
in Chapter 2 Hume calls on France, Spain, Germany etc to adopt a policy 
of free trade (Essays 331). In other words, Hume recommends that these
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absolutist states strengthen their commercial sectors. The political 
effect of doing such a thing would be the evolution of free govern­
ment in these states. Thus, if the absolute monarchies and principal­
ities of Europe pay heed to Hume's advice, then one day they will be in 
a position to transform their states into Perfect Commonwealths.
In short, while at present "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is not 
aimed at Monarchical Europe, this might change in the future.
Hume is saddened by the fact that in modern Europe "the situation... 
with regard to civil liberty [the rule of law], as well as equality of 
fortune [equality of property in the sense that all ought to be allowed 
to enjoy the fruits of their labour (Essays 265) i.e the effective 
enforcement of justice], is not near so favourable, either to the 
propagation or happiness of mankind" (Essays 402; my emphasis). As we 
saw in Chapter 2, happiness, for Hume, is intertwined with luxury and, 
thus, with commerce, industry, and manufacturing. And since these are 
best encouraged under a free government (where the rule of law and the 
natural rules of justice are best enforced) it follows that, for Hume, 
man's happiness is best secured under a free government. Given this, 
and given that Hume takes his Perfect Commonwealth to be the best form 
of free government, we can say that, for Hume, the Perfect Commonwealth 
is best able to give man the happiness he deserves. Further, Hume 
thinks that the propagation of a nation's population depends upon 
"happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions" (Essays 382), and I 
think we can safely say the greatest happiness and virtue, along with 
the wisest institutions, are (in Hume's opinion) to be found in the 
Perfect Commonwealth. Given all this, and given Hume's criticism of 
the economic, social, and political situation that currently exists in 
most European nations (quoted above at Essays 402), we can say that
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"Hume's Dream" is that one day all the nations of Europe will achieve 
possession of governments which (a) PUkblaCTLY incorporate the principle 
of the rule of law, (b) PERFECTS enforce the rules of justice, (c) 
PERFECTLY acquire for their societies strong commercial and man­
ufacturing sectors, and (d) f e kFFjCtLY secure for their people safe, 
happy, and prosperous lives. In other words, "Hume's Dream" is that 
one day the nations of Europe will acquire, not just free government, 
but the best type of free government, that outlined in "Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth". And such a situation, no doubt, would be in 
Britain's greatest interest. For once the nations of Europe transform 
themselves into Perfect Commonwealths they will prosper. And given 
that, according to Hume, a nation's prosperity depends heavily on the 
prosperity of her neighbours (as we saw in Chapter 2), we can say that 
once the nations of Europe begin to thrive under their new well- 
contrived republican constitutions, Britain will reap great benefits.
But for all this to happen and for "Hume's Dream" to become a 
reality, the handful of European nations which are at present capable 
of erecting the Perfect Commonwealth in a conservative/radical manner, 
must do so, while the nations of Monarchical Europe must somehow ccme 
to acquire the political, social, and economic structures of free 
government. For only then will they be fit to make the jump to the 
Perfect Commonwealth in a conservative/radical manner. Hume would 
never allow or encourage these absolutist nations to directly implement 
the recommendations outlined in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". Such 
a thing would be too radical. But Hume is no radical. He is a 
conservative/radical reformer, and "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" is 
a conservative/radical reform.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. This is not to say that Hume wrote "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
with only the British public in mind. As we shall see in Chapter 
8, he did not. However, despite the fact that Hume did not intend 
to limit the practical impact of "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
to Britain alone, we in this thesis will impose such a limitation, 
due to a lack of space. Thus, in most of this thesis, all 
questions regarding "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" will be raised 
only in relation to Britain. I say "most" because in Chapter 8, 
section II we will very briefly touch upon the question of the 
practical impact of "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" on the other 
countries of Europe.
2. Plamenatz, John, Man and Society (2 Volumes), London: Longman,
1963, vol. 1 pp 330-31 (hereafter cited as Plamenatz, Man and 
Society); Robertson, John, "The Scottish Enlightenment at the 
Limits of the Civic Tradition" in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping 
of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by 
Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983, pp 137-78. See pp 169-74 (hereafter cited as 
Robertson, "The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic 
Tradition" in Wealth and Virtue); Stewart, John B., Opinion and 
Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992, pp 281-90 (hereafter cited as Stewart, 
Opinion and Reform) .
Here we should note that, at first sight, it might seem that 
Plamenatz does not take "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously. 
For he thinks that "Hume did not in fact want great changes made in 
England" (p 330), and he calls this essay "deliberately Utopian" (p 
330), the product of a man who "amused himself by devising an ideal 
system of government" (p 331), and by "speculating on what is 
ideally the best" (p 330). However, at the same time, Plamenatz 
tells us that, according to Hume, it is beneficial for us to 
reflect on what is the best, "for we can then strive to bring what 
exists, gradually and gently, nearer to our ideal" (p 330), and 
that "Hume, for all his conservatism, did not think it altogether
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unreasonable for men to attempt great though gradual changes in 
their form of government to bring it closer to their ideals" (p 
331). Given these latter views, and given, as we shall see later 
in the "Introduction" (and as comes out in the quote immediately 
above), that Plamenatz ascribes to Hume a form of non-conservative 
reformism, it seems safe to conclude that he thinks that "Idea of a 
Perfect Ccmmonwealth" ought to be taken seriously.
3. Letwin, Shirley. R., The Pursuit of Certainty, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965, p 89 (hereafter cited as Letwin, The 
Pursuit of Certainty). James Harrington (1611-77) gave the world 
his model of the perfect government in his Ccmmonwealth of Oceana 
(1656). Hume refers to this model in "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" (Essays 514-16; Essays 523).
4. Miller, David, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p 77 (hereafter cited as Miller, 
Philosophy and Ideology).
5. Whelan, Frederick. G., Order and Artifice in Hume's Political 
Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p 342 
(hereafter cited as Whelan, Order and Artifice).
6. Baier, Annette, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's 
Treatise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p 268 (here­
after cited as Baier, A Progress of Sentiments).
7. In Chapter 7 we shall examine the ideas and positions these 
scholars attribute to Hume which have the consequence of preventing 
us from taking "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" seriously.
8. Assuming, of course, that Hume was not an idiot and did not advo­
cate reforms of a non-conservative type, while embracing a form of 
conservative reformism. We shall make this assumption (i.e that 
Hume was not a simpleton) throughout this thesis. I think that the 
reader will not object to my making this assumption, regardless of 
what he or she might think of Hume and his philosophy.
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9. Mill, John Stuart, "Bentham" in Essays on Ethics, Religion, and 
Society, edited by J. M. Robson, vol. 10 of Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p 80.
10. Stephan, Leslie, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Cen­
tury, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962, vol. 2, p 157.
11. Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, p 89; p 90.
12. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 97; p 119; p 145. Whelan, Order
and Artifice, p 332 fn. 55; p 335; p 349; p 364; p 367; p 370-71.
13. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 316; p 349; p 367.
14. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 119; p 145; p 191.
Here we should note that two less important thinkers in the area 
of Hume's political thought (less important, that is, than Miller 
and Whelan) also take Hume to be a conservative reformer, namely, 
Wolin, Sheldon S., "Hume and Conservatism" in Hume: A Re-evaluation 
edited by D. W Livingston and J. T. King, New York: Fordham Uni­
versity Press, 1976, pp 239-56 (hereafter cited as Wolin, "Hume 
and Conservatism" in Hume: A Re-evaluation); and Livingston, Donald 
W., Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984 (hereafter cited as Livingston, Hume's Philo­
sophy of Common Life).
While Wolin does not explicitly classify Hume as a conservative 
reformer, and while he thinks that Hume had a "conservative dis­
trust of reform" (p 244), he also thinks that Hume was "sceptical 
of man's ability to effect reforms which would be both widesweeping 
and beneficial" (p 248; my emphasis), thus leaving open the pos­
sibility that Hume allowed reforms which were piecemeal and bene­
ficial i.e conservative reforms. And, importantly, nothing that 
Wolin tells us in his paper prevents us fron ascribing such a 
position to him with respect to Hume.
Unlike Wolin, Livingston explicitly tells us that Hume held a 
"conservative theory of reform" (p 341). For Hume, we are told,
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"society is a sacred order" (p 340) and "[the] established order 
has a sacred character" (p 330). Thus, quoting fron "Idea of a 
Perfect Canmonwealth", Livingston tells us that, for Hume, "we
__should attempt only those reforms__ that are in accord with
'the chief pillars of the [established] constitution' (Essays 499)" 
(p 341). In Chapter 6 we shall see that this passage from "Idea 
of a Perfect Cotrmonwealth" (a passage very popular among those who 
take Hume to be a conservative reformer) cannot be used as evidence 
to support the claim that Hume was a conservative reformer.
15. That Whelan thinks that, for Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Canmonwealth" 
is a radical reform is clear from the fact that he touches upon 
this essay during a discussion of political radicalism. Whelan, 
Order and Artifice, pp 341-44. That Miller holds the same view is 
clear given that he thinks that, for Hume, the establishment of a 
republican constitution (in a nation without such a constitution) 
would require starting "from scratch". Miller, Philosophy and 
Ideology, p 159.
16. Plamenatz, Man and Society, p 330; p 331; p 330. Here we should 
note that Plamenatz's idea that, for Hume, reforms ought to be 
introduced gradually, slowly, and cautiously, is not inconsistent 
with the claim we have made that he takes Hume to be a non­
conservative reformer. For non-conservative reformism (as I under­
stand it) has nothing to do with the way in which reforms are 
introduced, but with the extent of such reforms. And, as we have 
seen (note 2 above), it is clear that, for Plamenatz, Hume was 
willing to advocate reforms which deviated significantly fron what 
the public was used to, and thus, was a non-conservative reformer.
17. Robertson, "The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic 
Tradition" in Wealth and Virtue, p 169. Like Plamenatz, Robertson 
sees Hume as an advocate of gradual reform. However, as we noted 
above (note 16), the gradual introduction of reforms is consistent 
with non-conservative reformism. Thus, the fact that, for 
Robertson, Hume thinks that reforms ought to be introduced slowly 
should not be seen as evidence that we are wrarong in classifying him
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as one who takes Hume to be a non-conservative reformer.
18. For a change in form of government involves a significant change in 
both the established principles of the polity and the practices, 
beliefs and institutions founded upon such principles. Further, as 
we shall see later (and as Robertson is well aware), for Hume, 
political causes have social and economic effects. Thus, in Hume's 
view, any significant change in a nation's poltical principles must 
bring a similar change in its social and economic realms.
19. Laursen, John Christian, The Politics of Skepticism in the 
Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant, New York: E. J. Brills, 1992, p 
167; p 187 fn. 29 (hereafter cited as Laursen, The Politics of 
Skepticism).
20. Laursen does make a number of brief but important points on the 
subject of "Hume the (non-conservative) reformer", and I shall 
make use of these in this thesis. Unfortunately, Laursen does not 
tell us anything about the status of "Idea of a Perfect Common­
wealth" in Hume's thought. We cannot assume that he thinks that 
this essay should be taken seriously just because he classifies 
Hume as a non-conservative reformer. For, as we shall see, showing 
that this essay ought to be taken seriously involves a lot more 
than merely holding that Hume was a non-conservative reformer.
21. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp 6-9, and Chapters 5 and 6 passim.
22. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 181.
23. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 210; p 211.
24. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 213. As noted above (notes 16 and 
17 above) the slow and careful introduction of reforms is con­
sistent with non-conservative reformism.
25. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 321; p 158 (Whelan's brackets).
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26. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 60; p 61; p 65.
27. Hume scholars do not agree on the question of the authorship of An 
Abstract of a Treatise of Human nature. I agree with those who 
attribute authorship to Hume e.g J. M Keynes and P. Sraffa in their 
edition of the Abstract (An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature: 
A Pamphlet hitherto unknown by David Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1938). See "Introduction", pp v-xxxi; Broome, 
Jeff, "On the Authorship of the Abstract: A Reply to John 0. 
Nelson", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 1992, 95-104; Norton, David 
Fate, "More Evidence that Hume Wrote the Abstract", Hume Studies, 
vol. 19, no. 1, 1993, 217-22.
28. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 122. Whelan thinks that, in the end, 
Hume's "conservative outlook is firmly grounded in his philos­
ophical skepticism" (Order and Artifice, p 322). In Chapter 3 we 
shall see that Hume's scepticism does not have conservative conse­
quences .
Here we should note that in Philosophy and Ideology Miller argues 
in a way similar to Whelan. According to Miller, Hume's scepticism 
involves (among other things), recognising that "it is folly to 
resist natural necessity" (p 36), and that we ought to acquiesce in 
the natural. (For a full statement by Miller of Hume's scepticism 
see pp 34-35). And what is natural? What does nature teach? Among 
other things, that "[m]ost of our beliefs are incapable of being 
justified by reason, but they result fron the natural workings of 
the imagination [i.e custom] and must therefore be taken as given" 
(p 95). Miller goes on to say that, for Hume, some improvement in 
our beliefs is possible, but even here "[w]e are in no way escaping 
from the reign of custom" (p 38). "[S]uch improvement...[does not] 
consist in replacing non-rational judgement by rational judgement. 
Improvement can only take place within the limits set by the 
natural workings of the imagination [i.e custom]" (p 39). Thus,
"[improvement__is limited..by the natural boundaries of the
imagination" (p 77), so that in all areas of life we must "accept 
human judgement at face value, as non-rational and corrigible only 
to a small degree" (p 191). Here Miller is telling us, not only
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how things are for Hume, but also how they ought to be. Improve­
ment ought only to take place on the basis of past experience (and 
therefore is very limited). For the only other alternative to 
irrproving belief on the basis of custom is improvement on the basis 
of a priori reason. But improvement on this basis is destructive 
(p 96). For Hume, then, custom ought to be our guide of life.
As we have seen, both Whelan and Miller hold that, according to 
Hume, our choice of guides is limited to either reason or custom. 
Livingston, in Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, holds the same 
view (though he uses a different language). According to Living­
ston, for Hume "[t]he standards [of reform] must be either abstract 
tenseless standards [grounded in the "autonomy principle" i.e 
reason alone] or concrete narrative standards [grounded in the 
"historical order"]" (p 335). Use of the former standard leads to 
"the violent intrusion of rationalistic metaphysics into politics" 
(p 308), while use of the latter leads to a "conservative theory of 
reform", a theory "squarely in the classical skeptical tradition"
(p 341).
29. Whelan, Order and Artifice, pp 129-30; p 356.
30. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 113-114.
31. According to Whelan (Order and Artifice), Hume ascribes to humans, 
a "basic affinity for...order" (p 356) and regards "stability and
uniformity__as the predominant inclination of our nature" (p 335).
For Hume, Whelan tells us, "order...[is] a fundamental desideratum 
of human life" (p 306). As a result of this desire for stability, 
the Humean individual "experience[s ] uneasiness in the face of any 
abrupt disturbance in regular and habitual patterns of expecta­
tion" (p 157). In other words, given his love of order, the Humean 
individual fears the new and novel.
32. While both Whelan and Miller recognise that the Humean individual's 
desire for a good reputation causes him to conform to the moral and 
political standards of society (Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 177;
Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 115), both fail to see the
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strong conservative consequences of this desire. We shall examine 
these in Chapter 4.
33. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 119.
34. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 114.
35. Berry, Christopher J., Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, The Hauge: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, p 79 (hereafter cited as 
Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature).
36. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 331; p 371.
37. Whelan, Order and Artifice, pp 338-39.
38. Haakonssen, Knud, "The Structure of Hume's Political Theory"
in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by David Fate Norton, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 196; p 197 (here­
after cited as Haakonssen, "The Structure of Hume's Political 
Theory" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume).
39. Norton, David Fate, "An Introduction To Hume's Thought" in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by David Fate Norton,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 24. Norton does not 
tell us what type of reformer he takes Hume to be.
CHAPTER 1
1 . In the "Introduction" we saw that many important Hume scholars to­
day take Hume to be a reformer (either conservative or non-conser­
vative ). Thus, the task of proving that Hume was a reformer is not 
a pressing one. However, I still want to embark upon this task, 
for doing so we will reveal a number of ideas in Hume's thought 
which are important for this thesis as a whole (e.g Hume's 
mitigated scepticism, his experimental method of reasoning, his 
view that reformers ought to pay heed to the natural etc).
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2. According to Whelan, Hume "clearly has positive doctrines to 
advance, doctrines both scientific and moral...Like the other 
prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment, Hume assumes the role 
of a teacher of the public." Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 295.
See also Phillipson, Nicholas, Hume, London: Wiefenfield and 
Nicholson, 1989, p 2; p 9; p 28; p 53; p 55; pp 76-77 (hereafter 
cited as Phillipson, Hume).
3. "[Hume's] concern with questions of style and presentation show 
him to have been interested in being widely heard and correctly 
understood." Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 295.
4. The Advertisement to the Essays is not reprinted in the edition of 
this work used in this thesis. See instead, David Hume: The 
Philosophical Works, edited by T. H Green and T. H Groose, 4 
Volumes, London: Longman, 1882 (reprint, Darmstadt: Scienia Verlag 
Aalen, 1964), vol 3, p 41.
5. Stroud, Barry, Hume, London: Routledge and Kegan, 1977, p 4. See 
also Mackie, John, Hume's Moral Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980, pp 5-6.
6. Again and again, Whelan brings out the prescriptive side of Hume's 
writings. See Whelan, Order and Artifice, Index under "normative 
doctrines (Hume)". I do not always agree with the normative 
prescriptions that Whelan ascribes to Hume.
7. As we shall see later in this thesis, Hume founds moral distinc­
tions upon certain sentiments of human nature. But how can Hume do 
such a thing given that, in his famous "is/ought" passage (T 469- 
70), he himself recognises the invalidity of deriving values from 
facts? Is Hume violateing his own law? No. As Whelan notes, in 
the above mentioned passage "Hume calls into question only the 
logical cogency" of deriving an "ought" fron an "is". He does not 
question "the propriety [of such a derivation] as a considered act 
of philosophical choice....[Hume] deliberately acquiesces for 
practical purposes in what he takes to be his (and other people's)
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most basic and trustworthy feelings and mental dispositions." 
Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 306. See also Kemp, J., Ethical 
Naturalism: Hobbes and Hume, London: Macmillan, 1970, pp 46-47.
8. As suggested by Haakonssen, "The Structure of Hume's Political 
Theory" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, p 183.
9. Given its emphasis on liberty, Haakonssen takes Social Contract­
arianism to be enthusiastic for Hume. Haakonssen, "The Structure of 
Hume's Political Thought" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, p 
183.
Here we should note that, while it is true that for Hume the con­
sequences of enthusiasm are on the whole pernicious, it is also 
true that he welcomes one of its consequences (when not carried to 
extremes), namely, its promotion of liberty. Thus, "the English 
owe the whole freedom of their constitution" to the Puritans (H 4 
146), and, in France today, "the jansenists preserve alive the 
small sparks of the love of liberty" (Essays 79). It is also true 
that, according to Hume, the "fury" of enthusiasm wanes "in a 
little time" (Essays 77).
10. This idea is developed carefully by Whelan, Order and Artifice, 
143-47. See also Immerwahr, John, "Hume on Tranquillizing the 
Passions", Hume Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp 293-314.
11. For a fuller account of this difference see Immerwahr, John, "The 
Anatomist and the Painter: The Continuity of Hume's Treatise and 
Essays", Hume Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1991, pp 1-14, esp. pp 4-6.
12. In Chapter 5 we shall see that the rules of justice play a signifi­
cant role in Hume's thought, and that Hume labels these rules "Laws 
of Nature". These laws, we are told, are uniform and constant at 
all times and under all circumstances, and are founded on human 
nature. Thus, the question of the uniformity and constancy of 
human nature is of great significance for Hume, given, as we shall 
see, the fundamental importance of justice in his thought.
Here we should note that scholars disagree about Hume's position
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regarding the uniformity and constancy of human nature. On the one 
hand, there are those who argue that, while Hume does talk about 
the uniformity of human nature, at the same time he thinks that the 
contents of this nature is diverse and flexible, affected by his­
torical and social circumstances. Thus, Forbes tells us that, for 
Hume, "[t]he universal principles [of human nature] are to be re­
garded as abstractions from the concrete variety of human (=social) 
experience", but that "the content of mind__is various and sup­
plied by social and historical circumstances." (Forbes, Duncan, 
Hume's Philosophical Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, p 119 . Hereafter cited as Forbes, Hume's Philosoph­
ical Politics.) Miller thinks that "Hume saw socially derived 
characteristics as overlaying the basic and uniform traits of human 
nature." According to Miller, while "Hume does... believe that 
there is sane uniformity among human beings...[such as] the same 
underlying moral sentiments...[and] sane similarity in motivation", 
he also thinks that "men are powerfully affected by the manners and 
customs of their age, by their education and social position, and 
by individual differences of temperament." Thus, for Hume, there 
are a variety of "sources of variation in human nature." (Miller, 
Philosophy and Ideology, p 121; pp 102-03). Richard Dees thinks 
that, for Hume, "the structure of human motivations remains the 
same, even when the content of those motivations is quite differ­
ent" Drawing from Wertz, S. K., "Hume, History, and Human Nature", 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 36, 1975, pp 481-96, Dees tells us 
that, for Hume, human nature is uniform only in a "methodological"
sense. That is, for Hume, "we must assume that__[people] have
certain biological needs..[and] certain minimum requirements of 
rationality...But such requirements are rather weak; they do pre­
suppose little content to...[people's] behaviour (Dees, Richard, 
"Hume and the Contexts of Politics", Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 30, 1992, pp 219-42; p 227; p 227).
On the other hand, Berry ascribes a different position to Hume. 
While he thinks that, for Hume, "[the] principles, operations and
springs__in human nature are abstract", he claims that they are
abstract only "in the sense of pertaining regardless of specific 
context", and quickly adds that "this does not mean that what Hume,
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in fact, regards as constant is devoid of content." Rather, after 
drawing up a list of attributes which Hume takes to be constant 
constituents of human nature Berry concludes that "Hume's delinea­
tion of the content, of what is constant in human nature, is exten­
sive and reveals that human nature for him is no mere residual ci­
pher" (Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, p 63; pp 61-62; p 63). 
According to Berry, then, Hume's view is that human nature is uni­
form and constant, not merely in structure, but in content. I 
agree with Berry. Others who ascribe a similar position of "sub- 
stansive uniformity of human nature" to Hume include: Mackie, John 
L., Hume's Moral Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p 
152; Norton, David Fate, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Scep­
tical Metaphysician, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, p 
136n (hereafter cited as Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, 
Sceptical Metaphysician); Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 218 fn. 
23).
13. By "moral subjects" Hume means all those subjects which fall under 
"the science of human nature" (E I 5), that is, "everything dis­
tinctively human" including "human thought, action, feelings, 
perceptions, passions and language." Stroud, Hume, London: Rout- 
ledge and Kegan, 1977, p 2.
CHAPTER 2
1. Thus Hume would not have agreed with the judgement of his friend 
Rousseau that the British constitution is "a model of the proper 
balance of the respective powers." Rousseau, J.J., Lettres Ecrites 
de la Montagne, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin and M. 
Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-69,
Vol. 3, p 874 (my translation).
2. In fact Hume thinks that "a man... without public spirit, or a re­
gard to the community, is deficient in the most material part of 
virtue" (Essays 27).
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3. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 236.
4. While Hume demands that constitutions which embrace the principle
of the division of powers also embrace the principle of the balance 
of powers (checks and controls, so as not to allow any single power 
to swamp the others and rule in its own interest), his friend 
Rousseau does not. Thus, in Social Contract, while Rousseau tells 
us that "one who has authority over men should not have authority 
over laws, [and] one who has authority over laws should also not 
have authority over men." (Rousseau, J. J., On the Social Contract, 
in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy/ translated by Judith Masters and edited by Roger Masters, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 68), the title of Chapter 2, 
Book 2 of that same work announces that "Sovereignty is Indivi- 
sibe", for, as Rousseau says elsewhere: "It is of the essence of
the sovereign power not to be able to be limited: it can do every­
thing, or it is nothing". Rousseau, J.J., Lettres Ecrites de la 
Montagne, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin and M. 
Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-69,
Vol. 3, p 826 (my translation). Of course, like Hume, Rousseau
is aware of the dangers of self-interest in the political realm: 
"[Njothing is more dangerous than the influence of private inter­
ests on public affairs." Rousseau, J. J., On the Social Contract, 
in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by Roger Masters, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 84. However, he still feels 
that it is safe to place absolute power in the hands of the sove­
reign, no doubt because he places sovereignty in the hands of the 
General Will, a will which always has the public interest at heart. 
In contrast, Hume has no device like the General Will, and so de­
mands that when a constitution divides power among several bodies, 
it must also ensure that these bodies check one another. Thus, 
Hume's Perfect Commonwealth unites the principles of the separation 
and balance of powers (see Essays 517-22). As one scholar notes, 
in the Perfect Commonwealth "authority is widely distributed, and 
checks and balances abound." Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p 
267.
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5. Williams, Basil, The Whig Supremacy; 1714-1760, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952, p 27 (hereafter cited as Williams, The Whig Suprema­
cy) .
6. Williams, The Whig Supremacy, p 26.
7. Miller notes: "The mechanism at work here is not explained, but 
one might look for it either in the inbuilt human propensity to 
compare oneself with others - so that each person naturally gener­
ates his own hierarchy of esteem - or in the more instrumental 
consideration that rank is necessary to social stability." Miller, 
Philosophy and Ideology, pp 133-34.
8. Miller stresses this "checking function" of men of high status in 
Hume's thought. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 135-37.
9. "Exact numbers [of the Lords] for 1714, 1719, 1728 and 1759 were 
213, 220, 221, and 214". Williams, The Whig Supremacy, p 22 fn. 1.
10. Williams, The Whig Supremacy, p 24.
11. For a brief but good discussion of this issue see Miller, Philos­
ophy and Ideology, pp 163-67.
12. "Indeed one of Hume's main purposes was to show that the old divi­
sion [between Whigs and Tories] had become irrelevant and should 
be replaced by a straightforward contest between Court and Country 
parties." Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 173.
13. In contrast, Rousseau calls for the elimination of all interest 
groups from society. True, he adds that where this is not possible, 
then "their numbers must be multiplied and their inequality pre­
vented, as was done by Solon, Numa, and Servius." Rousseau, J. J., 
On the Social Contract, in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manu­
script and Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and 
edited by Roger Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, pp 
61-62. However, as his reference to Servius makes clear, what
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Rousseau has in mind here is the creation of parties whose every 
aspect (e.g size, composition, role) is to be completely controlled 
by the legislator's law (p 116). Thus, unlike Hume, Rousseau does 
not think that any good can come from the free competition among 
rival interest groups.
14. According to Hume, philosophers ought to distance themselves fron
partisan political disputes: "It belongs, therefore, to a philos­
opher alone, who is of neither party, to put all the circumstances 
in the scale, and assign to each of them its proper poise and 
influence" (Essays 507).
15. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 167-70. Phillipson, Hume, pp 
76-91.
16. "On the Court side were the king and all those who controlled the
chief institutions through which the power of the State was 
deployed: the Royal Household, the ministries, the armed forces, 
the Church, the 'City'. On the Country side were the elements of 
society who, for one reason or another, resisted the activities of 
the Court: gentlemen who objected to the interference of the Court
in the way they ran their local communities as Justices of Peace; 
provincial business men envious of the privileges of the 'City'; 
dissenters from the doctrines and worship of the Church of England; 
and the freemen of the City of London, a powerful body of radicals 
almost permanently at odds with the financial magnates of the 
'City', and thus usually in opposition to the Court." Williams, E. 
N., The Ancien Regime in Europe: Government and Society in the 
Major States 1648-1789, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1972, p 504.
17. According to Hume, these parties "are the real causes of its [the 
constitution's] permanent life and vigour" (H 5 556), note J).
18. Importantly, this "chief support" (i.e parties of interest) of the 
British constitution will remain in the Perfect Commonwealth 
(though in a much improved form) (Essays 525), thus contributing to
the non-radical introduction of the Perfect Commonwealth into
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Britian. We shall return to this point in Chapter 6.
19. We have already noted that the Perfect Commonwealth will contain 
parties of interest. Now, according to Hume, all governments must 
come to an end (Essays 51), and the Perfect Commonwealth is no 
exception (Essays 528-29). One way, Hume thinks, that his prefer­
red form of government might collapse is if parties of interest are 
removed and, as a result "whimsical and unaccountable factions... 
arise, fron personal favour and enmity" (Essays 529). This indi­
cates that just as parties of interest are "[t]he chief support" of 
the existing British government (Essays 525), they will be a chief 
support of the government of the Perfect Commonwealth too.
20. Taylor, W. L., Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of 
Adam Smith, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965, p 36.
21. For a full discussion of the economic reforms recommended by Hume, 
with emphasis on their progressive nature, see Stewart, Opinion and 
Reform, pp 257ff.
22. Sekora, John, Luxury: The Concept in Western Thought, Eden to 
Smollet, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977, p 155.
23. Hume argues against the common opinion that luxury is "the source
of every corruption in government, and the immediate cause of fac­
tion, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss of liberty" (E II 
181). For an investigation of this common opinion in eighteenth 
century Britain see Sekora, John, Luxury: The Concept in Western 
Thought, Eden to Smollet, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1977, Chapters 2 and 3 passim.
24. On Hume's ideas about the positive consequences of commerce, 
luxury, and manufacturing see, Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp 257- 
74, and Robinson, "The Scottish Enlightenment at the limits of
the Civic Tradition", in Wealth and Virtue, pp 137-78, esp. pp 155—
173. I have benefited fron these discussions.
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25. In contrast to Hume, Rousseau praises man's distant ancestors, 
calling the tribal stage "the best for man", "the happiest and most 
durable epoch", and "the veritable prime of the world", and refer­
ring to Rome as the "model of all free peoples." Rousseau, J. J.,
A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in The First and Second 
Discourses, translated by Roger Masters and Judith Masters, New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, p 151; p 80. At the same time, he 
glorifies Sparta as "a republic of demi-gods rather than men". 
Rousseau, J. J., A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, in The 
First and Second Discourses, translated by Rodger Masters and 
Judith Masters, New York: St. Martins Press, 1964, p 43.
26. Rousseau too talks about the dangers of idleness. See Rousseau, J. 
J., Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre, translated by Allan 
Bloom, in Politics and the Arts, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1968, p 126; and Considerations sur le Gouvernment de 
Pologne, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin and M. Ray­
mond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-69, Vol.
3, pp 957-58. However, it is clear that, for Rousseau, idleness is 
a danger only in the context of civil society. For elsewhere he 
says that "there is no original perversity in the human heart, and
__the first movements of nature are always right." Rousseau, J.
J., Lettre a Christophe de Beaumont, in Oeuvres Completes, edited 
by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque
de la Pleiade, 1959-69, Vol. 4, pp 937-38 (my translation). Now, 
one of these original movements of nature is idleness: "To do
nothing is man's primary and strongest passion after that of self- 
preservation." Rousseau, J. J., Essay on the Origin of Languages, 
in The First and Second Discourses Together with the Replies to 
Critics and Essay on the Origin of Languages, translated by Victor 
Gourevitch, New York: Harper & Row, 1986, p 266n. Given the 
naturalness of idleness and the rightness of the natural, it 
follows that, for Rousseau, idleness is right and good. But since 
he warns us about the dangers of idleness in civil society, Rous­
seau's view must be that idleness is right and good for man only 
outside society. In society men must always be active.
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27. In contrast, Rousseau claims that luxury is "the worst of all evils 
in any state whatever." Rousseau, J. J., A Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality, in The First and Second Discourses, translated by 
Roger Masters and Judith Masters, New York: St Martin's Press,
1964, p 199. Unlike Hume, Rousseau is opposed to luxury, commerce, 
and progress in the arts and sciences. For, as he says in the pre­
face to Narcissus: "All our writers regard the crowning achieve­
ment of our century's politics to be [progress in] the sciences, 
the arts, luxury, commerce, laws, and all the other bonds which,
by tightening the knots of society among men through self-interest, 
place them all in a position of mutual dependence." Rousseau, J. 
J., Narcissus (preface), in The First and Second Discorses Together 
with the Replies to Critics and Essay on the Origin of Languages, 
translated by Victor Courevitch, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, p 
105. But according to Rousseau, all personal dependence (relying, 
using, controlling) is evil: "Dependence on men, since it is with­
out order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave 
are mutually corrupted." Rousseau, J. J., Qnile; or, On Education, 
translated by Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1979, p 85.
28. In contrast, Rousseau argues that "the more [men] come together, 
the more they are corrupted. The infirmities of the body as well 
as the vices of the soul are the unfailing effect of this over 
crowding. Man is, of all the animals, the one who can least live 
in herds... Cities are the abyss of the human species." Rousseau,
J. J., Emile; or, On Education, translated by Allan Bloom, New 
York: Basic Books, 1979, p 469; p 59.
29. According to Hume, "a serious attention to the sciences and liberal 
arts softens and humanizes the temper, and cherishes those fine 
emotions, in which true virtue and honour consists" (Essays 170).
30. As Warner notes, Hume uses the term "public" in two different 
senses. Sometimes he uses it in contrast to the "private" e.g 
Essays 19; Essays 263; Essays 280. Other times, however, by "the 
public" Hume means "the government" e.g Essays 255; Essays 272. 
Warner, Stuart D., "David Hume on the Public Interest", Reason
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Papers, No. 15, Sumner 1990, pp 74-90. See pp 11-IQ. It is clear 
that, here, Hume is using "the public" in the latter sense. Other 
examples of such a use will appear as this section progresses.
31. "But industry, knowledge, and humanity [all of which, as we have 
seen, are intertwined with the growth of luxury and commerce], are 
not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuse their bene­
ficial influence on the public, and render the government as great 
and flourishing as they make individuals happy and prosperous"
(Essays 272). In fact, Hume thinks that "the greatness of the 
sovereign and the happiness of the state are, in a great measure, 
united with regard to trade and manufactures' (Essays 262).
32. Though here we should note that in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" 
Hume tells us that the executive must retain sane arbitrary power 
in order to deal with emergencies: "The protector, the two secret­
aries, the council of state, with any five or more that the senate 
appoints, are possessed, on extraordinary emergencies, of dictac- 
torial power for six months" (Essays 521). Hume's commitment to 
the principle of the absolute rule of law (except during crises) is 
undeniable, though this commitment is not blind: [T]hough some 
inconveniences arise fron the maxim of adhering strictly to law, 
yet the advantages overbalance them, and should render the English 
grateful to the memory of their ancestors, who, after repeated 
contests at last established that noble, though dangerous, 
principle" (H 5 329-30; my emphasis).
33. A point brought out clearly by Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 
121-27.
34. Unlike Hume, Rousseau is revolted by the commercial classes, 
blaming them for Geveva's problems, (Rousseau, J. J., Lettres 
Ecrites de la Montagne, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin 
and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959— 
69, Vol. 3, p 881), and making sure that they do not form the 
foundation of either Corsica or Poland (Rousseau, J. J., Projet de 
Constitution pour la Corse, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B.
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Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la 
Pleiade, 1959-69, Vol. 3, pp 904-05; p 911; pp 919-20; and Consi­
derations sur le Gouvernment de Pologne, in Oeuvres Completes, 
edited by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Biblio­
theque de la Pleiade, 1959-69, Vol. 3, p 1004).
35. Stewart stresses Hume's contempt for the "ancient nobility" and his 
admiration for the "middling rank". Stewart, Opinion and Reform, 
pp 191-92; pp 290-96. Phillipson too notes this admiration, but is 
silent on Hume's attitude towards the established nobility. Phil­
lipson, Hume, p 55.
36. Rousseau too seeks to avoid extremes of wealth and poverty: 
"[T]olerate neither opulent people nor beggers. These two condi­
tions, naturally inseperable, are equally fatal to the common good" 
Rousseau, J. J., On the Social Contract, in On the Social Contract 
with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, translated by Judith 
Masters and edited by Roger Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1978, p 75n.
37. That a well-contrived republic is, in Hume's view, the best form of 
government, will come out clearly in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 3
1. As Stewart, to whom I am much indebted throughout this chapter, 
shows. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp 7-8; p 193; pp 205-06; p 
210; p 215.
2. According to Hume, "we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds fron 
a past repetition" (T 102; T 198).
3. I am indebted here, and elsewhere, to Winters, Barbara, "Hume on 
Reason", Hume Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 1979, pp 20-35.
4. As Stewart notes, when Hume declares custom to be the guide of
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life, all he is doing is "explaining__the origins of all beliefs,
false as well as authentic. The decisive question asks how we can 
distinguish between false and authentic beliefs." Stewart, Opinion 
and Reform, p 209. David Fate Norton stresses that Hume was inter­
ested in getting his readers to thoroughly examine their beliefs. 
Norton, David Hume; Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, 
pp 208-38. In other words, Hume's aim was not to emphasise the 
authority of custom and sentiment over reason and to get us to 
accept the authority of habitual belief as argued by Smith, Norman 
Kemp, The Philosophy of David Hume, London: Macmillan, 1941.
Hume's philosophy was not, what Smith calls, "naturalistic__in
tendency" (p 155).
5. Hume sometimes uses the terms "praise" and "blame" respectively.
6. While Hume tells us that moral judgements have human character and 
motives as their object, he admits that, since we cannot look 
within another mind, we must use "actions as signs or indications 
of certain principles in the mind and temper" (T 477). We commonly 
approve or disapprove of actions (T 477; T 517), but "[i]f any 
action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of scxne 
quality or character" (T 575).
7. For good discussions on the role of reason in Hume's moral thought, 
discussions to which I am indebted, see Whelan, Order and Artifice, 
pp 201-03; and Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp 141-44.
8. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp 205-06.
9. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 338.
10. In fact, Hume's claim about "ultimate ends" occurs in the first 
appendix to the second Enquiry, entitled Concerning Moral 
Sentiment. Here, Hume makes use of the spectator (E II 289).
11. "Hume's rehabilitation of the passions [that is, Hume's discovery 
in Book 1 of the Treatise that unfettered reason leads us to crip-
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pling Pyrrhonism and that salvation comes only by means of nature, 
in the form of the passions; that the passions do not corrupt but 
save and deliver] does not imply that reasoning cannot be powerful 
in forming and reforming morals. But here reasoning means, not de­
monstrative reasoning, but the experimental method of reasoning. 
Hume does not deny the role of moralists and politicians; on the 
contrary he insists on their importance. Provided they accept the 
goals of human nature as the ends to be sought, they can, by the 
experimental method of reasoning, first, help clear away pernicious 
old beliefs, and second, help discover the best means to those 
ends." Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 315. I agree with Stewart 
here on all points except one: I do not think that, for Hume, "the
gaols of human nature" are "the ends to be sought". Rather, I 
think that, for Hume, the goals of human nature, fron the point of 
view of the spectator, ought to be sought.
12. Stephan Buckle correctly notes "sane of Hume's most spectacularly 
non-sceptical views, such as his great optimism about the benefits 
to be secured by the development of commerce, and by the refinement 
of the arts in general. On these subjects, Hume is [very much]... 
removed from a sceptical view...In the economic writings his great 
optimism renders any sceptical tag, even the most mitigated, 
thoroughly inappropriate." Buckle, Stephan, Natural Law and the 
Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 
pp 250-51. Buckle's explanation for this lack of doubt differs 
fron mine.
Given (as we have already seen) that, for Hume, economic, social, 
and political elements are intertwined as causes and effects, it 
follows that, according to Hume, the certainty attainable in the 
economic realm is transmitted to the social and political realms. 
That Hume thinks that certainty is possible in these realms (par­
ticularly the political) is something we have already seen. Thus, 
when Hume tells us things like, "the science of politics affords 
few rules, which will not admit of sane exception" (Essays 477), 
we should not take him (as many have) as telling us that certainty 
in the realm of politics is impossible. Rather, we should take him 
only as being a consistent mitigated sceptic and denying dogmatism
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(see pp 20-23 above).
13. According to Hume, education is founded on custom or repeated 
experience (T 116-17). But given that "[c]ustom m y  lead us into 
sane false comparison of ideas" (T 116), it follows that education 
can (and often does) inculcate false beliefs. Education is 
"frequently contrary to reason" (T 117). Unfortunately "more than
one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind__[are]
owing to education" (T 117).
However, not all education is bad. Hume does think that there is 
such a thing as "good education": "Virtue, which is nothing but a
more enlarged and more cultivated reason, never flourishes to any 
degree...except where a good education becomes general; and where 
men are taught the pernicious consequences of vice, treachery, and 
immorality" (H 1 179-80. See also Essays 54-55). We shall deal 
with the subject of Hume, virtue and "good education" in Chapter 5.
14. If all this is correct, then it is clear that Hume's mitigated 
scepticism does not dictate conservatism as some have suggested 
(see "Introduction" note 28 above). Armed with the experimental 
method of reasoning, the mitigated sceptic is able to attain 
certainty (in the form of proofs) in the realm of human affairs, 
and in this way has the means to abandon pernicious inherited 
beliefs and embrace new, more salutary ones. Experimental 
reasoning enables the mitigated sceptic to move with confidence 
into a new, better future.
15. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 209.
CHAPTER 4
1. While Stewart realises that the conservatism of the Humean
individual causes problems for anyone wanting to talk about "Hume 
the non-conservative reformer" (Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 211; 
p 212; p 213) he fails to analyse and deal with this problem in any 
detail.
NOTES - 287
2. Hume notes: "The mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of
objects, to which it is accustom'd, and naturally prefers them to 
others, which, tho', perhaps, in themselves more valuable, are less 
known to it" (T 355).
3. In the second Enquiry sympathy is no longer a mental mechanism, but 
a basic instinct of "benevolence" or "fellow-feeling" or "humanity" 
by means of which we have a disinterested concern for the happiness 
of others and by means of which we approve of those things that pro­
mote the happiness of others and disapprove of those things that do 
not (E II 219-32; E II 270-75). In this thesis I shall restrict 
myself to the way in which the term "sympathy" is used in the 
Treatise. For, as Whelan notes, this use "is more interesting, 
because more problematic and complex, than the Enquiry's". Whelan, 
Order and Artifice, p 160. For a good discussion of the question 
"What is behind Hume's revision of the role of sympathy?" and, 
generally, of the differences between Hume's moral philosophy in the 
Treatise and the second Enquiry see Capaldi, Nicholas, Hume's Place 
in Moral Philosophy, New York: Peter Lang, 1989, Chapter 7 passim, 
esp. (on the former question) pp 241-48.
4. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 130.
5. See Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 160ff.
6. David Hume, "Dissertation on the Passions", in David Hume: The 
Philosophical Works, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Groose, 4 
Volumes, London: Longman, 1882, (reprint, Darmstadt: Scientia 
Verlag Aalen, 1964), vol. 4, p 152.
7. Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism, p 158; p 165.
8. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 206.
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CHAPTER 5
1. While Stewart seems to be aware of the problem caused by Hume's 
views on justice and allegiance for anyone wanting to argue that 
(a) Hume was a non-conservative reformer, and (b) "Idea of a Per­
fect Commonwealth" ought to be taken seriously (Stewart, Opinion 
and Reform, pp 171-74; pp 215-19; pp 254-55), he fails, I think,
to bring out and properly deal with this problem.
2. According to Wolin, because Hume placed severe limits upon the 
scope of rationalist reason, "[t]he net effect...was, of course, to 
undermine the whole theory of natural law with its immutable values 
discoverable by rationalist inquiry." Wolin, "Hume and Conserva­
tism" in Hume: A Re-evaluation, p 242. Duncan Forbes, however, has 
shown that Hume was able to found his theory of natural law, not on 
rationalist reason, but on the experimental method of reasoning. 
Hume belongs, not to the rationalist tradition of modern natural 
law, but to the empirical tradition. Forbes, Hume1s Philosophical 
Politics, pp 59-90.
3. While Hume does not use the terms "artificial" and "natural" 
virtues outside of the Treatise (in his Letter from a Gentleman, he 
uses these terms when referring to the Treatise), it is clear that 
he retained these concepts throughout his thought. On this point, 
and on the question of why Hume dropped the language of "arti­
ficial" and "natural" virtues, see Whelan, Order and Artifice,
pp 218-19.
4. Hume does not use the term "conjectural history". To my knowledge 
the term was first used by Dugald Stewart. According to this 
method, "when we are unable to ascertain how men have actually con­
ducted themselves upon particular occasions" we look at "the man­
ner they are likely to have proceeded" by investigating "the 
principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their external 
situation." Fran these two elements, "human nature" and "external 
situation", we are able to account for the origins and development 
of law, religion, government, science etc. Dugald Stewart, Account
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of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, in Stewart, Dugald, The 
Collected Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton, Edinburgh: Themas 
Constable & Co., 1858, Vol 10, p 34. As we shall see now, it is 
by means of this method of conjectural history (that is, by 
examining the interaction between human nature and man's situation) 
that Hume sets out to answer the question, "What prompted humans to 
establish rules of justice and allegiance?"
Hume does not use the expressions "economic society" and "commer­
cial society" in this context. However, since, for Hume, the rules 
of justice are meant to facilitate a "mutual exchange and commerce" 
within society (T 514; T 567; E II 195), we are justified in using 
these expressions.
According to Hume, "ability" is improved by "the partition of 
employments" (T 485), or the division of labour. Thus Hume, like 
so many before (and after) him, regards the principle of the 
division of labour as beneficial. His friend Rousseau, however, 
does not. For division of labour is a form of personal dependence, 
and dependence, Rousseau thinks, "since it is without order, en­
genders all the vices" (Rousseau, J. J., Bmile; or, On Education, 
translated by Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1979, p 85) and 
is the cause of social disorder (Rousseau, J. J., A Discourse on 
the Origin of Inequality, in The First and Second Discourses, 
translated by Roger Masters and Judith Masters, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1964 pp 151-52; pp 154-60). Thus, Rousseau's ad­
vice to the Corsicans is to severely limit the division of labour. 
Rousseau, J. J., Projet de Constitution pour la Corse, in Oeuvres 
Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 
Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-69, Vol. 3, p 914; pp 924-25.
Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, pp 74-80.
For a detailed discussion of this point see Miller, Philosophy and 
Ideology, pp 68-71.
A second reason why Hume thinks that people adopt "present pos-
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session", "occupation", "prescription", "accession" and "succes­
sion" as their rules of property distribution is because they 
realise that these rules must be inflexible and exceptionless: "By
the laws of society, this coat, this horse is mine and ought to 
remain perpetually in my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoy­
ment of it: by depriving me on it, you disappoint my expectations" 
(E II 310; E II 304-05). Thus, "[p]ublic utility requires that 
property should be regulated by general inflexible rules" (E II 
305). Hume thinks that it is because rules of property must be 
inflexible that people adopt the five "natural" rules of property 
distribution listed above. For it is only these rules that ensure 
that property will be assigned in a stable and exceptionless 
manner. They do not distribute goods "differently in every par­
ticular case", but "extend to the whole society" inflexibly, with­
out exception (T 502). This is not so with other rules of property 
distribution. For example, if property were distributed on the 
basis of "merit", then, given the "natural obscurity" of this 
quality and the "self-conceit of each individual", we would never 
have a "determinate rule" of property allocation and, as a result, 
"the total dissolution of society must be the immediate conse­
quence" (E II 193). The same would follow if we were to distribute 
property on the basis of need. Thus, "[t]he relation of fitness 
and suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, in 
distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern our­
selves by rules, which are more general in their application, and 
more free from doubt and uncertainty" (T 514).
In general, people ought not to (and in fact do not, as we shall 
see now in the long quote) adopt property rules which are not 
exceptionless, for,
this would produce infinite confusion in human society, 
and that the avidity and partiality of men wou'd quickly 
bring disorder into the world, if not restrain'd by sane 
general and inflexible principles. 'Twas, therefore, 
with a view to this inconvenience, that men have estab­
lish'd those principles [for the distribution of proper­
ty mentioned above], and have agreed to restrain them­
selves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite
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and favour, and by particular views of private or public 
interest (T 532).
We have seen that, according to Hume, people are willing to abide 
by the rules of property stabilisation on the condition that others 
do the same. People require the "expectation that others are to 
perform alike" before they refrain from violating the property of 
others. This expectation, as we saw, is founded on repeated 
experience or custom. Clearly, the fact that the rules of property 
adopted by people are exceptionless helps strengthen this custom 
and, therefore, this expectation.
So, according to Hume, people adopt the five rules of property 
mentioned above because (a) they seem natural to them and can be 
embraced without the need for contracts and promises, and (b) 
because they are inflexible, distributing goods without "spite and 
favour". It is for these reasons, also, that Hume himself recom­
mends these rules (in contrast to rules founded on merit, need 
etc) as the rules of property distribution that ought to be 
embraced by society.
Finally, we should note that Hume's demand that the rules of 
property be exceptionless is linked intimately to his view that it 
is not the case that every single act of justice is beneficial. We 
have noted that, for Hume, justice (like all the artificial vir­
tues) is approved of because of its utility. But from where does 
this utility arise? Not from every single act of justice, for we 
often find that "a single act of justice" is opposed to "the public
good"or to "humanity" (T 579). "[I]t is impossible for__[the
rules of justice] to prevent all particular hardships, or make 
beneficial consequences result from every individual case" (E II 
305). However, while individual acts of justice are not always in 
harmony with the public good, the "whole plan or scheme" of justice 
is (E II 305), and it is fron this "whole plan or scheme" that the 
utility of justice arises. Thus, "however single acts of justice 
may be contrary, either to private or public interest, 'tis certain 
that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed 
absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the 
well-being of every individual" (T 497). Given that the utility 
of justice is founded on the system of justice as a whole, rather
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than on the individual acts of justice, it follows that, if this 
system is to yield its beneficial consequences, then "[p ]roperty 
must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules.
9. Whelan emphasises this educative role of the politician. Whelan, 
Order and Artifice, pp 250-93. I am indebted to this discussion. 
However, I do at times deviate from it significantly.
10. Here we should recall Hume's view noted in Chapter 3 that moral 
distinctions are founded on sentiments common to all humans.
11. Rousseau is one of those who argues that virtue is an artificial 
human creation: "[Positive] [l]aw comes before justice and not 
justice before [positive] law." Rousseau, J. J., Geneva Manu­
script , in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and 
Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by 
Roger Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 191. Hume 
would disagree, given, as we have seen, his view that justice can 
exist in a small, pre-governmental society. According to Rousseau, 
the state produces "a remarkable change in man, by substituting 
justice for instinct in his behavior and giving his actions the 
morality they previously lacked." Rousseau, J. J., On the Social 
Contract, in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and 
Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by Roger 
Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 55. Hume, no doubt, 
would agree that the state produces an important change in man in 
the area of virtue (as our discussion so far makes clear). However, 
the change does not involve the complete invention of virtue (as 
Rousseau thinks), but instead the encouragement and guidance of 
sentiments which are natural to man. While the state, in Hume's 
view, is responsible for the moral status of certain types of 
behaviour, it does not invent moral distinctions.
12. Rousseau agrees, calling education "certainly the State's most 
important business." Rousseau, J. J., Discourse on Political 
Economy, in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and
Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by Roger
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Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 223. However, it is 
clear that Hume and Rousseau would disagree about the object of 
this education by the state. See note 11 above.
13. For Hume, then, the politician brings order and virtue into
political society, not by means of doctrines and books, but by 
properly arranging the laws and institutions of that political 
society. Rousseau agrees. See Rousseau, J. J., Projet de Constitu­
tion pour la Corse, in Oeuvres Completes, edited by B. Gagnebin 
and M. Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade,
1959-69, Vol. 3, p 948.
We should also note that this quote indicates that, for Hume, 
a nation's constitution ought to be more than a mere means for the 
regulation of subjects' external, physical behaviour. Instead, it 
ought to be an instrument for the transformation (improvement) of 
human nature. This is why Hume thinks that "legislators and 
founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men", 
and why he disagrees with the ancients for having "made gods of all 
the inventors of useful arts", but merely "dignif[ied] legislators 
...only with the appellation of demigods and heroes" (Essays 55). 
The legislator's task is more glorious, because more important, 
than the inventor's (or anyone else's for that matter).
14. Elsewhere, Hume declares that, "[e ]ducation, custom, and example, 
have a mighty influence in turning the mind" (Essays 270). Norton 
and Laursen, both of whom, as we saw in the "Introduction", take 
Hume to be a reformer, note Hume's talk of the use of habit as a
a way of achieving reform. Norton, David Fate, "An Introduction 
to Hume's Thought", in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by 
David Fate Norton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 
24; Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism, pp 164-65.
15. See Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 86-9.
16. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 218.
17. "Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society.
NOTES - 294
Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also 
removes the natural obligation to obedience. The moral obligation 
is founded on the natural, and therefore must cease where that 
ceases" (T 552-53). Hume notes that, while "[f]ew persons carry on 
this [i.e the above] train of reasoning" (T 552), still "'tis 
certain, that all men have an implicit notion of it, and are 
sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account 
of public interest" (T 553). Thus, for Hume, the above way of 
reasoning, is both the way people do in fact reason, and the way 
they ought to reason.
Miller downgrades the role of interest in Hume's theory of 
allegiance. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 89-98. Stewart, 
on the other hand, emphasises this element. Stewart, Opinion and 
Reform, pp 172-74; p 255.
18. Thus, it seems that, for Hume, the principle of self-preservation 
has, not only a descriptive character, but also a prescriptive one. 
The same seems to be true of Rousseau: "Our first duties are to 
ourselves; our primary sentiments are centered on ourselves; all 
our natural movements relate in the first instance to our preserva­
tion." Rousseau, J. J., Emile; or, On Education, translated by 
Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1979, p 97 (my emphases).
19. As noted by Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 6; p 255.
CHAPTER 6
1. In fact, this detailed discussion will bring out a point which is 
of great significance for this thesis as a whole, namely, that, for 
Hume, well-contrived republicanism is the best form of government. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, same scholars deny this claim 
and hold that, in Hume's view, the best form of government is ab­
solute "civilized" monarchy. But if this is so, then Hume could 
not have been serious about his own well-contrived republic. Thus, 
it is important for us to show that, for Hume, well-contrived 
republicanism is the best form of government. This will come out
NOTES - 295
in the following discussion of Hume's views of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various forms of government he distinguishes. 
Here I should note that in this discussion I have benefited fron 
the following works: Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, pp 142-162;
Robertson, "The Scottish Enlightenment and the Civic Tradition" in 
Wealth and Virtue, pp 161-69; Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 171; 
pp 233-39.
2. Hume thinks that Sweden is also ruled by a limited monarchy (Essays 
647, note j). However, he tells us nothing about the Swedish 
limited monarchy.
3. In contrast, Rousseau condemns representative democracy. According 
to him, only direct democracy will do. Rousseau, J. J., On the 
Social Contract, in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript 
and Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by 
Roger Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, pp 101-04.
4. As Stewart notes, such a situation will exist in Hume's well-
contrived republic: "Hume's ideal society is not one ruled by a
small aristocracy, but one in which many citizens, ideally most 
citizens, are in the middle station. It is these people - thought­
ful, competent, balanced, moderate people - not monarchs and 
nobles, who are to have political power in his ideal commonwealth." 
Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 298.
5. As we have seen, in the counties, voting was restricted to those
who met the forty-shilling freehold qualification. But in the 271 
boroughs "there was a multiplicity of franchises. Burgages, or 
pieces of property, conferred the right to vote on their propri­
etors or tenants in sane fourty-one__Only the members of corpora­
tions were allowed to vote in ninteen__There were a hundred where
the freemen voted. In the remaining fifty-five apart fron the Uni­
versities of Cambridge and Oxford, the franchise rested on sane
kind of residential qualification__In most boroughs__ various
restrictions were imposed. The least restrictive was the provision 
that inhabitants should be householders...Then came the boroughs
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where men had to be self-sufficient and not in receipt of alms or 
charity...Finally there were the boroughs where the householders 
had actually to be paying church and poor rates, local taxes known
as scot and lot__If the electorate was not qualified by universal
manhood suffrage, neither was it distributed into equal electoral 
districts." Speck, W. A., Stability and Strife. England 1714—
1760, London: Edward Arnold, 1977, pp 16-17.
6. However, Hume notes: "[T]hough the king has a negative in framing
laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that 
whatever is voted by the two houses, is always sure to pass into a 
law, and the royal assent is little better than a form" (Essays 
44).
7. "Let all freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the county, and all 
householders worth 500 pounds in the town parishes, meet annually 
in the parish church, and chuse, by ballot, some freeholder of the 
county as their member, whom we shall call the county representa­
tive" (Essays 516). Thus, the voting qualifications of the Per­
fect Commonwealth will be very different from those of contemporary 
Britain. We should also note that, unlike in Britain (see note 5 
above, final sentence) the Perfect Commonwealth will be divided 
into equal electoral districts. Thus, "[t]he first year in every 
century is set apart for correcting all inequalities, which time 
may have produced in the representatives" (Essays 522).
8. For surely Hume would not have constructed a form of government 
which did not allow (what he considers to be) the laws of nature to 
be fully realised.
9. Though, if what we said in Chapter 5 is correct, then, even if 
Britain's existing rules of justice were not close to the laws of 
nature (as uncovered by Hume), and the introduction of the Perfect 
Commonwealth into Britain did require the complete uprooting of 
that nation's existing rules of jutice and their replacement by the 
new, natural rules of justice, still no problem would arise. See 
pp 168-174 above.
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10. Harrington, James, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in The Commonwealth
of Oceana and A System of Politics, edited by J. G. A Pocock, Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp 100-01.
11. Though, as we saw in Chapter 5, Hume does think that "natural 
avidity" ought to be controlled and redirected by the rules of 
property. But, as we also saw, Hume is convinced that this re­
direction does not violate human nature.
12. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 342.
13. Whelan, Order and Artifice, p 342.
CHAPTER 7
1. Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, p 89.
2. Here we should note that Hume's condemnation of commonwealths which
are "perfect and immortal" occurs during a reference to Harring­
ton's Oceana. According to Harrington, not only is is his model of 
government perfect, but also immortal. Harrington, James, The 
Commonwealth of Oceana, in The Commonwealth of Oceana and A 
System of Politics, edited by J. G. A Pocock, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992, pp 217f.
3. As noted by Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 282 fn. 38.
4. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 168; p 182; p 183; my 
emphases.
5. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 182.
6. Here we should note that the letter is damaged. Where Greig has 
"[Revolution" (L II 306), Stewart has "[Constit]ution" (Stewart, 
Opinion and Reform, p 283 fn. 38). I follow Stewart.
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7. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 183.
8. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 183.
9. As Eugene Miller notes: "Hume revised his essays continually
throughout his life-time, and there are many significant differ­
ences between earlier editions of the essay and the 1777 edition, 
which was corrected by Hume shortly before his death" (Essays 601).
10. See Eugene Miller's notes on these revisions. Essays 647.
11. And here we should note that Hume left open the possibility of a
large republican state as early as 1742: "To balance a large
state or society, whether monarchical or republican, on general 
laws, is a work of so great difficulty" (Essays 124; my emphases).
12. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 182.
13. Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p 283 fn. 38.
14. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158.
15. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158.
16. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158.
17. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158.
18. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158.
19. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 158-59.
20. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 159.
21. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p 168.
22. According to Miller, for Hume, "a republic would be the best solu-
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tion." Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 159.
23. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 161.
24. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 159.
25. Miller, Philosophy and Ideology, p 161.
26. Phillipson, Hume, pp 48-50.
27. Phillipson, Hume, pp 59-65.
28. Phillipson, Hume, 64-5.
29. Phillipson goes so far as to say that, for Hume, absolute 
"civilized" monarchy is "natural". Phillipson, Hume, p 59. But this 
is wrong. Recalling our discussion in Chapter 6, how can a form of 
government which (a) does not ensure the premotion of commerce (b) 
does not ensure equality of property (in Hume's sense) (c ) leaves 
open the possibility that the ruler will use his subjects in order 
to advance "the greatness of the state", be natural for Hume? On 
the basis of what was said in Chapter 6, it seems that, for Hume, 
the only 'natural' form of government is free government, especial­
ly well-contrived republicanism.
30. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, p 315.
31. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, p 315.
32. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, p 315.
33. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p 268.
34. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p 267.
35. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p 268.
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CHAPTER 8
1. Unfortunately, no scholar who takes "Idea of a Perfect Cannon- 
wealth" seriously, gives us a detailed account of how the Perfect 
Commonwealth will cane into being.
2. Hume's talk of the "wise politician" is a good indication that, 
like so many philosophers before him, Hume demands the union of 
wisdom and political power. This also came out in Chapter 2 where 
we noted (a) Hume's demand that the existing property qualifica­
tion for those allowed to vote in county elections in Britain
be raised because current electors lack education (see pp 44-45 
above), (b ) his demand that there should be a change in the type 
of people sitting in the House of Lords (see p 51 above), and (c) 
his praise of the middle rank as the only group capable of 
attaining wisdom and knowledge (see p 84 above). His friend 
Rousseau also calls for the union of wisdom and power: "So long as 
power is alone on the one side, intellect and wisdom alone on the 
other, the people will continue to be vile, corrupt and unhappy." 
Rousseau, J. J., A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, in The First 
and Second Discourses, translated by Roger Masters and Judith 
Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, p 64.
3. As Miller's notes indicate, the passage quoted above fron Essays 
604-05 was dropped by Hume after 1768 and did not appear in the 
final 1777 edition of the Essays. Given this, it might seem that 
Hume abandoned the idea that people ought to be guided rationally, 
without the use of brutal force, as if they were beasts. However, 
as I have indicated, at Essays 477, Hume condemns reforms which are 
introduced in an "imperious" fashion, and he retained this idea in 
all editions of the Essays. Given this, we can say that, while 
Hume did withdraw Essays 604-05 from his work, he never abandoned 
the idea expressed therein.
4. Here we should recall Hume's idea that "example" is one of the 
things that has "a mighty influence in turning the mind" (Essays
270), and that there is an "imitation of superiors" by "the people
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(Essays 207).
5. According to Whelan, Hume "does allow (in apparent seriousness) 
that unusual circumstances might someday permit an effort to
realize [the Perfect Commonwealth]__'in some distant part of the
world'." Whelan, Order and Artifice, pp 342-43. I find nothing 
"apparent" about Hume's seriousness.
6. Rousseau, J. J., On the Social Contract, in On the Social Contract 
with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, translated by Judith 
Masters and edited by Roger Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1978, p 68.
7. According to Rousseau, "good social institutions are those that 
best know how to denature man." Rousseau, J. J., Bnile; or, On 
Education, translated by Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1979, 
p 40. Hume disagrees. Good institutions are those that respect 
the course of nature. As we saw in Chapter 6, the Perfect Common­
wealth has such institutions. Regardless of the way in which the 
Perfect Commonwealth is erected (either by means of wise 
politicians improving the existing constitution, or by means of 
society's leaders leading the people into rebellion against an 
existing pernicious government, or by means of such leaders 
establishing an independent settlement in sane distant land), those 
responsible for its erection will respect, build, and improve upon 
what has been provided for by "wise nature".
8. Here, it seems, Hume is giving us an empirical test for determining
the best form of government: That form of government which best
contributes to population growth is the best. And which form of 
government has such an effect, according to Hume? Republicanism. 
Thus, Hume thinks that the fact that in "SWISSERLAND...and HOLLAND 
__the numbers of people__ abound__ prove[s] sufficiently the ad­
vantages of their [republican] political institutions" (Essays 
403). Thus, here we have more evidence, if more were needed, that, 
for Hume, republicanism is to to be preferred over all other types 
of government. Here, it is interesting to note that Rousseau gives
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us an identical empirical test: "All other things being equal, the
government under which__the citizens populate and multyply the
most is infallibly the best." Rousseau, J. J., On the Social 
Contract, in On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and 
Political Economy, translated by Judith Masters and edited by Roger 
Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, p 96. Rousseau thinks 
that only his legitimate republic outlined in the Social Contract 
will have a positive effect upon population growth.
9. Here, two points should be made: (a) We noted earlier (p 258 above) 
that, while Hume talks about people belonging to inferior and 
superior ranks, he also talks about "the natural equality of man­
kind" (Essays 185). In other words, while society distinguishes 
people into inferiors and superiors, people are still by nature 
equal. Now, however, he tells that sane humans are naturally 
inferior to others. I cannot see how these two positions can be 
brought into harmony, (b) we have already noted Hume's view that
"the emulation, which naturally arises among__neighbouring
nations" is a "source of improvement" (Essays 119). Thus we should 
ask whether Hume would allow that the "inferiors" living outside 
the walls of the Perfect Corrmonwealth might be "improved" as a 
result of emulating those living inside these walls. Probably not, 
for he believes that the "inferiority" of the outsiders is natural. 
They can never be improved.
10. In addition to Great Britain, Holland, and Venice, the following
states also enjoy free governments (according to Hume): Sweden
(ruled by a limited monarchy (Essays 647 note j), republican 
Switzerland (Essays 127; Essays 403), republican Genoa (Essays 92), 
and the free city of Hamburg (Essays 92).
11. We have already noted Hume's view that small states naturally move
towards free government (Essays 119; Essays 527). Given, as we 
have also already noted, Hume's approval of the movements of 
nature, it follows that this "mimicry" by small states of "greater 
monarchies" (which Hume clearly condemns) must have caused Hume 
great distress. Rousseau, too, condemns such mimicry: "[The large
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monarchies of Europe] shine with that brilliance which dazzles most 
eyes [the eyes of the surrounding, smaller states], the childish 
and fatal taste for which is the most mortal enemy of happiness and 
freedom." Rousseau, J. J., A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 
in The First and Second Discourses, translated by Roger Masters and
Judith Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, p 90.
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